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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

ALGIERS PAPER HITS MOROCCAN DIPLOMATIC BREAK WITH 'FRONT' COUNTRIES

LD051205 Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 23 Apr 80 p 1

[Article by Tayeb Belghiche: "The Eternal Headlong Rush"]

[Text] Incapable of facing up to the consequences of its adventurist policy, the Rabat regime has finally embarked on a headlong rush with no way out. Applying the famous "Hallstein doctrine," albeit tardily and selectively—proof of a certain confusion—it has recently broken off diplomatic relations with Cuba and Libya because those two countries have recognized the Sahara Democratic Arab Republic [SDAR], the former on 21 January last and the latter in keeping with a decision of the latest Arab resistance front "summit" in Tripoli. It threatens to do the same to Syria, which also recognized the SDAR in keeping with the front's decisions, and to leave the OAU if the latter admits the young Saharan Republic at its next "summit" in Freetown (Sierra Leone).

Why this ambiguous attitude from the Moroccan monarchy toward Syria, and intolerable pressure on the PLO? Rabat is clearly seeking and hoping for the dismemberment of the resistance front, which is the main organized force for Arab national liberation from the Mashrig to the Maghreb. Undoubtedly it hopes to force the front members to abandon their basic principles. Moroccan policy is not inordinately surprising. It even corresponds to a pitiless way of thinking—that of imperialism and the other forces which dream of keeping the Arab nation politically and economically subservient. King Hassan II has already worked toward this by clearing the ground for the Camp David accords, which themselves are at the root of the Arab resistance front's creation. Is it not significant that former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, a notorious Zionist, stated when in Rabat on Monday on being elected associate member of the Moroccan Royal Academy, that "the United States must take very seriously the threat hanging over Morocco after the recent decisions taken by the Arab Steadfastness Front in Tripoli"? Coming from such a man, this statement explains very well the role assumed by the Moroccan monarchy within imperialism's global strategy, both in the Arab world and in Africa—that same Africa where it won fame by its military

expeditions "in defense of the free world and the West." These are the favorite slogans of the Zionist and South African leaders, the principal deputy gendarmes of the Middle East and the African continent.

This is not a fortuitous coincidence: The Rabat monarchy is wielding its blackmail and threats over Africa, too, because the OAU refuses to stand surety for expansionism and recognizes the Saharan people's right to self-determination and independence. However, the empty chair policy which has become Moroccan diplomacy's current practice has failed to influence the logical and normal development of events.

Having suffered setbacks at the United Nations, the OAU and within the non-aligned movement, Rabat will not succeed in dividing the Arab resistance front, which is guided by clear principles in keeping with the aspirations of the Arab masses whose decisions are irreversible.

By refusing to face reality, it believes that it can escape the inevitable. It is merely isolating itself increasingly every day on the international stage. This is the price paid by all regimes which deviate from the path of legality and justice.

CSO: 4400

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

ARAB LEAGUE CHIEF CHEDLI KLIBI INTERVIEWED ON PALESTINE, OTHER ISSUES

LD060917 Tunis L'ACTION in French 27 Apr 80 p 4

[L'ACTION interview with Arab League Secretary General Chedli Klibi: "Seven Questions for Mr Chedli Klibi"--date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] Question: Mr Secretary General, what do you think of the last Tripoli summit? At this time of struggle against the common enemy is there not a danger of a split among Arab countries and is that not likely to damage the Arab cause?

Answer: That is one way of looking at things. However, it is important to consider that there can be other ways. A meeting between a limited number of Arab states devoted to the economic, social, informational or even political sphere can also constitute an effort to unite the Arab states' viewpoints in a gradual way. I do not therefore entirely share your rather pessimistic view that any meeting which is not plenary, which is not attended by all Arab countries would have a negative effect on Arab solidarity. I think there can be another aspect to this question.

Nonetheless, I personally hope that the platform drawn up by the Baghdad summit and then confirmed and enriched by the Tunis summit--a platform which brings the Arab countries closer together and urges them to cooperate--might constantly serve as a point of reference to support their consensus, in other words their unanimous agreement on the objectives they have set and the means of attaining them.

Question: What is the present state of Euro-Arab dialogue, Mr Secretary General?

Answer: It was making relatively good progress recently since we had established contact with our European friends at various levels and on various occasions. As you know I have had meetings with President Giscard d'Estaing and with the Italian prime minister. I have also had contacts with EC officials. It therefore seemed as if things were moving in a direction very

favorable to the resumption of Euro-Arab dialogue, especially after the French president's recent statements of the Middle East and the Palestinian problem in particular, stressing, as you know, the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.

We therefore thought that these statements, once accepted and backed by the other European countries, could create an atmosphere favorable to the resumption of Euro-Arab dialogue.

However just a few days ago we were very surprised to learn of a passage in Italian Prime Minister Cossiga's investiture speech in which we seemed to detect a hesitation and even a step backwards in relation to the stance taken by President Giscard d'Estaing and immediately afterwards by all the community countries. We are wondering whether this is a reversal, a fundamental change or simply a statement intended to give satisfaction to certain political factions on which the government depends?

We are asking these questions with some anxiety and are going to see whether our worries are founded.

Question: Could you assess the Arab League's achievements since your election?

Answer: It is a little early to make any assessments after 8 months.

What I can say without either false modesty or presumption is that all observers and even the Arab leaders agree that there is now new life [in the league] and a new approach to the problems. Many note the league's dynamism since its transfer to Tunis.

Our friends in the world, both in Africa, Asia and in Europe also stress the positive, specific approach to problems and in any case the league's more open attitude to the outside world. I think that, without making any overall assessment, that constitutes a positive aspect of our activity.

Question: Are there any particular difficulties which you have had to face Mr Secretary General?

Answer: There have been many particular and general difficulties and I do not know where to begin. These are numerous everyday problems. Before I took up my present post I did not think that the problems would be so great, so numerous and so persistent. However, my determination has not wavered. When I accepted this post I was absolutely determined to tackle all difficulties and problems and to try to do something. My determination is still the same. As long as I am convinced that despite everything I can achieve something I will continue to work and act with the same conviction.

Question: For the past 35 years the league has been mainly concerned with the Palestinian problem. Now that it has come of age it hopes to near the settlement of this problem soon. What will the league's main concern be then?

Answer: Yes, the league has been concerned too long and too inefficiently with this unfortunate Palestinian problem. Too long because the league has done nothing else for 35 years. Inefficiently because in these 35 years it has not done a great deal. It has been powerless and sometimes clumsy and has helped to aggravate the problem.

I think, therefore, that the past teaches us an important lesson, namely that the Palestinian problem is primarily the Palestinian people's problem. We must all accept that it is up to the Palestinian people to fight--and that is now accepted--but also that it is up to them to determine their future and choose their options. It is not possible for the Palestinian problem to be defended only by Arab states and for the Palestinian people to merely watch battles between regular armies as was the case for a long time. The Palestinian problem is a problem of colonization and liberation, and should therefore form the object of a struggle using all available means and waged by the Palestinian people themselves but supported by the Arab states and peoples morally, politically and materially. We must also accept that they should have first say when it comes to choosing solutions. It is not up to the Arab states to dictate anything regarding the Palestinian people's self-determination. These are the two important things which we can learn from the past.

I believe we are now approaching a new phase which, I hope, will be constructive and will lead, perhaps quickly, to a solution which is fair, peaceful and acceptable to the Palestinian people. If this is the case we will certainly be pleased but do not think that it will put the league out of a job. The league was not formed because of the Palestinian problem or the state of crisis created by that problem. It has a different vocation: first to organize cooperation in all spheres among Arab states and especially solidarity among them in an effective and realistic way and perhaps to draw up major political options. However these political options can only be envisaged in a very long-term context while the real short-term link between states is the economy, social matters, culture and education. It is that which we will regard as essential, priority task for the coming years.

Question: You will be visiting Germany soon and you have also accepted an invitation to the USSR. Is this the first visit to the Soviet Union by an Arab League secretary general?

Answer: I am visiting Germany to meet with Chancellor Schmidt and Foreign Minister Genscher. I think these talks will be very important for relations between Arab states and European states and for exchanging views on the Middle East problem and the Palestinian problem.

It is true that I have accepted the invitation made to me by the Soviet Government for a visit to the USSR and I think that I will make this visit during the summer. This is a very important visit because of the importance of relations between the Soviet Union and the Arab states.

You know that the USSR attaches great importance to the Palestinian cause, that it also supports and aids a number of Arab states and that its economic and cultural cooperation with the whole Arab world is excellent. These are all reasons for the league secretary general to make this visit. I do not know whether it is the first visit of its kind but I am sure that this visit will have a constructive effect on relations of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Arab world.

Question: You have had a meeting with President Bourguiba, Mr Kl'bi. What did he say to you?

Answer: I have regular meetings with President Bourguiba and he has just done me the honor of granting me an audience as have many other Arab heads of state who receive me regularly. For instance, I have met with President Hafez al-Asad more than three times. I have met with President Saddam Husayn twice and I have also had the honor to be received twice by King Husayn of Jordan, to mention but a few. It is natural for the head of state of the host country housing the league's headquarters to receive that organization's secretary general regularly too. This should not occasion surprise. However, it is true that aside from relations connected with protocol I cannot forget the personal ties I have with the supreme combattant [that is, Bourguiba] who honors me with his concern and respect. You are right to want to know what we discussed. Our talks were of a political nature and related to the situation in the Arab countries. President Bourguiba always informs me of his ideas which, as you know are always characterized by great wisdom.

C: 4400

KUWAIT, OTHER STATES SEEK TO INCREASE OIL SHIPPING CONTROL

Paris **AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO** in English 21 Apr 80 p 4

[Text]

Kuwait has confirmed its position in the forefront of OPEC states trying to increase their control over all aspects of their oil industries by announcing changes in the structure of management of its state oil companies; these are designed to push forward a long-term plan to ship half of the country's oil exports in Kuwaiti-owned tankers.

The official Kuwait news agency (KUNA) last week said that the changes would mean tighter links between the marketing and transport divisions of the Kuwait National Petroleum Co, Kuwait Oil Co and the Kuwait Oil Transportation Co; these three companies were merged in January in the National Petroleum Organisation in a move to control all oil operations in the country. A fourth company under the Petroleum Organisation's umbrella, Kuwait Petrochemicals Co, is not affected.

These follow moves towards Kuwait's goal of doubling its refining capacity to 750,000 b/d, half of the country's current crude output (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, February 18).

It is one of the objectives of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) that at least half of every country's exports should be transported by ships owned or chartered by the country in question. Needless to say, very few developing countries are anywhere near that target, although China, by spending about \$1 billion, has added 228 ships to its merchant fleet over the past three years and now owns more than 680 deep sea vessels with a total tonnage of more than over 10 million dwt tonnes.

The result is that wholly-owned Chinese ships carry between 33 and 40 per cent of the nation's exports, while vessels sailing from Hong Kong under flags of convenience make the total controlled by China over 50 per cent.

By comparison, the total gross tonnage of all Arab countries is barely 8 million tonnes. As the accompanying table shows, Kuwait has the largest single fleet - measured in tonnage - followed by Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Libya.

The Arab Fleet, July 1978
(Numbers of vessels and aggregate deadweight tonnage)

		Tankers		General cargo		Gas Carriers		Bulk carriers		Total
Kuwait	17	1,200,000	89	897,000	1	44,000	2	13,000	109	2,154,000
Iraq	29	1,100,000	15	81,000	—	—	—	—	44	1,181,000
Saudi Arabia	47	1,000,000	43	106,000	—	—	2	64,000	92	1,170,000
Algeria	22	643,000	38	175,000	4	199,000	6	81,000	70	1,098,000
Libya	16*	799,000	19	40,000	—	—	—	—	45	839,000
Egypt	29	131,000	70	220,000	—	—	—	—	99	351,000
Morocco	14**	158,000	32	91,000	2	6,400	3	59,000	51	314,400
Lebanon	2***	23,000	173	224,000	—	—	—	—	175	247,000
Others	21	196,000	132	225,000	2	1,000	2	20,000	157	442,000
Total	197	5,250,000	611	2,059,000	9	250,400	15	237,000	842	7,796,400

*includes one chemical tanker

** includes seven chemical tankers

*** includes residual flag of convenience vessels

Source: Lloyd's Register of Shipping

BRIEFS

MONETARY FUND CAPITAL INCREASE--The Arab Monetary Fund is to raise its authorised capital by roughly \$50 million to \$1.1 billion as the result of an increased commitment by Iraq. The decision to increase the Fund's capital was taken at a board meeting in Abu Dhabi last week at which the AMF's annual report for 1979 was presented. The report indicated that the AMF's paid-up capital had almost doubled last year, from \$261 million in 1978 to \$463 million. Loans made by the Fund total \$69 million, with two-thirds of these in the form of automatic borrowings to which a member state is entitled. Sudan has been the biggest borrower, but the AMF has also lent money to Morocco, Mauritania and Egypt, which has been suspended from the Fund following the Egypto-Israeli peace treaty. Egypt was still servicing its \$16 million loan to the AMF, according to a report from the Gulf, which quoted Fund officials as saying that a further loan to Mauritania is being considered. [Text] (Paris AB-BAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 21 Apr 80 p 12)

CSO: 4820

WESTERN MEDIA ATTACKED FOR 'DISSEMINATION OF LIES'

Kabul HAQIQAT-E ENQELAB-E SAWR in Dari 31 Mar 80 p 2

/Article: "Once Again, the Dissemination of Lies"/

/Text/ The Western mass media, which one can consider to be the hireling loudspeakers and town criers of monstrous exploitative monopolies, always have one unholy duty, and that is to proceed to fabricate, weave lies and even sometimes spin myths regarding phenomena in countries which have raised the banner of struggle for freedom and salvation from the oppression of Western colonialism.

Like immense parasites, through the unholy duty which has been given to them by their masters, a little minority of exploiters from the dross of society, the Western mass media, which are nourished by the enormous money which has been brought by windfall from the exploitation of colonized countries, and even the people of their own countries, have the function of pursuing delirious, hysterical propaganda, through all the ways and means which have been placed at their disposal, wherever on our planet people decide to shake the yoke of slavery and subservience off their shoulders, and they try to hide the facts behind the dark cloud of fabrication of falsehoods and weaving of myths.

When they cannot engage in twisting and making events seem the opposite of what they are, since their filthy face has now come out from behind the mask of "veracity of news" and "impartiality," the mass media of the Western bourgeoisie try to weave myths from their arsenal of news and in this manner deceive people's thinking, even if only for a short time.

The people of our country, following the glorious April revolution, especially after the triumphant uprising of 27 December, which shattered the glass of the biggest cowardly demonic plan to cast Afghanistan into the circle of imperialism with the stone of despair, have come under intense heavy bombardment from the fabrication of Western mass media lies, and now, on their own skins and through their own ears, realize that the so-called "impartial" news of these media is without content and incorrect.

A new example of the myth-making of the arsenal of France Presse is another outrageous lie based on the claim that so-called disturbances took place in the cities of Kabul and Kandahar on 29 March.

It is a source of amazement that the news-fabricating planners in the West have even lost their sick minds and have abandoned the reins of the minimum preservation of "sanctity of reporting." Our people, especially the noble residents of Kabul and Kandahar, who are greeting the most joyous days of spring these days, and whose trees of hope are budding after the bitter cold had kept them without leaf and fruit for a long time, are eye-witnesses, and have heard with their own ears, that they pursued a calm, happy life on that day and, benefiting from the weekend, engaged in relaxation.

Let the mass media of the West, the sun of whose news influence has reached the edge of the dawn of "sunset," weave lies more outrageous than this in the factory of their sick minds; now the people of Afghanistan recognise this sworn enemy of theirs and will never fall into the flamboyant trap of these fabricated lies and this telling of tales.

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CSO: 4803

AFGHANISTAN

WHITE HOUSE BLAMED AS 'FABRICATOR OF LIES'

Kabul HAQIQAT-E ENQELAB-E SAMR in Dari 1 Apr 80 pp 1, 4

/Article: "Every Technique of the Unholy War of Weaving Lies Is Being Carried Out in the White House"/

/Text/ BAKHTAR NEWS AGENCY's commentator, in connection with recent claims by Warren Christopher, assistant secretary of state of the United States of America, writes as follows:

"In recent days, new noise has been stirred up by imperialist propaganda agencies against Afghanistan. They think that if a lie is repeated a hundred times stupid people finally will be found to believe it.

"For this reason Western politicians are time and again reiterating the story that Afghanistan's soldiers and Soviet forces in Afghanistan are apparently using poison gases and napalm against the villages and rural areas of Afghanistan. This type of false news was alleged especially by America's assistant secretary of state Warren Christopher in a speech to the Washington Press Club. In addition, he even alleged that in Afghanistan there are apparently more than 15,000 political prisoners.

"Mr Christopher has deliberately mixed things up. The whole world knows that the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, following the new stage of perfection of the April revolution, has freed more than 15,000 political prisoners. Some while ago Afghanistan's officials, through authoritative forums of group understanding, denied these kinds of lies of America and the other Goebbelses of imperialism. In this regard we tell the Mr Goebbelses of imperialism that even if they repeat yesterday's lies today, these will never become fact.

"At the same time, it is necessary that one ask why at this specific moment a new wave of lies against Afghanistan has been put in motion. One must request the answer to this question, which has been advanced by all, from the United States of America, because it is leading this unholy war against the revolution of Afghanistan. The road of all these lies which have been

set in movement against Afghanistan in the United States ends in the White House and from there movements against Afghanistan are organized, as is now obvious to everyone.

"The White House is engaged in the presidential elections and activities for Carter's re-election. Some time ago Carter was decisively defeated in the New York state primaries by Senator Kennedy.

"In this state, all key economic and financial affairs are in the hands of the American Jews of this so-called District of Israel. In the opinion of these Jewish masters, Carter does not have the necessary decisiveness to destroy the Iranian revolution, enable Israel to strangle the Palestinian movement and expand the aggression against Afghanistan; in other words, they are showing Carter that if he wants protection from Zionist circles he must increase the United States' foreign activities in various areas of the world, especially in the Middle East and southwest Asia.

"There are copious examples in United States history of the fact that when candidates to the presidency do not have the fitness for solving domestic problems, they address themselves to foreign matters in order to gain popularity and win elections.

"This is plainly what Carter is actually doing.

"In fact Carter is preparing to show his power.

"Carter is preparing the ground to gain victory in some other states, and this is something Carter wants to perform by creating activities outside the United States. For this reason America has massed more than 30 warships in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean, including aircraft carriers, and for this reason American trainers, by orders of the White House, are training terrorists and bandits on Pakistani soil against the revolution of Afghanistan with American money and arms and sending them to kill people on the soil of Afghanistan. When the heroic army of Afghanistan bravely and victoriously proceeds to rout these murderers and casts them from the soil of Afghanistan, the Western propaganda agencies start screaming that these terrorists and bandits have been burned by gas and napalm.

"No, Mister imperialists, these terrorists and murderers, these foreign agents, have been burned not by napalm and poison gases; rather, it is the fiery body of the people of Afghanistan which has set fire to the souls of the enemies, the body of the people who want to clean our clothes in the country of the filth of the existence of these murderers and imperialistic agents. This type of weapon, that is, the will power and strength of the people, has never been prohibited by any international convention."

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CSO: 4903

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN, CHINA CRITICIZED VIOLENTLY AS 'INTERVENTIONISTS'

Kabul ANIS in Dari 29, 30, 31 Mar 80

/Article: "Interventionists--Hands Off the Domestic Affairs of Afghanistan!"/

/29 Mar 80 p 2/

/Text/ After the triumphant April revolution, which took place through the unshakable will of the free people of Afghanistan, the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan made requests for economic, political, cultural and urgent military aid from the Soviet Union on several occasions. In accordance with its iron belief in and faithfulness to internationalist ideas, and the treaty of good neighborliness and friendship made between the two countries in December 1978, the Soviet Union sent its limited military forces to Afghanistan in order to help the people of Afghanistan in their time of trials, as they were subjected to the serious threat of the bloodsucking serpent of American imperialism and its local servant, that is, the gang of Amin, from several directions.

World imperialist and reactionary circles did not derive a lesson from the events of history and the shameful failures of the old colonialism; constantly, they have continued their black plots against the young Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which has made a great new turn in history for the sake of the progress and happiness of the struggling people of Afghanistan.

Right now, there are more than 50 special bases and 20 camps in Pakistan, in these shameful colonialist locations, bands of gangsters and foreign hirelings are being given military training. The multifarious officials of archcriminal American world imperialism--from the CIA to the Intelligence Service, from Pakistani military reaction to the Maoist chauvinism of China--have all joined hands and are teaching the most reactionary gangs and terrorist plundering teams various ways to burn down schools, hospitals, mosques, and holy places and destroy small towns and nomads' winter quarters, bridges, public thoroughfares and main roads.

The black schemes of assassination and the murder of innocent people, including patriots and members of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, are being hatched in the arsenal of American imperialism and the colonized military circles of Pakistan. America, China and Pakistan, in collusion with the most reactionary puppet regimes of the region of the Middle East and south Asia, have for a long time also had the intention of bringing the heroic people of Afghanistan into their black imperialistic circle, which is condemned to destruction, but, through the innovation of the new leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, and the unstinting cooperation of the people and liberating armed forces of Afghanistan, all the intrigues of reaction and imperialism have been neutralized.

After the new and historic phenomenon of 27 December, the broad masses of the people declared their solidarity with the new government, which is led by Babrak Karmal. Day by day the black, satanic faces of the enemies of the security, the territorial integrity and the independence of Afghanistan are being exposed.

Following the conclusion of World War Two, American imperialism was subjected to crushing, destructive blows by just struggles for independence and national movements. Therefore, the old-line strategists of American policy swiftly changed their strategies, methods of influence and imperialistic actions. Inflaming the fire of continuous wars and taking military action in politically disturbed areas of the world became the centerpiece of the agenda of aggressive American imperialist policy. The war in Vietnam, which was launched by America, is to be considered an obvious example of the aggressive policy of American imperialism. It is one of the corrupting characteristics of American imperialism that it does not accept any limits to its greedy, monopolistic interests and sometimes, if these interests are faced with danger, it holds back from no kind of crime. Thirty years ago, by the orders of Harry Truman, the former American president, the atomic bomb was exploded over Hiroshima.

The people of Afghanistan are not alone. This is the loud cry of all freedom-loving peoples and guardians of international peace. The experiences of the history of national liberation movements in the continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America show that these movements and uprisings do not only need moral and diplomatic aid at times of trial--they also are in dire need of practical, heroic internationalist aid.

The revolution of Afghanistan is also to be considered an effective part of this international liberation movement. Could the failure of this movement be anything other than the repetition of the bloody events of Chile? In this regard, N. A. Ahmad, member of the political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Lebanese Communist Party, has stated, "The Soviet Union has shown in practice that its peaceful policy is unchangeable and that it is wholly faithful and loyal to internationalist principles and duties."

In December, after the new transformation in the April revolution, life in Afghanistan became totally normal. Amin's laws and decrees of assassination and murder were abrogated. The new revolutionary government, with its passionate love for the freedom-loving people of Afghanistan, once again opened the true road of the April revolution. The international prestige of the People's Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has also truly risen to a high level.

Babrak Karmal, at one of his press conferences, on 10 January, referred to the friendship between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan: "The Soviet Union is the true friend of all the Moslems of the world. The relations of friendship between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan are being perfected in an atmosphere of complete confidence, in accordance with the accord of last 5 December."

The active members of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, who were living in hiding in the period of Amin's shameful system of torture and terrorism, or had been thrown into terrible, inhuman prisons, are now further strengthening the bonds and the natural solidarity of the party and the toiling people of Afghanistan as much as possible with a revolutionary spirit. In the period of the rule of Amin, this obvious representative of the American Central Intelligence Organization (CIA), the effort was made in many areas for the course of events in Afghanistan to progress in accordance with the demands of American imperialism. Amin concentrated all governmental and state power in his bloody hands and those of his criminal gang, and without feeling the least shame kept the eyes of the majority of the people of Afghanistan from Socialism. He killed many nationalistic personalities, including noble religious scholars.

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In January of this year, first Huang Hua, the foreign minister of the People's Republic of China, and subsequently Lord Carrington, the minister of foreign affairs of Britain, visited Islamabad. Also, visits were made by Andrew Peacock, the minister for foreign affairs of Australia, and recently Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security advisor of the president of America, to Islamabad. Their trips were not just restricted to visiting Islamabad. They stepped up and visited Peshawar and the northwestern areas of Pakistan, that is, places which have been called camps and in which so-called "Afghan refugees" are receiving military training.

The borders of Pakistan are always prepared for the plans and savage acts of American imperialism and Maoist Chinese chauvinism. These borders are being used against the revolutionary government of Afghanistan in the first place and against all the progressive and democratic forces of the region of the Middle East, the Gulf area and all south Asia in the second place.

In reality these regions--that is, the so-called regions possessing vital importance--are constantly permanently under the surveillance and control of Washington and Peking, through the use of borders and other Pakistani bases. Local reaction in the region, which for years has assumed the black, servile role of the forces of international colonialism and imperialism, has joined hands, and, by making use of the mobilization of propaganda of American imperialism and its Western allies against Afghanistan, has been weaving plots and sending bands of terrorists and murderers into Afghanistan's territory. Most of these bands' military instructors consist of experienced, long-standing spies of the CIA and the Intelligence Service, the Chinese Secret Information Agency, and Pakistani military officers.

These spies are organizing their destructive activities in Peshawar, Chitral, Parachinar, Attock, Miram Shah Zhob, Cherat, Kohat, Lundi Kotal and Jamrud, and their powerful espionage and information bases are centralized in these locations.

The militaristic regime currently dominating Pakistan, which assumed the reins of affairs in that country following the coup d'etat of July 1977, has been following a dangerous policy. This policy is not only in contradiction with the pressing needs of the region--it is directly in contradiction with the peaceloving demands of the toiling people of Pakistan.

At the start, the government of Pakistan gave the people the promise of holding parliamentary elections. However, this false promise has been postponed several times, in the absence of a feeling of responsibility, and has now been completely removed from Pakistan's political agenda. As a consequence of the dominance of the dictatorial regime, a profound economic crisis has settled in throughout all of Pakistani society. That country's military budget is increasing 20 percent a year, in accordance with the political and military assignments of international imperialism; in 1979 Pakistan spent \$1.1 billion for military purposes and \$250 million for the use of its torturing administrative and bureaucratic machinery. The enslaving capital investments of the imperialist countries are plundering the national resources and domestic revenues of this country and are having a deep effect in intensifying inflation and crisis.

The capitulationist, anti-nationalist policy of the current regime has turned Pakistan into a base and arsenal of war for American imperialism and local reaction. America's military presence on Pakistani soil is becoming greater and greater every day. America has promised Pakistan \$400 million in aid for military purposes.

In this regard, the WASHINGTON POST reports "Brzezinski, on his trip to Pakistan, stated that this \$400 million in aid was the beginning of America aid. The White House is inclined to bring plans to manufacture American arms inside Pakistan to fruition."

Likewise, on 26 January of this year, the WASHINGTON POST wrote, "The United States of America will provide Pakistan with warships, jet bombers, various tanks, submarines, anti-tank missiles, and missiles used from the air against the ground and in the air."

THE STATESMAN published in New Delhi reported in January "Pakistan now is threatening peace and security in south Asia."

Pakistani reaction, with the cooperation of American imperialism and Chinese chauvinism, held the conference of Islamic countries in Islamabad, and developments in democratic Afghanistan were discussed at that conference. Holding this conference shows without a doubt that Washington and Peking are presenting themselves as the defenders of the true religion of Islam in south Asia with their false, ludicrous masks and are trying, through special colonialist tricks, Maoist theses, and their propaganda, to draw the Islamic national into this capitulationist, imperialist line. However, the revolutionary government of Afghanistan, following the new transformation in Afghan society, is extending the hand of friendship and brotherhood to all its neighbors.

As Babrak Karmal, the secretary general of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, president of the Revolutionary Council and prime minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, pointed out at his 23 January press conference, "Friendship with the peoples of Pakistan and Iran has an inseparable connection with the interests of the people of Afghanistan."

The best way in which Pakistan can choose to restore peace to the region and the people of Pakistan and the region will assuredly be the one in which Pakistan arranges its relations, contrary to the evil goals and intentions of American imperialism and the apostate self-aggrandizers of China, with all its neighbors in accordance with the principles of peaceful coexistence, non-interference in one another's affairs and respect for the resolutions of the United Nations Organization, and refuses to allow Pakistani soil to become a center for the preparation and organization of the destructive, imperialist doctrine of Brzezinski, Hua Guofeng and other reactionary forces.

Political observers believe that most American military aid to the groups of saboteurs and hireling elements is being given through Egypt. There is also undeniable evidence available that Egypt, Oman and Pakistan have reached a secret agreement regarding counterrevolutionary activities on the territory of Afghanistan.

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The revolutionary transformation of 27 December in Afghanistan has confused the leaders of Peking, and the new policy of the democratic government of Afghanistan has been considered a danger to the interests of imperialism and the Western monopolies.

In one of its recent issues, the newspaper JENMIN JIH PAO writes "The word Afghan, which is given to Afghanistan, is always on the tongues of the ruling circles in China."

China, from previous times, has had a special interest in using Afghanistan as the connecting point of its influence in the region of the Middle East and the southwestern area of Asia. However, with the new transformation in Afghanistan, these hellish hegemonist plans have turned into thin air.

The Chinese agencies of undercover and overt espionage have gone to work; on the border between Afghanistan and China, as well as the Pakistan border, broad counterrevolutionary operations have begun against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. In the Wakhan areas, Chinese agents outfitted in Chinese military uniforms are training gangs of saboteurs and mercenaries. In August 1978 Hua Guofeng reached agreement with the deposed Shah of Iran to participate in counterrevolutionary efforts in all areas in Afghanistan.

The London newspaper DAILY TELEGRAPH reports "Reports which have been received relate that China has been sending various weapons to counterrevolutionaries in Afghanistan through the Pakistani border. These weapons consist of various kinds of rifles, machine guns, bombs, and light and heavy arms. In Chinese camps, terrorist and counterrevolutionary gangs are receiving military training, following which they are sent through the Pakistan border to carry out the black, counterrevolutionary role on the soil of Afghanistan." Chinese military instructors are always present together in bases in the areas of Chitral, Chirat, Kohat, Peshawar, Quetta and Naushahr and are giving military training to terrorists, murderers, and traitors. In the spring of last year, the commander of the Chinese air force, Zong Tengfa, made a visit to the operations of military personnel and members of the Chinese secret information department in Pakistan; subsequently China, with American help, was able to establish a powerful base for an arsenal of weapons for counterrevolutionaries in an area around Peshawar. This commander also visited the Khyber area and other strategic points of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

It is taken for granted by everyone that local reaction and the self-aggrandizing leaders of China and American imperialism are substantially unhappy with the developments in Afghanistan and will not allow the people of Afghanistan, who have opened the way to their good fortune and social welfare, to live under conditions of peace and security. The experience of history shows that old colonialism and imperialism will offer nothing but destruction for their savage acts.

The people of Afghanistan will follow the road from the fetters of all kinds of tyranny and oppression which is truly the course of salvation for man and the guarantee of the best democracy, the road which they have firmly chosen; as in the past, all imperialism's shameful intrigues will

meet with failure, because triumph belongs to those peoples who have movements of national deliverance and powerful revolutionary waves within their own ranks which today have become transformed into an indestructible force.

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AFGHANISTAN

ARMS PRODUCED IN BORDER VILLAGES FOR REBELS

Paris LE MATIN in French 5 Apr 80 pp 8-9

[Article by Herve Chaballier: "The Arsenal City"]

[Text] At Dara, in Pakistan, along the Afghan border, craftsmen are manufacturing weapons for the warriors of the local tribes. Today they serve the Afghan rebels, the mudjaheddin.

Just one long street, crowded and dusty; wild-eyed men, armed to the teeth, rifles shouldered, pistol, dagger, and a cluster of hand-grenades on the belt; bursts of firing which nobody hears any longer; landing at Dara, a small town in the northern part of Pakistan, a pocket arsenal protected on all sides by an immense mountain fortress, I did not feel very reassured. As a matter of fact, I felt completely naked among all those Tartars of Central Asia, all of whom looked like walking arsenals.

The power of men is measured here by their fire power and I, with my ball-point pen, my notebook, and my camera quite obviously counted for less than nothing. As I passed by, these fellows would laugh their heads off at me, making fun of me in an insupportable manner because I would jump at every explosion and that was quite often. I first of all had to master that reflex which comes from another, calmer world, before trying to get used to these thunderclaps of war.

Except for the exotic interest of a visit to Dara at any time, an open town specializing in the manufacture, sale, exchange, and testing of weapons of all kinds (and, moreover, a hashish market), I wanted to see for myself--as public rumor had it in Peshawar, the capital of the province and the headquarters of the Afghan resistance movement--whether the workshops were running full speed, just about unable to meet the growing demand and having trouble meeting the orders which had been flowing in ever since the fighting in Afghanistan was stepped up.

I entered a first shop, quite at random. They all look alike: a rectangular room, covering 10 square meters, open toward the street, decorated on the outside with some painted signs, very colorful and surrealist,

showing a revolver, a cartridge, or a submachinegun. On the walls I saw rifles and brand-new yellow leather holsters as well as bandoleers of all kinds; a small chest of drawers, a pair of imitation-leather overstuffed chairs or a bed covered with blankets, that was all the furniture. In one corner, an old gray safe, certainly an essential piece of furniture. On the ground, a carpet and, sometimes on the carpet, a telephone. On the ceiling, a fan.

The shopkeeper thought that I was a tourist; he ordered tea, he had me sit down and he showed me his revolvers, perfect imitations of Italian weapons, 7.65 Beretta models. All looked alike but the prices varied according to the quality of the steel: 1,800 rupees (F900) for first class, 400 rupees (F200) for the others. Abdoul (we were on a first-name basis) caressed the handle, and showed me the item; he quickly realized however that I was not a serious customer. Without showing his disappointment--this vendor was a pro--he lined up the Beretta pistols and showed me some pencils which fire 6.35 (millimeter) bullets. A redoubtable weapon, in any case! If it works, it can kill a man at 2 meters. If the cheap steel, of which the barrel is made, does not withstand the explosion, the user loses his hand. To overcome my hesitation and with entirely admirable courage, the shopkeeper tried the "pencil that kills" in front of his door. It worked and I bought it; for F50, this is a gift which pleases but is good for nothing.

My taste for gadgets made the vendor bring out an old walking-stick gun dating back to I do not know when. He quickly realized that all of these things hardly interested me: "I am looking for Kalashnikov assault rifles, submachineguns, AA guns, and mortars." I asked him whether the Afghan rebels are taking delivery during the day or at night and how the shipment is handled. Abdoul quickly lost his commercial smile: "No, here we only sell to the tribes of the region; we have nothing to do with the mujaheddin."

Abdoul prefers to stick to the official story rather than to the truth; the Pakistani authorities want to avoid giving the pro-Soviet government in Kabul any opportunity for any accusations since that government has been denouncing "foreign interference" and "aid given to the rebels" by third countries. Pakistan--which by the way does not furnish any major military aid to the Afghan resistance fighters--is trying to play down the role of Dara in arming the mujaheddin. It would like to stop all traffic between the armors at Dara and the rebels but for historical reasons it does not have the means to do so.

Dara is in a tribal zone, a strip of land running along the Afghan border, belonging to Pakistan; but it has a kind of extraterritorial status which means that the inhabitants do not have to abide by Pakistani laws. While you need a license to own a weapon in Pakistan, this is not

true in the tribal zone. Peshawar mayor, Jamshid Burki, admitted: "We have no way of banning the manufacture and sale of arms at Dara. But you know, on its own territory, the Afghan government, in an area along our tribal zone, has never been able to impose its laws either; it therefore cannot really blame us for anything."

The people who live in Dara and the surrounding region, on either side of the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, have always been indomitable and ungovernable. They belong to the Pashtoon tribe of the Afridi, one of the most warlike. During the 1830's, the British tried to impose the flag and the laws of the Empire upon them but they paid a heavy price in soldiers before dropping their intentions, humiliated and decimated.

Hardly a week passes in this area without a massacre serving to settle some family quarrel. This is a place where the law of the survival of the fittest prevails and the veneration given to the chief of the tribe or the clan is directly proportional to the size of his arsenal. That led to the birth of Dara to supply all of the small local chiefs and their faithful followers with arms and ammunition. In this arms race--quite a bit more modest than the arms race among the superpowers--the craftsmen have come to manufacture heavy weapons and even AA guns whose usefulness--the tribes do not yet have any aircraft--is more psychological than military.

I continued my inspection of the arms shops. Like the Japanese, the Afridi have a fine talent as imitators. They manufacture any kind of model arm the moment they have the original: Sten or Thomson, sub-machineguns, Spanish Star-pistols, Colt, Mauser, Smith and Wesson models. The one weapon which is still the most popular is a copy of the Enfield 303, that old British rifle which is still the basic weapon and often the only one of the Afghan rebels.

Following my insistent questions, a Pashtoon led me along a street as narrow as a corridor, bordered by clay walls, on to bigger game. Some children were cleaning sparkling yellow bullets, collected in a wicker basket with powerful jets of water, sticking their hands into the nozzle. A teenager was seated at a small table, reading a book from the Koran school. Neatly arranged on the table were half a dozen hand-grenades. A door opened to a dark workshop where about ten employees were working around three lathes. The owner told me that there are about ten enterprises of this size in Dara. "It is true," he said, "the workers are busy here from sunrise to sunset making 600 rupees (F300) per month. They make one hand-grenade every half hour. Each week, the mujaheddin organize convoys to transport them to the guerilla fighters." The owner showed me a Kalashnikov, a real one. A rebel, who had taken it from the enemy, had just brought it to him and asked him to make copies. "It will take about two weeks to get the first one out," the owner

estimates. But he is already happy; he loves this beautiful piece of workmanship and he is delighted with the idea of making a weapon as prestigious as this one. It will sell for 20,000 rupees but the financial aspect of the operation matters less to him than the technical performance required. The craftsmen at Dara produce very few Kalashnikov rifles because this sort of thing is hardly profitable. On the other hand, certain mujaheddin, after a victorious operation against the Afghan or Soviet soldiers, come here to sell some of those rifles. They keep the best weapons for themselves and they exchange the other "Kalash" against rifles. One Kalash is worth six Enfield 303s, for example, and, in the guerilla units, six men equipped with Enfield rifles are worth more than one man equipped with a Kalashnikov. That is what the guerillas say, anyway. At Dara, as in the other thieves' markets in Asia, one can find all kinds of military equipment, more or less sophisticated, taken from the enemy but useless in the guerilla areas. Somebody even offered me a tank periscope with an electronic system.

This martial shopping actually gave the Pakistani journalist accompanying me quite an appetite. So, we had curried mutton, with a slice of bread, everything very fat and looking rather doubtful. A dirty and dusty dervish passed by. A small itinerant vendor proposed a thousand and one perfumes and pulled tiny little bottles out of a box made of precious wood. Our table companion rolled himself a huge joint, lifted his Pashtoon beret and pulled out his little hashish bag, black Pakistani hashish, one of the best in the world. This "dope" came in the form of a spiral resembling those licorice pastries which our bakers in the rural areas still make.

The hemp grows quite naturally on the sun-drenched slopes of the mountains. It benefits from the altitude and the heat. It puffs up in the summer and the harvest begins in September. In short, at Dara, it would be just as odd to be astonished over the consumption of hashish as it would be strange to be astonished at the consumption of wine at Narbonne. Like our French wine growers in the South, the Afridi stress the medicinal virtues of their output. At Dara, hashish can be purchased by the kilogram and even by the ton. The problem is getting it outside the tribal zone.

About 10 years ago, 1 kilogram of Pakistani black cost \$15; and 5 years later the price had gone up to \$80; today, a kilogram sells for \$200. In short, for hashish and for weapons or ammunition, the law of supply and demand has pushed prices up.

Dara is a victim of success and is no longer what it was. Neither its recent fortune, nor the talent of its manufacturers will however change the course of military developments in the war in Afghanistan. After all, there are the craftsmen and, in comparison to the Stakhanovite workers in the Soviet arms factories, they hardly count for anything.

IMPACT OF 'AFGHAN CRISIS' ON SOVIET MOSLEMS DISCUSSED

Paris POLITIQUE STRANGERE in French No 10, Mar 80 pp 9, 13-25, 267-268

[Article by Alexandre Bennigsen, study director at the School for Higher Social Science Studies]

[Text] Alexandre Bennigsen was born in St Petersburg in 1913. He has been study director at the School for Higher Social Science Studies (chair of the History of Non-Arab Islam) since 1952. Since 1970 he has also been visiting professor in the University of Chicago's History Department. He has also been visiting professor at Columbia University and the universities of Rochester and Indiana. In 1979 he was named a Fellow of the Kennan Institute in Washington. He is the author of numerous articles and works devoted to the history of the Moslem peoples in the Soviet Union, including "National Movements Among Russia's Moslems--Sultan Galievism in Tatarstan" in collaboration with Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay (1960), "The Press and the National Movement Among Russia's Moslems Before 1920" (1964), "Islam in the Soviet Union" (1967), "The Khanate of Crimea in the Ottoman Archives" (Topkapi) (1978), and "Moslem National Communism in the Soviet Union--A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World" (1979).

Moslems of the USSR and the Afghan Crisis

Does the large Moslem minority in the USSR represent an advantage or a disadvantage to Soviet expansion in Afghanistan? Heirs to a brilliant civilization, the Moslems of the USSR possess an intellectual elite free of any inferiority complex with respect to the Russians. Relations between the Moslem community and the Soviet establishment are strained. They are marked by a basic visceral hostility, an absence of ethnic mixing, persistence in a traditional way of life, religious revival, rediscovery

of the past, latent nationalism and, more particularly, a feeling among the Moslem elite that time is working in their favor. The aid provided by Moslem religious leaders in Central Asia and the Caucasus to Soviet propaganda abroad and the use of Moslem cadres in Afghanistan have certainly been an asset to Soviet political expansion. In the long run, however, the semifailure or incomplete success of the USSR in Afghanistan could cast doubts on the USSR's position in the rest of the Moslem world. The risk in Central Asia is even greater if the Soviet "big brother" proves that he is not invincible.

In its southern regions the Soviet Union has a very large Moslem minority that now numbers some 45 to 50 million souls. At a time when the Middle East is "destabilizing" and the Soviet Union appears to be the main beneficiary of that development, the question arises as to whether that Moslem minority represents an "asset or a liability," to use the English expression, as far as Moscow's expansion is concerned.

My purpose here is not to answer that question but simply to offer a few points for discussion.

What Does Soviet Islam Represent?

The Soviet census of 1959 showed that the USSR contained from 33 to 34 million "Moslems," a term describing individuals belonging to nationalities which before 1917 had been of the Moslem religion. As commonly used in the USSR, the term "Moslem" does not mean that the person thus designated is a believer. One can be simultaneously a Marxist and a Moslem. A writer from Turkistan recently told me, "I am an atheist, but also, of course, a Moslem."

That community has been growing rapidly since the 1959 census. In the 11 years between the censuses of 1959 and 1970, the growth rate among Moslem nationalities in the USSR has shown a spread between 19 percent--the lowest rate (Volga Tatars)--and 53 percent (Uzbeks and Tadzhiks). During the same period, the Russian community grew by only 13 percent, while the Ukrainian community increased by 10 percent. Detailed census figures for January 1979 have not yet been published, but it seems that the gap separating the biological dynamism of the Moslems and the stagnation of the Slavs has grown even wider. Between 1970 and 1979, the total population of the "Slav" republics (the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia) showed an average increase of between 5 and 6 percent, while that in the Central Asian republics (Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan in particular) rose by between 25 and 32 percent.

According to Soviet demographers, the extremely high fertility rate among the Moslems of Central Asia and the Caucasus should continue at least until the 1990's. At the end of this century, the total number of Soviet Moslems is expected to be between 84 million, according to American estimates (Murray Feshback), and 105 million, according to a more pessimistic Soviet estimate

(Bodnarskaya). It would be a young--very young--population (60 percent under 20 years of age in the year 2000) compared to an aging Slavic population.

With the single exception of the Volga Tatars, who have been a nation in diaspora since the middle of the 16th century, the Moslems of the USSR have refused to leave their national territories. In 1970 less than 1 percent of the Moslems of Central Asia did not live there. The attempt to "Europeanize" Kazakhstan and Central Asia under Khrushchev's regime did not produce the expected results. On the contrary, although immigration to Central Asia and the Caucasus has continued since 1959 (although very slowly), the relative number of Russians and other Europeans has declined in all the Moslem territories, in some cases dramatically. In Uzbekistan, for example, the number of Uzbek and other Turkmenian Moslems rose from 80 percent in 1959 to 82 percent in 1970 and an estimated 85 percent in 1979. In Turkmenistan, the progress of the Moslems has been even more spectacular: 77 percent in 1959, 81 percent in 1970, and an estimated 86 percent in 1979. Even in Kazakhstan, where in the 1950's the indigenous population was in danger of being completely submerged by the flood of "European" immigrants, the Moslems have regained ground, increasing from only 34 percent in 1959 to 40 percent in 1970 and an estimated 42 percent in 1979.

The Moslem gains are spectacular everywhere, even in the cities. In 1970 Baku became the first capital of a Moslem republic to have a Moslem majority. Tashkent probably followed suit in 1979, as did perhaps Dushanbe, the capital of Tadzhikistan. In some regions--Azerbaijan and Dagestan, for example--the Europeans are leaving, since an often fierce religious and ethnic hostility makes it difficult and even impossible for the two communities to live together.

"Demographic competition" between Europeans and Moslems in the Central Asian and Caucasian republics is perceived by the Russians and the natives as a historical phenomenon of capital importance. In 1973 the Kazakh press welcomed the publication of 1970's census results with triumphant jubilation. They showed that the Kazakhs had just become the majority once again in several regions of their republic.

If there is no massive emigration by Moslems out of Central Asia toward the industrial regions of Siberia or European Russia, the growing population pressure, combined with the unbearable psychological climate, will force the Russians and other "Europeans" to leave those areas, which will become increasingly Turkic and Moslem. And there is nothing to indicate that a Moslem emigration will take place in the foreseeable future.

The Moslems of the USSR are important not only because of their numbers but also by reason of their "quality":

1. Since the 9th century, Central Asia and the Caucasus have been in the very heart of the brilliant Turko-Iranian Moslem civilization. Bukhara, Urgench, Kazan, Samarkand, Baghchesarai, and Gendzhe have been hallowed

centers of Moslem culture--comparable to Damascus, Cairo, or Istanbul--and the seats of powerful empires. Refined and sophisticated Moslem elites have existed in Central Asia and the Caucasus since the first centuries of Islam, and the decline of the Turkmenian civilization in the 18th and 19th centuries was largely offset by the brilliant "Tatar Renaissance" of the 19th and 20th centuries. Today the Moslems of the USSR possess an intellectual, technical, and political elite which is every bit the equal of the Russians and which is perfectly capable of taking over the leadership of their republics. For that matter, their participation in the administration of their national territories is increasing rapidly, and the process of "indigenization" is affecting the universities and academies of science as well as the economic apparatus, the soviets, and even the communist parties of the various republics. In the 1970's the percentage of natives on the central committees of the communist parties in the five Central Asian republics was in very exact proportion to the percentage of Moslems in the total population of those republics. In the Moslem republics, only the army and the KGB remain the exclusive preserve of the Russians.

2. This Moslem community--75-percent Turkic--is neither submissive nor spineless, and it has no inferiority complex with respect to the Russians--just the opposite. In the past it has caused the Soviet Government a number of very serious problems: the revolt of the Basmachi in Central Asia, a rural guerrilla war by Uzbek, Turkoman, and Tadzhik peasants and nomads that it took the Red Army 10 years to crush (1918-1928); the insurrection by the highlanders of Dagestan and the Chechen country, led by the Sufi brotherhoods (1920-1922); the Chechen revolts in 1936 and 1940-1943 (the latter having led to the deportation in 1943 of more than a million Caucasian highlanders); and, since the end of the war, many bloody incidents between Russians and natives in Tashkent (at a soccer game, as one example), Grozny, Orjonikidze, and Dushanbe (the last of these in May 1979). We should also remember the climate of general insecurity that characterizes all the Moslem cities, where the Russians feel that they are "in a foreign country."

3. The Moslem community is politically alert. As far back as 1918 its representatives tried to adapt Russian Marxism-Leninism to the specific conditions of Moslem society and drew up various theories and programs, all of them heretical (from the viewpoint of the Russian Bolsheviks) and all more or less openly anti-Russian. Sultan Galiev's "national communism," Turar Ryskulov's "Marxist pan-Turanianism," or Nadjmuddin Samurskiy's revolutionary "pan-Islamism" were among the most serious ideological deviations that Stalin had to combat (and liquidate physically) in the communist centers of the Moslem republics between 1923 and 1938.

The insistence with which, even today, the official AGITPROP attacks those ideologies from a distant past seems to demonstrate their vitality and the interest they hold for the young generation of Moslem intellectuals.

Moslem Community and Soviet Establishment

It is difficult to speak of collective behavior or of a "world view" common to all the Moslems of the USSR. Their number certainly exceeds 45 million. What we see is a complex and diversified world, and what is true in Central Asia may not be true in Kazan or the Caucasus. As a result, the analysis that follows is necessarily brief and superficial. The relations in question can nevertheless be defined under seven points.

1. The existence of fundamental and mutual hostility.

On a grassroots level, among the rural or urban masses, one notes a visceral hostility: a mutual and probably unshakable hatred. For the Russians and other "Europeans," the natives are "subhumans" and "blacks" (or more precisely, "blackasses" (chernojopye)). For the Moslems, the Russians are still hateful conquerors and unclean infidels (Kafirs). A few scenes and conversations heard in 1979 illustrate the relations between the Moslems of Central Asia and their "big brother": in a city of Kazakhstan where there is a strong Russian majority, an old Kazakh was kneeling in the middle of the sidewalk saying his noonday prayers. A Russian passer-by gave him a vigorous kick. The Russian crowd laughed. The Kazakhs, faces stony, passed by. In Uzbek and Tadzhik country, one frequently hears people say: "Wait until the Chinese get here, then we'll paint the walls of our houses with your blood." And there are other remarks of the same kind, more or less gruesome in their variations. The riot of May 1979 in Dushanbe, which required the intervention of an armored brigade, seems to have started when a Russian slapped a Tadzhik child.

2. Isolation

The two communities--European and Moslem--rub elbows with each other but do not mix. There is no ethnic mixing, and mixed marriages are extremely rare. Generally, the children of a mixed couple--if living in Moslem territory--are Moslems. There is no linguistic assimilation, and the percentage of natives speaking and writing their national language is increasing steadily. There is no acculturation: there is nothing to indicate the coming, predicted by Stalin, of a "culture proletarian in its essence and national in its form." What we know of Central Asia's contemporary literatures proves that their form and essence remain national.

3. Persistence of a traditional way of life.

The traditional way of life, totally imbued with Islam, is still observed, not only by believers but also by atheists, including the members of the communist parties in the republics. Circumcision, religious weddings, and religious funerals in cemeteries reserved especially for Moslems are rites observed by practically the entire population, including those who are officially responsible for combating religion and its vestiges. Islam's major feasts (Kurban, Bairam, Mawloud, and Uraza-Bairam) are regarded as "national"

holidays and attract considerable crowds. The confusion between "national" and "religious" is total in Moslem territories. "A non-Moslem cannot be an Uzbek" and "An uncircumcised man cannot be a Tadzhik" (or a Turkoman or a Kirghiz) are frequently heard remarks. The clan and tribal structures remain living realities among the former nomads (Kazakhs, Turkomans, Kirghiz, and Karakalpak), and among the Caucasians of the north. Lastly, the persistence of numerous traditional customs and attitudes renders difficult or even impossible any rapprochement between the Russians and their "younger Moslem brothers": the inequality of sexes, respect for the elderly, the absence of drunks (among the Moslems, obviously), endogamous taboos, the purchase of the bride (kalyam), the levirate, and even the cloistering of women and polygamy.

4. Religious revival.

This expression is being used increasingly in place of "the vestiges of religion." According to the most recent sociological surveys in Central Asia and the Caucasus, the proportion of atheists in Moslem territories is only 20 percent, with the remaining 80 percent divided among various faiths through conviction, tradition, or the pressure of close kin. The atheists themselves retain ties with Islam, since the vast majority of them have their children circumcised, are married in a religious ceremony, and are buried in Moslem cemeteries. It should be recalled that among the Russians, the proportion of atheists to believers is the reverse: 80 percent are atheists and 20 percent are believers. The same phenomenon of religious revival can be observed, for that matter, throughout the Moslem world without there being any direct influence on Soviet Islam by Islam in the Middle East—Iranian or Turkish. Unlike the development characterizing the Islam world abroad, the religious revival in Central Asia and the Caucasus shows two faces, making it even more vigorous. One is a fundamentalist, conservative, and traditionalist revival that is hostile to Marxism (because Marxism represents "irreligion" and "error") and opposed to the Soviet regime. That revival is led and inspired by the Sufi brotherhoods (tariqats). The other is a modernist—"djadid"—liberal, and progressive revival that is favorable to conditional cooperation with the Soviet regime. It is led and controlled by the four Moslem directorates (Tashkent, Ufa, Makhach-Kala, and Baku). There is no conflict between those two Islams: the "parallel" Islam opposed to the regime and the "official" Islam loyal to the regime. They represent the two sides of one and the same religious phenomenon.

5. Rediscovery of the past.

In the Soviet Union the movement goes by the name of "mirassism" (from the Arabic word "miras," meaning heritage). It is concerned with the history, culture, literature, and even religion of Islam. The movement's objective is the complete recovery of the entire cultural heritage of the past, including its feudal and clerical elements. It is comparable to the rediscovery of Dostoevski or Andrei Rublev by the Russians, but it is infinitely more difficult (because of the triple change of alphabet—Arabic, Latin, and

Cyrillic--undergone by the Moslem languages) and more powerful, because the resuscitated past is much more prestigious than the Russian past. The golden age of Irano-Turkic literature in Central Asia began in the 9th century and continued without interruption until the 18th century. But the search for the past is concerned not only with the distant past but also with more recent times. The holy war led by Chamil against the Russian armies in Dagestan, the revolt by Kenessary Kassymov, the Kazakh khan, at the start of the 19th century, the insurrection by Andizhan Moslems in 1895, the great revolt by the Kazakh and Kirghiz nomadic tribes in 1916, and others are all relatively recent examples of struggles against the Russian invaders, and almost all of them were carried on in the name of the defense of Islam.

6. Latent nationalism.

This is perceptible in every field, but above all in the competition between native and Russian cadres and in the national literature, which over the past several years has tended to become increasingly xenophobic. Let us cite a recent example: in its issue for November 1978, the Uzbek literary magazine GULISTAN of Tashkent published the text of a short story entitled "Kul Buyida" (Near the Lake), chosen by the Uzbek students at Tashkent University as the "best short story of the year." It is a beautiful and poetic story of three anthropology students from Tashkent--two girls and a boy--who are doing research into popular oral literature. They stop near a lake at the tent of the boy's grandfather, a Sufi mystic and adherent of the Yasawiya Brotherhood who symbolizes the people's wisdom. The story's odious and ridiculous character is one of the two girls, a Russianized Uzbek who wears a miniskirt, smokes, and drinks. She speaks her language with a Russian accent, prefers Pushkin over Ali Chir Navai and, to top it all off, has Russianized her beautiful Turkic name of Gulia into Galia. National identity is evolving constantly. The linguistic and cultural differences between the various Turkic nationalities of Central Asia are tending to fade. In discovering their glorious past, the Moslems are also discovering that they belong to a common culture and that they share the same historical heritage. A probably irreversible process of rapprochement ("ablijenie") between Moslem nationalities, which began after Stalin's death, is again bringing to the fore the various pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic ideologies whose corollaries are not only a growing interest in the Turkic and Iranian peoples of the Middle East but also a determination to stand aloof from the Russians.

7. Feeling of satisfaction and security.

This is a very rare attitude among citizens of the Soviet Union. But the Moslem elites have the impression that "time is working in their favor." They are stronger than the Russians biologically, their prestigious culture is gradually being returned to them, and their cadres are slowly replacing the Russian and "European" cadres in all areas--in short, their republics are losing their colonial character and becoming increasingly national. Today the Moslems probably feel more comfortable within the Communist Party system than the Russians themselves. They have in fact succeeded with a

curious and skillful symbiosis between the party hierarchy and the still very alive structures of clan and tribe. In Kazakhstan, for example, it is the members of the Great Horde (Ulu Juz) who monopolize leadership positions in the party and government. In Turkmenistan, it is the members of the Tekke tribe who control not only the political leadership of their republic but also all the cultural life. This surprising symbiosis is explained by the very logic of the Soviet system, in which a highly placed apparatchik has to spend his time defending himself against his own colleagues. And what better guarantee can one find against betrayal by one's friends than to surround oneself with members of one's own clan or tribe? Moslems adapt very well to communism. For them it no longer represents an ideology or, even less, a quasireligious faith, but simply a means of power. Certainly they would prefer a communism without the Russians, but they hope that someday that will come--inch'Allah. Even among believing Moslems there predominates the feeling that Islam--the religion of the one God--has nothing to fear from Marxism, which is only a modern phase of irreligion and therefore of ignorance. With respect to atheistic communists, all Moslems have a feeling of absolute superiority. In Islamic territory, even after 60 years of the Soviet regime, the atheist is seen as neither a romantic rebel nor a scholar, but as a fool of diminished intelligence.

Finally, one last factor may explain the feeling of security entertained by the Moslem elites in the USSR, and that is the close ties linking the native intellectuals, most of whom are of peasant origin, with their working masses. There is no gulf or breach between the intelligentsia and the people, as there is among the Russians. The Uzbek or Turkoman intellectual is not trying to find himself: he feels very comfortable with himself, and the "people" regard him as their representative and undisputed guide.

In those conditions, it would be risky to expect those Moslem elites, whether communist or religious, to shatter the Soviet empire. For the moment, far from wanting to destroy it, they cooperate with the regime in numerous areas through a skillful game of "bazarlyk"--a complex game in which each party is obliged to make concessions and in which the Moslem elites hope to get the best of the bargain. For the moment, there is hardly any organized opposition in the Moslem republics (except that of the Sufi brotherhoods, especially in the northern Caucasus). There is no Moslem samizdat, and the only protests--and they are vehement--come from two deported nationalities: the Crimean Tatars and the Turks of Meskhétie.

Moslems of the USSR: Asset or Liability to Soviet Expansion?

The "asset" side is the most apparent, chiefly in two sectors: the aid given by Moslem religious leaders of Central Asia and the Caucasus to Soviet propaganda abroad and the use of Soviet Moslem cadres in Afghanistan.

Relations between the Soviet state and the Islamic religious hierarchy are ambiguous. The religion of the Prophet is still very much attacked, and anti-Islamic propaganda is intense--more violent perhaps than that directed

at the other religions. But at the same time, the Moslem religious leaders--especially the Grand Mufti of Central Asia, Ziautdin Babakhanov, and his two deputy muftis, Chakir Yusufkhan and Abdulgani Abdullaev--take a very active part in the wooing propaganda campaign that the Soviets have been engaged in for several years throughout the Moslem world, especially in the conservative or pro-Western countries: Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, and so on.

There is no Islamic conference that is not attended by Soviet religious leaders. Sumptuously dressed, turbaned, speaking literary Arabic, and perfectly versed in theology, those religious leaders speak in the name of the Soviet Union. They never fail to vaunt the benefits of the Soviet regime and the happiness of its Moslems or to denounce the misdeeds of Israeli or American imperialism. Since 1975 Ziautdin Babakhanov or his assistants have addressed the following Islamic congresses:

The Mecca Congress on "The Mission of the Mosques" in 1975.

The Islamic-Christian Dialog in Tripoli in 1976.

The Bangladesh Conference on "Islamic Preaching" in 1977.

The congress on "Moslem Thought" in Algeria in 1977.

The Istanbul Conference on the Hegirian Calendar in 1978.

The Karachi Congress on "The Propagation of Islam" in 1978.

The second congress on "Moslem Thought" in Algeria in 1979.

To this we should add the innumerable missions effected by those same Moslem religious leaders in all the Islamic countries, from the Seychelles to Morocco and from Indonesia to Saudi Arabia, as well as the Islamic congresses and conferences sponsored within the Soviet Union itself. In 1977 the Tashkent Congress, devoted to the 1,200th anniversary of the death of Imam Ismail Al-Bukhari, author of the "Collections of Hadiths," attracted a thousand delegates from all the Moslem countries in the world.

The Moslem religious leaders are certainly valuable allies of Soviet diplomacy, since they facilitate its access to pro-Western countries. But they are neither puppets nor--much less--agents. Their position is much more solid than that of someone like Patriarch Pimen, because their scope for action is greater. They carry on with the Soviet Government a skillful game of chess in which each act in favor of the Moscow government must be paid for with concessions: the opening of new mosques (an average of between 8 and 10 over the past 2 years) and the publication of religious works (Korans and collections of Hadiths), and all of this certainly favors the religious revival. The religious revival and the population explosion are making the rapprochement ("sblizhenie") between Russians and Moslems more problematic

than ever. The game is not, therefore, without its dangers, and the Soviet Government cannot play the game indefinitely.

Soviet Moslems in Afghanistan

Until the Afghan affair arose, few Moslems were employed abroad: there were two or three ambassadors, but most were chauffeurs and interpreters. Since 1978 the situation has changed dramatically. Weakened by the successive purges and the fact that Russians speaking the languages used in Afghanistan (Pashto, Tadzhik, Uzbek, and so on) are rare indeed, the Afghan administration collapsed, and it became necessary to issue a massive appeal to cadres native to Central Asia. Today thousands of Uzbeks and Tadzhiks and a few Turkmens are employed at all levels of the Afghan administration, from the least important job to the post of deputy minister or undersecretary of a ministry. Others serve in Soviet army units (as enlisted men or NCO's, but never as officers). For the first time since the October Revolution, therefore, Soviet Moslems are being used by the government to establish, or at least help to establish, communism in a foreign Moslem country. The dream of Sultan Galiev and Turar Ryskulov is finally being realized: revolutionary energies are being transferred to the East. This would make the Moslem peoples "subjects" and no longer "objects" of the communist revolution. The Moslems of the USSR have always been more adventurous than their Russian comrades with respect to the problem of revolution in the Third World. In 1920 they favored a more active policy in Turkey and intervention by the Red Army in Ghilan. In 1946 they were in favor of strong support for the democratic republics of Azerbaidzhan and Kurdistan. Stalin, more cautious, condemned their expansionist theories, which were regarded as "leftist," and liquidated those responsible.

There is every reason to believe that with respect to the problem of expanding Soviet power beyond the national frontiers, today's Uzbek or Tadzhik intellectuals have an attitude like that of their predecessors in 1920. The conquest of Afghanistan--or of other Moslem countries--is certainly regarded by the Moslem elites of the USSR as a positive historical event.

The intellectuals of Central Asia may believe sincerely (or pretend to believe) that they are helping the Soviet Army liberate their Uzbek, Tadzhik, or Turkmen brothers oppressed by the Pashtuns. On the other hand, the real and valuable help they are giving the Russians in Afghanistan could logically force Moscow to pay for the aid received by granting concessions affecting vital problems, such as the possible and more or less forced transfer of surplus Central Asian manpower to the industrial regions of Siberia or the farming areas of European Russia's northern region. Is that hope reasonable? It is still too soon to talk about it, but it is certain that there is a great temptation to try to deal with the Russians as partners and no longer to be treated by them simply as pawns. Finally, the "transfer of revolutionary energies" to the East could transform Afghanistan into a "soviet socialist republic," and that would add some 15 million inhabitants to the 45 or 50 million Moslems in the USSR. This would bring closer the time when

Moslems in the Soviet Union would outnumber the Russians. The liberation of the "oppressed brothers" in Afghanistan would thus be a preparatory step toward the liberation of Soviet Moslems from Russian tutelage.

The help that the Moslems of Central Asia have given the Moscow government in its Afghan policy seems--in the short term--substantial and even irreplaceable. Without massive participation by the Turkmenians, the Afghan venture would have been infinitely more difficult. Thanks to them, the total collapse of the Afghan state's administrative and economic apparatus was avoided. The machinery operates more or less effectively, but rather less than more. Moslems from Central Asia are present (or more accurately, were present) in the Soviet Armed Forces committed to Afghanistan. It was chiefly a matter of soldiers and interpreters attached to the military units. Their number has certainly been exaggerated by foreign observers, but it enough to produce an illusion and to present the invasion of Afghanistan as an "inter-Moslem" operation; Soviet Moslems running to the assistance of their Afghan brothers threatened by imperialism. Finally and especially, the religious leaders of Tashkent give the Afghan operation their spiritual backing. Thanks to them, the Soviet Union is not yet completely relegated to the camp of the enemies of Islam.

Such is the "asset" side of the Moslems of Central Asia. There also exists a negative side: liberating one's oppressed brothers is one thing, but to machinegun or--what is worse--watch the Russians machinegun those same brothers is likely to provoke serious crises. Despite the incredible difficulties involved, Soviet Moslem soldiers have deserted and joined the rebels. Any prolonged contact between Soviet Moslems and the Afghan population presents obvious dangers. Foreign observers have noted intense brainwashing activity among Soviet Moslems by the Afghans and a fraternization that the Russians find it hard to control. Also noted in Kabul is an active black market in Korans, which the Turkmenians buy at a very high price. It is possible that the danger presented by such fraternization is the reason why the Soviets have gradually replaced units including Moslem soldiers with purely "European" regiments.

The least military or political failure or semifailure threatens to have immediate repercussions in Central Asia and to give ideas to those nostalgic for the Basmachis and for Chamil's wars. An indefinite extension or worsening of the guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan is equally dangerous. The USSR is in danger of seeing itself relegated eventually by the entire Moslem world into the camp of the latter's enemies.

Chinese propaganda, which was already violent and effective before 1977, has intensified since then. If the Afghan venture drags on, China will eventually appear to the Moslems--of Central Asia and the Middle East--as Islam's only friend. That would be a real disaster for the USSR.

The presence of a large Moslem population in Central Asia compels Moscow, therefore, to wind up its Afghan venture and to do so quickly. Otherwise,

Afghan guerrilla warfare could awaken ideas of independence. The Afghan rebels could become a model, and their unequal fight could become promise and proof that it is possible to stand up to "big brother" by armed means. In its immediate and long-term consequences, a Soviet failure in Afghanistan would be comparable to Russia's Tsarist defeat in 1905. As for the Afghan insurgents, even if they are defeated by the overwhelming power of the Soviet Army, they can still play a role comparable to that of the Chechens and Ingush, who were deported to Central Asia in 1943 and who are responsible to a large extent for the revival of religion and xenophobia among the Moslems of Central Asia.

So it is that after 60 years of isolation, destabilized Soviet Islam is renewing its ties with the Middle East, which is also destabilized and shaken by violent movements whose consequences are unforeseeable. For the Soviet Government, the advantages and risks of this resumption of contact are clear: advantage in the short term but danger in the long run.

One may therefore wonder why the Soviets undertook the conquest of a foreign Moslem country which was already in their zone of direct influence. Was there a need to help a friendly regime threatened by rebellion? That is the least satisfactory explanation. Was it simply an error in judgment due to an underestimation of the potential opponent? It is a fact that there are very few experts on Afghanistan in the Soviet Union. Was it a preparatory move toward more important operations such as control of the Strait of Hormuz, the conquest of Pakistan, and the encirclement of China? Was it an "operation of terror" through the ostentatious deployment of military power for the purpose of humiliating the United States and separating the latter from its West European allies? Or was it, for that matter, a preparation for opening up to the United States on the basis of a few simple but effective arguments such as: "We are both threatened by the same enemy--'Moslem anarchy'--so let us get together and divide up our spheres of influence"?

Whatever the explanation, the Soviets are imperatively compelled to terminate their Afghan venture with an overwhelming and rapid military and political success. That hardly seems conceivable, seeing that from the geographic and human standpoint, Afghanistan is the ideal country for interminable guerrilla warfare. A semifailure and even partial success are likely to call into question the quite favorable position that the Soviet Union has gained in the foreign Moslem world thanks to its patient efforts over the past 10 years. As for Central Asia, the danger is even greater if it is proven in Afghanistan that "big brother" is not invincible.

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RELIGIOUS STATUS, AFFAIRS OF MOSLEMS IN USSR DISCUSSED

Kabul ANIS in Dari 2, 3, 5, 6 Apr 80

/Article by R. Babat: "The Moslems in the Soviet Union: In That Country There Are 200 Big Mosques and More Than 1,000 Small Ones"7

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/Text7 The Moslems of the Soviet Union, like the other subjects of that country, enjoy all the rights and privileges included in that great, advanced country's constitution, and comprehensive efforts are being made to increase their wellbeing.

The Moslems in the Soviet Union are fundamentally part of Turkish societies which live in Central Asia, Kazakhstan, the Caucasus and the Volga area.

The 1970 census showed that Turkish-speaking people in the Soviet Union number more than 40 million. The government of the soviets respects the religious beliefs and traditions of all nationalities without discrimination. Possession of a private kind of religious belief in the Soviet Union is a personal, individual matter and the government does not interfere in the field.

The constitution of the Soviet Union guarantees complete freedom of belief and performance of religious services to every subject of that country and condemns and considers criminal any form of discrimination against those holding beliefs or the creation of obstacles to prevent the performance of obligations of religion or creed. All religions, without discrimination, enjoy equal rights, and there is no dominance over any religion in this country by any other religion.

Organization of Religious Life of Moslems in the Soviet Union

To organize the religious life of Moslems in the Soviet Union, there are independent departments which promote religious matters in accordance with the wishes of the Moslems. These departments, which are headed by Islamic leaders, consist of Islamic personalities and people possessing

expertise. Among the departments organizing the affairs of Moslems, one can mention the existence of the Board of Moslems of Central Asia and Kazakhstan in Tashkent. There are also three other boards for Moslems, which have the status of religious centers and function separately from one another. One of these centers is involved with the affairs of Moslems in Baku, the second with the affairs of Moslems in the north, and the third is responsible for the affairs of Moslems in the European section of the Soviet Union and Siberia. Every year a large number of foreign visitors and Moslem representatives come to the Soviet Union from other countries, mix with the Moslems of this country, and exchange ideas, which shows that Moslems in this country enjoy all the rights contained in the Soviet constitution.

Regarding the imperialist press' distortions of the situation of Moslems in the Soviet Union, Prof Zia'olhosseyn Faruqi, director of the Indian Institute of Islamic Studies and editor in chief of the magazine ISLAM AND MODERN THOUGHT, writes "We in India witness propaganda from Western literature which generally distorts facts concerning the life of Moslems in the Soviet Union and the Socialist system." He added that in his opinion people who spread this sort of misunderstanding are either ignorant or are merchants who are prepared to write nonsense for pay. In either case, what is obvious and has been proved, and what numerous trips by representatives of Moslems to the Soviet Union have shown, is that Moslems in the Soviet Union have a happy, blessed life and the Soviet constitution guarantees the freedom of activity of the Moslems' broods.

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Regarding the comfortable, secure situation of Moslems in the Soviet Union, Mohammad Taqi Banki, editor of the newspaper KEYHAN, who also teaches at Tehran University, once stated that the condition of the Moslems in the Soviet Union is excellent and, by the grace of God, comfortable; they are free to perform religious obligations and can go to any mosque they like. In the sphere of religious studies and science they have studied deeply in order by this means not to lag in the rapid development of their society and to be informed about the advantages of modern life. He stated that he was very happy to observe the situation of Moslems in the Soviet Union, totally rejects the conceptions and propaganda of Western publications in the field and considers them at variance with the facts.

Likewise, with respect to the condition of Moslems in the Soviet Union, another religious figure, labelled with an accusation by Tunisia in connection with imperialistic propaganda, stated that Soviet Moslems live in complete peace and tranquility and, contrary to the claims of Western sources, enjoy general and complete freedom in performing their religious obligations.

This person stated that the Moslems of the Soviet Union have joyously mingled their Islamic beliefs with feelings of love for the motherland. Without a doubt, the freedom of the Moslems of the Soviet Union is one of

the freedoms which the Soviet government takes pride in and vaunts. Without a doubt, the government of the Soviet Union has won the respect of more than 700 million Moslems in the world through its respect for the religious freedom of the Moslems of its country.

The most beautiful religious structures and mosques, which have been constructed in a special Islamic style and are masterpieces of their genre, can be observed in the Soviet Union. These places of worship are under government care and large amounts of money are allocated to the restoration of Islamic buildings and preservation of their historic relics every year.

Among these structures one can mention the mosque and college of Mir Arab and the mosque of Zaynoddin in Bokhara. Each of these structures was built in the 16th century. One of the duties of the boards of Moslems in the Soviet Union is to present recommendations on preservation of the Islamic antiquities and historic sites in the Soviet Union to the government. These boards also send a large number of religious school students abroad for further study in religious fields every year. On the subject, Mofti Zaynoddin Babakhanov, head of the Board of Moslems of Central Asia and Kazakhstan in the Soviet Union, stated that a favorable answer has been given and is being given to all the Islamic Board's requests concerning the opening of mosques in cities and opulated areas by the government of the Soviet Union. At present there are 200 big mosques and more than 1,000 small ones in the Soviet Wepublics in Central Asia and Kazakhstan and religious observances are held in these mosques.

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Contact between Moslems in the Soviet Union and Moslems Abroad

The Moslems of the Soviet Union have all the necessary resources for contact and for establishing relationships with Moslems in other areas of the world. They preserve their contact with the Moslems of more than 70 Islamic countries and are enlarging these contacts through exchanges of religious committees. In these ongoing contacts, committees of Soviet Moslems travel to Islamic countries every year and those from Moslem countries travel to the Soviet Union.

The holy Koran, the sacred book of the world's Moslems, has already been published several times in the Soviet Union and a new publication of it is underway. Similarly, the anniversaries of the holy Islamic days are published in an organized manner and made available to the Moslems of that country every year. Periodicals on the life of Moslems in the Soviet Union are also published in Arabic, English, French and Uzbek. Similarly, a number of Soviet Moslems go to the holy place of God to perform the obligation of the pilgrimage and visit Mecca and Madina every year. According to the constitution of the Soviet Union, that country's subjects have the right to participate in political life and the organization of government affairs and of course the Moslems there also vouch for this in regard

to the matter. Moslems, in accordance with their talents and capabilities, can reach high government positions.

Solidarity of Soviet Moslems with Moslems of the World

The Moslems of the Soviet Union, according to sacred Islamic principles and principles of fraternity and the spirit of love for man, side with the struggles of the Moslems of the world and all forces in favor of peace and social justice which are fighting against colonialism and exploitation. In the course of a discussion Mofiti Zayyatoddin /gic/ Ben Hassan Babakhan, head of the Board of Moslems for Central Asia and Kazakhstan, stated, with respect to the solidarity of Moslems of the Soviet Union with movements of national salvation, "The Moslems of the Soviet Union, on the foundations of the sacred principles of Islam and belief in human welfare, are completely on the side of people who are fighting for their national freedom and social salvation against colonialism and imperialism. This solidarity can take place in various forms.

"At the present time, in the framework of this solidarity, Moslems of the Soviet Union have fraternal and friendly contacts with numerous countries of the world and high Islamic personalities visit the Soviet Union every year; recently such famous Islamic personages as the grand muftis of the countries of Syria, the Yemen Arab Republic, Lebanon, Tunisia and other Islamic and non-Arab countries visited the Soviet Union. The hearts of the Soviet Moslems and that country's gates are open to all religious personalities who have not yet visited the Soviet Union. One must state that these contacts are not onesided; rather, they are founded on a reciprocal basis, since Islamic committees from the Soviet Union regularly visit various Islamic countries and expand the groundwork for mutual understanding and cooperation in the field. The Moslem clerics of the Soviet Union have repeatedly visited Syria, Algeria, the Yemen Arab Republic, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries. It must be pointed out that religious leaders of the Soviet Union have regularly engaged in organizing international Islamic seminars in their own countries in order to strengthen Islamic culture and also participate actively in Islamic conferences to strengthen Islam, bolster the Islamic struggle against social injustice, and strengthen peace and human welfare.

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The Moslems of the Soviet Union, in the course of the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, stood alongside the Arabs completely and without restraint or restriction and expressed their solidarity with them. During these wars, the government and people of the Soviet Union unstintingly gave the Arab Moslems assurance of moral and financial protection in their struggles against imperialism, Zionism and aggression. In 1970 and 1973 the Moslems of the Soviet Union held special international conferences with the objective of defending the just struggle of the Arab brothers and solidarity with the homeless people of Palestine who have been living like vagabonds

in refuge camps for more than 30 years as a result of the aggressive policy of Israel. The Moslems of the Soviet Union have expressed their solidarity with movements of national salvation in Asia, Africa and Latin America which are struggling against the dominance of imperialism, Zionism and racial discrimination, through Asian-African solidarity organizations, and are participating actively in the field.

It is in the light of these acts of solidarity that the Moslems of the Soviet Union conspicuously greeted the triumphs of the people of Afghanistan and Iran, the peoples' revolution in these countries and the removal of the detested tyrannical regimes of the past and are defending them.

The Soviet Union, as the great, powerful base for all freedomloving forces fighting against tyranny and oppression, defended and greeted the revolutions of Afghanistan and Iran. However, American imperialism, which considered that its interests in the region were endangered by the consummation of these revolutions, deliberately misinterpreted this friendly aid and unblemished protection of Afghanistan by the country of the Soviets and is making the Soviet Union's military aid to Afghanistan seem otherwise. The public information media in the imperialist countries have, with the reactionary publications of the Chinese supremacists and reaction in the region, begun a shameless struggle against the Soviet Union. They have also published incorrect materials regarding the condition of the Moslems in the Soviet Union, and the incorrectness of this propaganda is clear to all.

The imperialists and Chinese supremacists, who are the enemies of friendship among peoples and the guarantee of social justice, want to distort the nature of the Soviet Union's humane, fraternal aid to Afghanistan, which took place in response to foreign imperialist threats against the territorial integrity and political independence of this country in accordance with the demand of the revolutionary government of Afghanistan, and they refer to it as Soviet intervention in Afghanistan! This is completely incorrect.

The Moslems of the Soviet Union, like that country's government, express their fraternal protection of the peace-loving people of Afghanistan and demand that their efforts in throwing back and neutralizing all the enemies' plots and turning Afghanistan into a modern, progressive country triumph.

Without a doubt, the Moslems of the Soviet Union are seriously defending the humane, just measures which have been taken by the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan following the new stage of the April revolution, including religious freedom, liberation of political prisoners and the normalization of all life in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. This noble, humane support by the government and people of the Soviet Union for the government and people of Afghanistan, who are seriously engaged in eliminating the traces of the imperialistic plans against the revolution and the territorial integrity of their land, must not be misinterpreted or given another name.

Similarly, these imperialistic statements, to the effect that in the Soviet Union there is supposedly discrimination against Moslems, are fundamentally without basis, since in no way are the Moslems of the Soviet Union discriminated against--rather, the Moslems of the Soviet Union enjoy all the rights and privileges contained in the constitution and all nationalities may freely perform their religious rituals.

Basic steps have been taken and are being taken in the Soviet Union to develop the moral life of Moslems and performance of their observances. Among these are the creation of facilities for Moslems to perform their religious duties.

It is a fact that the Soviet Union is a true friend of the Moslems of the world everywhere and in all cases. Military, financial and moral protection by that country of the Arab and Palestinian people in their struggle against imperialism and Zionism is itself clear testimony in this sphere.

The Soviet government has shown noteworthy progress in the life of the Moslems of that country and has given Moslems equal opportunities in learning and education. In its domestic and foreign policy, the Soviet Union has proved that it is the true friend of Moslems, that it views their beliefs with respect and that it wishes for the welfare and happiness of all Moslems and all people in the world.

11887

CSO: 4903

AFGHANISTAN

ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET MOSLEMS 'FOR PEACE' REPORTED

Kabul ANIS in Dari 22, 23 Mar 80

/Article by ANP: "The Moslems of the Soviet Union in a Struggle for Peace"/

/22 Mar 80 p 4/

/Text/ In September 1980, in the city of Tashkent, capital of the Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan, an Islamic conference is to be held under the slogan "The Fifteenth /Islamic/ Century must be the century of peace and friendship among peoples."

On this topic Zia'oddin Khan, son of Baba Khan, head of the Department of Moslems of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, regarding the participation by Moslems of the Soviet Union in the call for strengthening of peace and the struggle against imperialism, states:

"They do not just demand peace, but are seriously working to preserve it. It is necessary that attention be morally and physically given to the preservation of peace, like a family and like health. The desire for war is a sickness and the patient is dangerous for life. The microbe of this disease always finds a nest for itself in places where the selfish pursuit to gain profit becomes established. In our era, can this patient be considered curable when the forces generating material, cultural and scientific wealth fight against it?

"The Moslems of the Soviet Union, who have been educated under the aegis of the holy principles of Islam, express their contempt for the shameless plans to seek supremacy of the imperialist circles. From the first days of power of the soviets, which declared 'peace for the people,' the truly devout Moslems of the Soviet Union have defended peoples who are fighting for their national independence against the aggressions and intrigues of imperialists. The Moslems of the Soviet Union are sincerely pursuing this matter to guarantee happiness and peace throughout the world, which is God's will.

"The adherents of the holy Islamic religion in the Soviet Union are faithful to the government of soviet's principle of strengthening fraternal friendship and cooperation among nations, because friendship, in the words of the great Imam al-Bukhari, paves the way for the attainment of a clear vision of the world. Under the guidance of the instructions of Islam, the Moslems of the Soviet Union take part in all basic measures to strengthen peace.

"The well known leaders of the Moslems of the Soviet Union are members of the committees of peace of the regions, the republics and the boards of the Soviet Union Fund for Peace. Every year the devout members of various Islamic creeds participate in them on a voluntary basis. I am extremely honored to be a member of the World Council of Peace and the peace committees of the Soviet Union and Uzbekistan.

"The Moslems of the Soviet Union will be participating in international conferences of Moslems abroad and major sessions within the Soviet Union. In 1970 a conference was held in Tashkent under the title 'The unity of Moslems in the struggle for peace' through the initiative of the Islamic organizations of the Soviet Union. In 1973 Tashkent hosted a conference for the defense of the just struggle of the Arab peoples. I presented a report at the world conference of 'Religious workers for permanent peace, disarmament and just relations among peoples' held in Moscow in summer 1977.

/23 Mar 80 p 47

"The spiritual representatives of the Moslems of 25 nations of the world participated in an international symposium held in the city of Dushanbeh, capital of the Republic of Tajikistan, toward the end of last year concerning 'The contribution of the Moslems of Central Asia, the Volga Region and the Transcaucasus to the development of Islamic thinking calling for peace and social progress.' All participants requested that the occupation of Arab lands by Israel end and the rights of the downtrodden Palestinian people to self-determination and an independent country be guaranteed. The religious personalities condemned the policy of racial discrimination by the white minority in Rhodesia and South Africa and pointed out that racial discrimination is contrary to the commandments of Islam. They warmly greeted the triumphs of the people of Iran and Afghanistan in their struggle against imperialism in order to create a new society for themselves.

"In the month of January 1980, the leaders of the Islamic organizations in the Soviet Union met in Moscow to celebrate the beginning of the 15th century of Islam. In a statement approved by those participating in this gathering, the representatives of the Islamic organizations condemned the efforts by the forces of international reaction, headed by the United States of America, to destroy detente, accelerate the arms race, draw the world into cold war, fragment the world of Islam and spread the seeds of ill will among Moslems.

"Through their actions vis-a-vis the people of Iran and Afghanistan, who have obtained their independence, the American imperialists and their allies have shown their true face beneath the mask of so-called 'defenders' of Islam or the Moslems and are trying to impose their desires on them and once again lay the yoke of their hireling regimes upon the shoulders of the people of Iran and Afghanistan. We, in our statement, have shown our complete protection of the actions of the forces for peace which are struggling against the plots of imperialism in the Middle East and Southwest Asia and of the struggle of the Arab peoples for a just solution to the Middle East problem.

"Islam commands that God admits of no difference among his servants from the standpoint of race or language, indeed from the standpoint of piety, and the struggle to avoid war and the struggle to provide a peaceful, tranquil life for all people without consideration for their race or views is a call for justice. We ask our religious brethren to unite and turn the 15th Islamic century into a century of fraternity, friendship, good neighborliness and cooperation among peoples."

11887

CSO: 4903

NECESSITY OF 'FUNDAMENTAL REFORMS' IN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Kabul HAQIQAT-E ENQELAB-E SAMR in Dari 5 Apr 80 p 2

/Article: "Structural Changes in the Educational System"/

/Text/ The new stage of perfection of the revolution, which can be considered tantamount to a turning point in the revolutionary structural transformations of the country, has, as well as saving the revolution from the deviations whose end and conclusion could yield nothing but the abyss of nonexistence, cast it in its proper course, which is to move history forward and save its movement from progressing like a tortoise.

With the start of this new stage, in addition to the fact that the effort has been made to have "ointment" placed on the deep, profound wounds resulting from the inhumane, dishonest policies of Amin and his gang, the endeavor has been made for a structural change to come about in all social, economic and especially pedagogical and educational affairs of the society.

Since the right to an education is a natural inalienable right of mankind and plays a basic, even determining role in the building of character, the officials of the Ministry of Education have decided that they will proceed toward a deep, profound transformation and bring about a radical reform in this sector.

In a country which shows scandalous illiteracy and where literacy is at its lowest level, in accordance with the wrong and even dictated policies of the distant past, bringing about a structural transformation in regard to education is not an easy, ordinary activity.

Revolutionary Afghanistan, which now wants to take strides, by leaving difficult times behind it, toward new horizons of development and civilization, cannot proceed along that road, which is difficult to travel, and bring itself to the desired destination, without bringing about a structural change in the educational system, which is to make a lofty education and culture available to all.

A serious, basic point which one can observe in the new structural reform of the educational system is the reduction of the educational term. In times past, we witnessed the fact that classes in some higher levels were nothing more than the parrotlike but complicated repetition of the accumulated lessons of lower classes. By storing up a series of abstract, barren notions, the mind of the student was not given scope for "creative, constructive thinking"; in this manner, the student was simply turned into a moving tape recorder and no scope of activity was given to his innovative powers. Similarly, in this transformation, serious, fundamental attention has been given to organizing classes in the first and second grades, which one can consider the firm foundations of the educational system, in the sense that the application of structural reforms in the educational system will start with these two grades.

Revolution, which one can consider the mover of history, in order really to put a society which has been in the bondage of the nexus of fetters and shackles of obsolete relationships of tribal chieftains in movement, requires vehicles through which to create a profound change in society. In this kind of educational system lies one of the strong pyramids through whose use one can create movement and activity throughout society and move the society forward.

In the structural change of the current educational system, the effort has been made to give life to the creative, constructive mentality in the make-up of the student and to prepare him to accept the heaviest responsibilities and newest scientific and cultural developments.

What has been given the most value of all in this system is intermediate education. One can consider this sector the strong backbone of this system and the foundation of the educational system of the future will be based on this.

The doors will be open to all higher educational organizations, including the universities, before the student who completes this cycle.

In this manner, another new foundation stone has been laid for the future structure of our society and one can with total confidence built the magnificent palace of the country's future.

11887

CSO: 4903

ALGERIA

STUDENTS DEMONSTRATE FOR BERBER CULTURAL RIGHTS

Calm Police Reaction

Paris LE MONDE in French 10 Apr 80 p 6

[Article by Daniel Junqua]

[Text] Algiers--On Tuesday evening, 8 April, the authorities officially denied reports disseminated among student quarters that one demonstrator had been killed and several others seriously wounded as the result of police action on Monday against a procession of young people demanding the "right to establish Berber culture." The communique published by the APS acknowledges that "a certain amount of effervescence continues to be maintained by minority groups in the universities of Algiers and Tizi-Ouzou" and gives assurance that "the forces of security responsible for the maintenance of order are doing their job with the maximum sangfroid." The police also announced that all the students who were held for questioning have been released. They totaled 100. For their part, the students believe that "most" of their comrades were released; however, they are unable to give details about those finally detained.

It is true that no serious incident occurred on Tuesday, although the striking students, numbering about 1,000, took their action in support of "freedom of expression" and against "police repression." Late in the morning, they held a meeting in the school of letters, right in the heart of town, on Didouche-Mourad Street, near the main post office. The speakers came out in favor of a "real popular culture." In substance, they said that they were not against the Arabic language so long as it was the popular Algerian Arabic language and not an eastern Arabic language which is not understood by the majority of the population and which is foreign to the cultural traditions of the country and gives rise to the creation of a "new caste."

Proclaiming their attachment to Islam, they challenged the idea that this religion would perforce be connected with the so-called classical Arabic language. There are many Moslem countries, such as Turkey or Iran, they noted, which have their own language. They demanded that the government take into consideration the cultural diversity and plurality of Algerian Arabic

languages; e.g., Kabyles, Chaoui or Mozabite, which enrich the country. They challenged the argument according to which their fight on behalf of the Berber language is in fact concealing a desire to maintain the position of French, "the language of colonization." Lively applause was accorded those who spoke out "to denounce the maneuvers of men such as Ait Ahmed who are exploiting the movement from abroad in an effort to make a political comeback." Finally, some of the speakers demanded the creation of a "democratic and representative student union."

At noon, the students, shouting "free the detainees" and "Algerian popular culture," formed a procession in an effort to reach the post office, some 300 meters away. They were only able to cover 100 meters. The police, intervening this time without excessive brutality, forced them to return to the university where they shut them in by blocking the exits. Circumscribed in this manner, the demonstration continued for 2 hours, with the participants reaching the terraces flanking Didouche-Morad Street where they continued shouting their slogans and singing patriotic songs.

The afternoon ended with a long meeting during which the students attempted to set up a "coordination committee" and started to prepare a platform. The strikers decided to continue their action, although they had not received as much support as they wanted from within the university. The movement did, indeed, grow larger on Tuesday but it seemed more a protest against police intervention than to promote Berber culture. It was noted that most of the students remained passive at the scientific and technical university in Bab-Esouar, 20 km east of Algiers, where classes continued normally and there were few strikers.

Messages of Support to the Authorities

Late Tuesday evening, the APS disseminated an editorial entitled "The Obscure Designs of Neocolonialism." After vigorously condemning the fact that a problem of national scope had been brought up in the streets by "questionable means" and "outside of existing democratic institutions," the editorial brought up the question of "certain offices and organizations in France." The agency said: "These offices and organizations have always tried to make the question of restoration of the national language, which was put down by colonialism, a center of discord among Algerians. That is in particular the case of a certain Ali Yahia Rachid, who acquired French nationality and is directing a so-called Algerian Unity Front (FUA) supported by certain services. In statements carried by an outlying radio station, he does not conceal his real intentions."

In conclusion, the agency issued an appeal "to the conscience and vigilance of the students." Finally, the agency published several messages of support "to the political leadership of the country" emanating from municipalities of two localities: Kabylie, Ain-el-Hamman (formerly Michelet) and Dra-el-Mizan, as well as committees of farmers, former combatants and women in the latter city, where a demonstration in support of the Algiers and Tizi-Ouzou students took place.

Ait Ahmed, "historical leader" of the FLN and head of the opposition organization, Front of Socialist Forces (FFS), in a communique denounced "the clubbings and repression" in Algiers and said:

"How can we lay claim to socialism, speak of returning to our roots and of democratizing culture when we deny the existence of a national culture whose contribution to the struggle for liberation patriots we cannot deny? Such a denial is fascistic and reactionary in character and falls within the framework of a bestowed charter which prefers to ignore the totality of the problem of national integration in order to divide the Algerian people and to cut them off from their traditions of democratic and revolutionary struggle."

Foreign Manipulation

Paris LE POINT in French 14-20 Apr 80 p 51

[Article by Daniel Junqua]

[Text] Algiers--The picture is now clear: the students on strike in Algiers and Tizi-Ouzou who are demanding an "authentically popular national culture, which makes a place in particular for the Berber heritage and language," are acting like enemies of the revolution. They are being "manipulated by reactionary forces tied to neocolonial imperialist interests" which are attempting in any way they can to "undermine national unity, the Arab character of the Algerian people, their attachment to the ideals of Islam and their commitment to build a socialist society." This excerpt from an "appeal" published Thursday, 10 April, by the National Union of Algerian Youth (UNJA) gives an idea of the tone of the campaign conducted by the authorities to discredit the strikes in the eyes of the people. The demonstration organized Monday in Paris is described in the same text as "an attempt to occupy our embassy." Action by members of the opposition, the UNJA says finally, is added to the "provocations of all kinds orchestrated by imperialism."

These arguments were taken up and developed during a large meeting held Thursday in Tizi-Ouzou after a "march" through the principal streets of the city. In the evening, there was a lengthy television account of this demonstration. The participants, numbering over several thousand, brandished giant portraits of President Chadli Bendjedid and many banners proclaiming in Arabic and even in French: "A single language, a single people," "No to reaction," "No to cultural neocolonialism." The different speakers, wali (prefect), national commissioner of the FLN party and commanders of the military sector of Tizi-Ouzou called upon the audience to close ranks around the chief of state and the political leadership of the country. They condemned "the troubles stirred up by internal and external enemies of the revolution" and in particular "those who frequent the salons of Paris."

It is, therefore, a dialog between deaf persons which is being undertaken, since the striking students at the outset set about challenging all these accusations by themselves denouncing the efforts of organizations designed to harness their activities by nailing "the Berber academy in Paris" to the cross, by proclaiming their loyalty to socialism and their adherence to Islam and by denying that their movement has any secessionist or autonomist character. By wishing to see nothing in the initiative of the opposition except a seditious undertaking manipulated from abroad, the leaders, whose analyses of the question could not always converge, are avoiding engaging in an in-depth, delicate debate on freedom of cultural expression and the place in the nation for a Berber-speaking minority which, united, is demanding the right to be different.

Those who favor rapid and systematic Arabization are doubtless not inclined to make concessions because of the extent to which they have just made many points and have secured control of key positions in the state. Some students, noting that EL MOUDJAHID had brought out the "need for taking charge of an important aspect of the national cultural heritage" and that the UNJA is talking about "the blossoming of our cultural heritage, including our popular heritage," want, however, to maintain the hope of seeing the authorities take their demands into consideration.

8143
CSO: 4400

CHILDREN OF HARKIS ADMITTED WITHOUT VISAS

Paris LE MONDE in French 3 Apr 80 p 6

[Article by Daniel Junqua]

[Text] Algiers--Official Algerian quarters have greeted with a certain amount of surprise statements made in Paris by two leaders of an organization of repatriates, the Recours [Recourse], according to whom the children of Harkis under 30 years of age would henceforth be authorized to return freely to Algeria. Recours is said to have received this assurance from the Algerian ambassador to France, Mr Salmoun, who reportedly gave directives to this effect to the Algerian consulates. (LE MONDE, 2 Apr 80). It is noted here that the children of Harkis hold French passports and, therefore, do not need to have a visa to enter Algeria. They have full rights to go there. Some persons are wondering, therefore, what role the consulates could play.

The problem of the free movement of former Harkis between France and Algeria is one of the points of difference now being discussed by the two countries. This problem will be handled by the working group which is concerned with the individual rights. This particularly delicate subject does not seem to have been discussed by the negotiators as yet. Algeria's position in this regard has always been very clear. It refuses in an almost systematic manner to permit entrance into its territory of former "Harkis or assimilated persons," such as the former rural guards, who are considered "traitors" and "collaborators." Every year, dozens of them, even hundreds, are turned back at border posts, but not without having been insulted. To reasons of principle, inspired by nationalism, are added the concern for protecting the lives of the interested parties from vengeance, which is still possible. In the remote douars of Kabylie and Aures, hatred is tenacious. A few years ago, a former auxiliary of the French army, who had returned to the country with a false identity to get his wife and take her back to France, had his throat cut the first night he was in his village.

On the other hand, the children of Harkis—who must number 200,000-300,000--have never been subjected to systematic repulsion. The authorities feel, in fact that they do not have to pay for the sins of their parents and are ready to accept them in to the national community. A certain number of young

people, tired of living on the fringes of a society which rejects them, have even asked to return to Africa where they fulfilled their military obligations and resumed their nationality of origin without difficulty. Paradoxically, the only real problems concerning the young people, particularly if they are minors, has nothing to do with their entrance into Algeria but with their departure therefrom. Children, who are sent by former Harkis to vacation with their families remaining in Algeria, are at times held back by their grandparents, or uncles, and cannot depart for France.

(Let us remember that in 1962 and 1963 the French army, as it withdrew, at its own initiative and under its sole control, had assured the departure to France of several thousand Moghasnis and Harkis and members of commando groups concerned about escaping the reprisals which claimed so many other victims. About 150,000 "French Moslems," including families, crossed the Mediterranean in this manner. At the beginning of 1965, following an agreement reached with the Algerian authorities, the Harkis who had remained in Algeria were authorized to go to France. They were assembled in a reception center which operated until 1970. More than 5,000 former auxiliaries, including several who had escaped from camps where they were being detained, were thus able to cross the Mediterranean. Beforehand, at the request of the French authorities, they signed an agreement to never return to Algeria and were notified by the Algerian services, which had expelled them, that they were banned from returning to the country. However, no document was ever issued to take away their Algerian nationality, so as not to penalize their descendants.)

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CSO: 4400

GROUNDWORK FOR REORGANIZATION OF STATE ENTERPRISES DETAILED

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French 14-20 Mar 80 pp 17-18

[Excerpts] On 5 and 6 March 1980, the Palace of Nations hosted a national seminar devoted to the reorganization of state enterprises. These two days of studies, which brought together heads of enterprises and presidents of ATE [expansion unknown], undeniably constitute a new and important step in the process of evaluating achievements of the past decade and in the establishment of a positive dialog on ways and means to be used to create the most favorable conditions to the pursuit of the socioeconomic objectives of our development.

Presiding over the opening session of the seminar, Mohamed Said Mazouzi, member of the Political Bureau and chairman of the Legal Commission and general organization, said in his introductory speech: "In scope and substance, this important seminar represents a major meeting place for discussion of politics and economics, and when we speak of politics, we are necessarily referring to the higher interest of our nation and our people in order to consolidate our economic independence."

Undeniable Importance

The National Constitution clearly states that management structures do not represent a rigid dogma and that they can be amended, improved or transformed based on experience, new development objectives to be achieved, the development of productive forces, improvement in the degree of maturity of the workers' social consciousness and the furthering of progress in all forms.

It is therefore easy to understand why the work of the commission, which took place on 5 and 6 March, is of undeniable importance for the future, inasmuch as the resolutions adopted will be submitted to the Political Bureau and the Council of Ministers for their study and approval before being presented to the Central Committee.

But let us now look at the content of the commission's work as well as the principal problems taken up at that seminar. Since 15 January 1980, the

ad hoc commission has organized its work into four subcommittees: commerce and industry, infrastructures, insurance and banking, agriculture and fishing.

Its task was: to analyze to what extent structural modifications could increase the effectiveness of socialist enterprises; to determine the scope of such modifications and the need for accompanying measures in order to achieve the objective of better general effectiveness of the economy; and to spell out the degree of such reforms based on the nature of the sectors involved (housing, public works, banks, industry, agriculture, and so on).

According to the document on the principal problems taken up and the nature of the orientations needed, work done is to lead, with respect to problems of reorganizing enterprises, to decisions having to do with: the responsibility given to every enterprise; the nature of the functions they are to perform (the production of goods and services, investment, exporting, importing and distribution); the nature of products and services of which they are in charge; the geographical distribution of the industrial system (national, regional, wilaya [governorate] and communal systems); and the type of internal organization of every enterprise.

Through this set of criteria and elements of methodology and approach to problems posed by the reorganization of enterprises, one can grasp perfectly the commission's concern over arriving at reliable results within the scope of the operation undertaken in the field.

In the light of experience acquired and the new circumstances of economic development, every subcommittee presented a report that was adopted at the plenary session.

For the commerce and industry committee, it was recognized that the complex but indispensable action of enterprises in all the country's sectors of activity could only achieve its objective if it is put back into the overall framework of national planning. It was therefore recommended that whenever possible, economic planning instruments be used in the place of purely administrative instruments of coordination.

Likewise, based on the report of the subcommittee, it was deemed desirable to clarify the respective roles and tasks of the central administration (ministries of tutelage, finance, planning, commerce and other administrations having to do with economic regulation) and of the enterprises. Along the same line of ideas, the need to settle problems of technical and economic coordination between national enterprises and regional or local enterprises occupied the attention of the subcommittee, which believes that a view of a better definition of the national or local nature of the enterprises implies the consideration, not of a given state of functions performed by the enterprise, but of a dynamic evolution of specialization.

Strengthening Monopoly

Regarding commerce, the separation of the functions of production and marketing should be accompanied by a contractual policy of prices. The reorganization should strengthen the state monopoly over foreign trade and wholesale trade, while providing better conditions for the organization, management and supervision of the industrial and commercial private sector.

A means of strengthening the planning system as an instrument of managing and democratizing the economy, the reorganization program must help reduce the weight of imports, goods and services encumbering our overall resources.

As for the agricultural and fishing committee, the study of the reorganization of the enterprises making up the support structure cannot be separated from the organization and the situation of the agricultural sector.

Regarding the latter, a certain number of observations and criticisms have been made, including the following:

With respect to organization, the difficulties are also linked to the lack of well-thought-out choices of production, and a limitation to highly strategic crops would have eased the organization of support structures.

Types of management in the field of agriculture succeeded one another at an excessively rapid rate and no experiment was carried to completion in order to derive all that could be learned from it.

The absence of an organized dialog between the world of producers and their environment hurt the producer, considering the lack of any arbitration. There resulted an absence of responsibility on the part of organizations involving producers and the producers' loss of interest in agriculture, inasmuch as they felt they did not have the strength to fight to take over their production functions.

These reasons and their numerous corollaries explain to a great extent: the inadequate production and productivity, the result of a denaturation of the producer; a rural exodus toward more profitable economic sectors; and difficulties in transferring products, which will cause disturbances of distribution, particularly of fruits and vegetables.

For the infrastructure subcommittee, the agenda included the following points: the current type of organization of enterprises in the infrastructure sector; the size of the enterprise in the sector; the prerogatives of the enterprises; actions previous to or parallel with reorganization; types of reorganization measures envisaged; and accompanying measures.

The basic problems of infrastructure activities have to do with the development of higher performance by: the reorganization of enterprises already in existence by providing them with formalized master plans, function slips and well-defined systems and procedures; the establishment of new design

and construction enterprises, whose number and vocation will depend on the short- and medium-range plans and policies for development of the territory.

Criteria

The criterion for applying the programs chosen was the territorial nature of the field of action (national, regional, wilaya, communal level). As for the internal organization of the national enterprise, it must take into consideration the criteria of specialization based on the nature of activity and the creation of structures for major projects.

Among the accompanying measures in the infrastructure sector, in addition to the application of the GSE [expansion unknown], the efficiency of enterprises, improved living and working conditions and decentralization, one also finds tutelage-enterprises relations. Actually, relations between the body exercising tutelage and the enterprises must be normalized so as to prevent any misunderstanding or ambiguity in the internal management of the enterprise. For the subcommittee, it is obvious that the role of tutelage must be limited to the functional framework — that is, orientation, strategic planning, inter-enterprise coordination and supervision. It is understood that operational factors are the province of the enterprise.

Finally, the insurance and banking committee was to define the orientations relating to the role of the banking system in our system of planning investments and financing production and marketing activities, and relating to the role of the BCA [Central Bank of Algeria], which is called upon to modify, clarify and strengthen with regard to the creation of money and the general management of the country's means of foreign payment.

The advantage of setting up "regional banks" in order to provide better handling of household activities or the promotion and support of small and medium-size industries, and the splitting of current banks into sectorial banks were the essential subjects placed before the insurance and banking group. In general, reorganization measures are to lead to decentralized decisions in keeping with the desire for greater economic decentralization and greater autonomy of enterprises.

In time, certain reorganization measures may become immediately necessary because their application is possible. On the other hand, in certain cases, the problem must be looked at in medium-range terms (1984-1985) after a phase of preparation, for reasons of efficiency.

Whatever the case, a real plan for the reorganization of enterprises should be drawn up and included in the overall national plan.

In conclusion, one can say that through the work of the ad hoc commission, one can clearly see the major concern of political leaders, that of reaching complete efficiency of our production apparatus so as to view future phases of our development with calm.

The reflection on the reorganization of enterprises was a significant demonstration of the reconsideration of relations between public enterprises and their configuration, vocation and responsibility. The hopes placed in this procedure call for a salutary production process moving in the same direction as our development strategy, a new thrust that will respond to the needs of the times. The principle has been established, the tone has been set and the process has been initiated. The next meeting of the Central Committee will certainly determine the policy to be followed in this domain and the appropriate methods of application.

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CSO: 4400

NEW FAMILY CODE TO BE BASED ON KORAN, PUBLIC OPINION

Paris LE MONDE in French 13 Mar 80 p 10

[Article by Daniel Junqua]

[Text] Algiers--A highly controversial subject, the drafting of a new family code, is once again on the agenda. The commission to draft the code is headed by Minister of Justice Lahcene Soufi and includes members of the FLN, the High Islamic Council, the National Union of Algerian Women (UNFA), representatives of the different ministries, jurists and members of the teaching profession.

Soufi told the National Council of UNFA that work would be based "on the Koran and general public opinion" and that the drafting of the code "would be done in harmony with usage and customs, the demands of development and Islamic and Arab traditions." The preliminary draft will be sent to the government and then to the People's National Assembly, he said.

The minister's remarks, reported by EL MOUDJAHID, gave rise to concern on the part of some individuals, especially those who fear that the text being drafted will not resemble the one prepared in 1973, which encountered violent opposition in university and trade union circles. In keeping with usage and customs, it allowed bigamy and the practice of the dowry to subsist, prohibited the marriage of an Algerian woman with a non-Muslim and continued to forbid adoption.

Drawing the conclusions from these confrontations, President Boumediene told the UNFA congress in April 1974 that "we are leaving the debate open." Recalling that one had to take into consideration "the fact that we are an Arab and a Muslim people," he nevertheless added that all decisions made or to be made would have to "be in perfect agreement with the basic socialist options of our evolution."

Some women fear that this aspect of the problem may be relegated to a secondary level and deem that any code not in keeping with constitutional provisions and the orientations of the national constitution would not be acceptable.

ALGERIA

'EL MOUDJAHID' HITS FRENCH ROLE IN TIZI-OUZOU EVENTS

LD020933 Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 25-26 Apr 80 p 1

[Article: "Those Who Pull the Strings"]

[Text] The CIA is on the rampage in Iran, admittedly in a pitiful way. In Algeria the equivalent French services, which has not ceased to "see red" since the Algerian people sent them packing to exercise their skills in their own country, have not given up hope of bringing the Algerian revolution to its knees. And any means are good ones.

From the Cap-Sigle "bombers" to the recent events in Tizi-Ouzou it is the same plot, the same objectives sought. The scenario was different this time since these same services which harbored the nostalgic killers of the Secret Army Organization (OAS)--who have continued their Arab-bashing against innocent emigre workers--the Serving Native Auxiliary Contingents (HARKIS) with an excessively short memory and the political corpses who seek support for their pathetic solitary dreams from Paris to Cairo via Rabat, these secret services have thus resorted to the old demons which they have supported in our society for over a century: Bringing Arabs and Berbers into conflict even though Algeria was already a nation displaying unity and solidarity long before the colonial occupation.

Yes, the "sergeants" and other destabilization experts have always had an Ali Yahia Rachid or other poor lost souls to carry out their filthy task.

Yes, in the space of a few weeks the "little Switzerland" of East Algiers--we remember perfectly how the colonialist left it to us on his departure--Tizi-Ouzou showed all the signs of having gone through a tornado in recent days. So people are asking themselves: Why and how is it possible that eruptions could have occurred on such a scale? And the central question which people are asking themselves: By what miracle is it that these acts of violence failed to produce a single death? In this respect we challenge the spreaders of conflicting news to prove what they say by providing a single name in this direction.

The reasons which explain the how and why of what, for lack of another name, are commonly called the Tizi-Ouzou events depend on the aims pursued by these pyromaniacs, a name given them by our colleague "A. A.," when they seized on the local expression of a popular cultural claim, the Berber character of the whole Algerian people, to turn it into a political war horse directed against national sovereignty, the people's unity and their socialist choices and active position in the world.

Before saying who gains from these events, and above all the acts of vandalism and destruction, let us look at the aims of the agitators who began their subversion from the day after 10 March. What, then, is the meaning of the attack on the FLN headquarters and Kasma [local party bodies], the signboards in Arabic of the local administration and institutions, the people's communal assembly and the communal multi-service agriculture cooperation, the sacking of Le Baloua Hotel and the destruction of the road signs and telephone lines linking the Dairas of the Wilaya.

Are these attacks on the people's property and the structures of national sovereignty not related to the pamphlets which have been circulated in the region demanding that the national charter and the FLN single party system be questioned? What were the agitators hoping to gain by paralyzing local government, by putting pressure on traders to pull down the shutters, by ransacking the Galeries Algeriennes, by inciting the workers of the Onalait concern to stop the Wilaya's milk supplies, by plundering such remarkable collective achievements as the bus station where they set fire to buses, even school buses, the local craft store, pharmacies, and so forth, in short, everything which serves the population's daily needs.

The facts are there to emphasize the scale of the plot launched from dubious dens in France perfectly synchronized with the French media which are breaking out into an obscene anti-Algerian campaign thanks to internal support which has actively collaborated in the execution of the conspiracy.

If the facts are indeed inflexible to reproach a French journalist who quotes Lenin to infuse his anti-national spleen, they are not forgotten. They enable us to realize that in all the "double hits" prepared by those dens for Algeria's sake, the French press has played a significant role in revealing people's feeling toward us across the Mediterranean.

The verbal violence and odious insinuations poured out by the French radio and the press--aimed equally at our emigre community--their insistence on distorting the facts and presenting them in a light which suits their subversive activity, all this has made them forget to establish one clear thing which is staring them in the face: The scale of the destruction in the city of Tizi-Ouzou and the absence of any death!

When you realize that all these acts of provocation were aimed at nothing other than provoking the drama and goading the security services into using

their weapons so that blood might flow, so that these agitators and foreign media could utilize this to divide our people and arouse hatred; when you note the coolness of the security services in the face of these excesses, and this for several days, then you must conclude that the maturity of every Algerian is even stronger and that this plot will fail like all those which have preceded it.

The lessons to be drawn from the Tizi-Ouzou events are indeed many. The city is now starting to return to normal and recover from its shock. The mass of inhabitants and students, who now have the necessary respite to reflect on the events which they unwittingly caused or of which they were the powerless witnesses, must make up time and get back into the rhythm of the whole country which is preparing itself for other trials, more noble than these, which will enable all the problems of the country's economic, social and cultural development to be met and solved.

CSO: 4400

ALGERIA

BRIEFS

FREE MOVEMENT OF FRENCH MOSLEMS--The PS [Socialist Party] "is pleased with the announcement made on the occasion of the meeting of leaders of Recours and the Algerian ambassador to France that free movement will be granted to the children of French Moslems." Recalling that it "had never stopped working" along these lines, "particularly at the time of its contacts with Algerian officials," the PS "salutes this humanitarian gesture which can only contribute to the improvement of Franco-Algerian relations." [Text] [Paris LE MONDE in French 3 Apr 80 p 6] 8143

SURVEILLANCE OF BEN BELLA--Surveillance of Ahmed Ben Bella, in Mails, was stepped up recently. The Algerian leaders seem to fear a revival of the popularity of the former Algerian president. On the occasion of one of his visits to the mosque, in February 1980, he was acclaimed by several hundred faithful, whom the police dispersed. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 14-20 Apr 80 p 51] 8143

ALGERIAN, YUGOSLAV AGREEMENT--Algiers--A decree has been published granting approval to an agreement concluded between Sonatrach and the Yugoslav Nafta-gas company on prospecting for and development of liquid hydrocarbons in Algeria. This is the first stage in a vast program of hydrocarbon exploration decided on by Algeria within the framework of recent national developments in the field of energy. The agreement will serve to strengthen the traditional ties of friendship and cooperation between Algeria and Yugoslavia. [LD030434 Algiers APS in French 1000 GMT 30 Apr 80]

CSO: 4400

BAHRAIN

GOVERNMENT SEEKS 60-75 PERCENT OWNERSHIP OF REFINERY

GF031100 Manama GULF MIRROR in English 3-9 May 80 p 1

[Text] Bahrain is seeking between 60-75 percent participation in the ownership of BAPCO's [Bahrain Petroleum Company] refinery, Minister of Development and Industry Yusuf al-Shirawi revealed this week.

But he added: "It is not our policy to take over the refinery completely. We want to reach an agreement with Caltex whereby they will be satisfied to remain with us."

Bahrain's oil production currently accounts for less than 20 percent of the throughput of the 250,000 barrels-a-day refinery. It manufactures a wide range of finished petroleum products, including LPG, gasoline, naphthas, jet fuels, kerosenes, gas oils, fuel oils, marine bunkers and asphalt.

With a major equity participation in the refinery, possibly through a new company, the government would want to increase the throughput of its own oil, Mr al-Shirawi said. Additional crude would be obtained from Saudi Arabia, but this would not affect Caltex's allocation of Saudi oil.

"Caltex has other outlets where it can process its crude," he said.

A spokesman for BAPCO confirmed that discussions are in progress.

Discussions are expected to hinge on the availability and source of crude, sales of finished products, the management of the refinery, the nature of the new company, and the date of implementation of the ownership proposals.

Last December's agreement with BAPCO, and its parent company Caltex, giving Bahrain control of the remaining 40 percent of its oil resources was backdated to January 1, 1979.

CSO: 4820

GENERAL SHAZLI DISCUSSES CHANGE IN SADAT REGIME

Algiers AL-NOUDJAHID in French 17 Apr 80 pp 1, 6

[Interview with Gen Sa'd al-Din Shazli, by A. Zouled: "Changing the Sadat Regime Can Only Be Accomplished Through Revolutionary Violence"; date and place not given]

[Text] The announcement of the establishment of the Egyptian National Front [FNE] by General Shazli, former chief of staff of the Egyptian Army and hero of the October War, is putting pressure on the Sadat regime which is bogged down in the throes of capitulation and is carrying on a life-and-death struggle in its policy of dividing the opposition, which unanimously decided to take action to reintegrate Egypt in the Arab nation and rid it of its ogre of oppression.

In a lengthy interview he granted us, General Shazli stressed, one after the other, the various phases which are to lead to the overthrow of Sadat and the dangers which threaten the Arab region through Israel's economic and cultural penetration of Egypt preceding the military invasion which will complete its control.

Analysing the recent Assiout events and the denominational incidents centered unfortunately in Egyptian cities, General Shazli indicated that they were a logical follow-up to the divisive policy practiced by Sadat and never before experienced since the advent of Islam.

Strongly denying gross "information" circulating in Cairo and calling attention to the FNE's intention to ask the Arab states to withhold a certain percentage of the wages of Egyptians working there, General Shazli specifically told the latter that the FNE is there to help them and that it will soon take steps with friendly countries on their behalf.

[Question] Can you tell us in what circumstances the FNE, of which you are the secretary general, was established?

[Answer] The idea of creating an Egyptian National Front arose as far back as September 1978 at the time of the negotiations between Sadat and the Zionist State; even before, during and after the conclusion of the Camp David accords.

Its objective is to rally all the opposition in order to confront the Sadat regime with firmness, based on the conviction that a scattered opposition will never be able to break down an autocratic regime whose policy is founded on oppression, deprivation and a ban on freedom of expression.

Therefore, from September 1978 on, there were meetings among various opposition groups both abroad and within the country; and these meetings continued until September 1979 without any positive results due to lack of agreement.

I then decided to intervene personally and meet with the different opposition factions.

A platform was found and agreed upon by the vast majority, and a meeting was held in Algiers at which we adopted the front's charter and the principles I proclaimed in Damascus on 27 March.

In fact, the latter were finalized on 26 February 1980 and I was authorized to choose the time and place to make them public. This was done, as you are aware, in Damascus on 27 March 1980 after I met with certain Arab states, particularly those of the Front for Resistance and Solidarity.

[Question] What does the FNE represent with regard to current opposition operating within the country? Is there any coordination between them?

[Answer] It is obvious that any change in the current regime can only take place within the country; but we cannot lose sight of the fact that national Egyptian elements abroad can also make a valuable contribution to this great task, particularly by means of information.

Moreover, it must be made clear that opposition within the country is confined to the underground, that it is pursued by the regime and deprived of any possibility of confronting the regime, just as it is deprived of all forms of expression.

It is at this point that opposition abroad becomes important, being completely free to attack the government, unmask its lies and make the Arab people of Egypt aware of the realities and ineptitudes propagated by Sadat.

In any case, opposition abroad and from within complement each other. One has the possibility of denouncing the manipulations of the current regime; the other can engage in revolutionary action which cannot be taken by the opposition abroad. That is the narrow bond which unites us.

[Question] Does the FNE consider itself an opposition group or a liberation movement?

[Answer] We are an opposition group which works simultaneously for the overthrow of the regime and for the liberation of the Egyptian will. We

can therefore not say that we are a movement of liberation or opposition. In other words, we are both at one time. In the face of an autocratic and dictatorial regime, change can only take place through revolutionary violence, since there are no democratic means of accomplishing that purpose.

Question In order to preserve Egypt's independence and return it to the fold of the Arab nation, the FNE has set itself the objective of overthrowing Sadat. Are we permitted to know the course of action?

Answer We do indeed have an idea on how to overthrow the regime. The first phase is undoubtedly to organize the opposition, the second is a propaganda campaign and the third is revolutionary action.

In reality, there is no clearcut separation among these three phases; they are interdependent.

With regard to organizing the opposition, it must be said that there are several trends and that the opposition movement suffers from a lack of top leadership. That is why we have thought it worthwhile to carry out this first phase before devoting our efforts to the propaganda campaign which already exists but which we want to intensify in order to make the people aware of the realities and create the conditions necessary for a direct confrontation with the government and its overthrow by force.

We do not mean thereby to replace the dictatorial regime with a regime of force but only to note the fact that we are obliged to abandon the democratic style, applied in democratic countries, for one of revolutionary violence in order to overthrow this regime.

Question Several thousand Egyptians live abroad enjoying their freedom. Do you plan to organize them and have them take part in the front's objectives?

Answer Naturally. In fact, there are a great many Egyptians living in foreign countries--about 2 to 3 million, according to statistics; of these, there is an active population of nearly 1 million workers.

That is a figure which the front took into consideration with the aim of opening our ranks to all who want to participate. Therefore, we plan to aid them to become organized within the factions and parties cited by the front, that is, the pro-Nassar group, the religious group and the Rally Party in which there are various factions, including the communists and the independents.

Question The front has considered the propaganda campaign one of its principal weapons in the struggle against the Sadat regime. Can we say that you plan to use a radio station to get through to the Egyptian people?

[Answer] Yes, indeed; we have considered this method of communication, but in a first phase we shall use the radio stations of the Front for Solidarity countries about 1 hour per day. We believe that will be sufficient without, however, excluding the creation of a radio station of our own, if events prove this to be necessary.

[Question] Have you already opened FNE offices in Arab countries?

[Answer] We have begun by appointing individuals, but we have not made their names public. I want to take this opportunity to recall that FNE decisions are made democratically and that, in this regard, there is a list of candidates which will be revealed only after there is agreement among the various FNE members. This will be perhaps in 1 month.

[Question] How do you analyze the recent Assiout demonstrations and the denominational incidents?

[Answer] The Assiout demonstrations and the denominational incidents are the logical result of the Sadat policy based on the principle "divide to govern" to maintain himself in power.

Since his accession to power, Sadat has not ceased to pit one against the other and to strengthen one party to the detriment of another before turning against him.

The only way to put an end to this divisive policy is to get rid of the regime practicing it.

This is to tell you that Egypt has never had any denominational conflicts before Sadat who fosters them; and this, since the advent of Islam.

Therefore, we are asking our Coptic, Moslem and communist brothers not to offer Sadat the opportunity to exploit them by pitting the one group against the other. That they avoid the trap which is being set for them by Sadat while awaiting his overthrow.

[Question] What do you think of Zionist penetration in the channels of Egyptian national life through commercial and cultural accords established by Sadat with Israel?

[Answer] There you have a question of exceptional seriousness, for Zionist economic and cultural infiltration is only a prelude to the execution of a more extensive plan aimed at total domination of the area.

If Sadat referred to the Koran or Bible, he would learn that the final goal of Zionism is the division of the Arab region or the part extending from the Nile to the Euphrates in order to rid it of its inhabitants and replace them by Zionists.

In this way they will achieve their political, economic and cultural domination of that region.

The 3 million Israelis are well aware of their inability to impose this policy by force; that is why, to achieve their dreams, they are resorting to cultural and economic invasion in order, later, to pave the way for military invasion which will make their total domination a reality.

In conclusion, General Shasli launches an appeal to all Egyptian people, especially those living abroad, putting them on guard against the elements which are maneuvering to keep Egypt black, white, weak, and keep the opposition in a state of discord in order to carry out their designs.

"Thus," General Shasli said, "I am asking them to distinguish between those who are on their side and those who are opposed to them, between their enemies and their friends, and not to yield to propaganda aimed at discrediting the FNE put out by enemies of resistance movements who, however, pretend that this is not so."

8568
CSO: 4800

CAIRO PAPER REPORTS ASSEMBLY APPROVAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

LD081017 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 1 May 80 pp 1, 3, 15

[Report by Jalal Al-Sayyid, 'Isa Marshid and Sharif Riyad on the Egyptian People's Assembly's 30 April session]

[Excerpts] At the beginning of the session, Dr Sufi Abu Talib [People's Assembly speaker] emphasized that the assembly is today holding a historic session because this is the first time in the history of parliamentary life since the establishment of the consultative chamber of deputies [as published] that the constitution is amended in accordance with the constitution and the law. In the past, constitutional amendments were made by a Khedivial decree, a royal decree or a republican decree. Today, the amendments are made by the will of the nation's representatives in the normal manner according to the constitution.

The report of the special committee formed under Dr Sufi Abu Talib to consider the constitutional amendments was then presented to the assembly by Hafiz Badawi, the committee's rapporteur.

After hearing the committee's report, Dr Sufi Abu Talib said that the assembly had approved these amendments in principle last July and that [today's] debate would be on each article separately:

Article 1: The Arab Republic of Egypt is a state having a democratic socialist system based on the alliance of the people's working forces. The Egyptian people are part of the Arab nation and work to achieve the nation's comprehensive unity. (approval).

Article 2: Islam is the religion of the state; the Arabic language is its official language and the principles of the Islamic canonical law are the main source of legislation. (approval and applause).

Article 4 [as published]: The economic basis of the Arab Republic of Egypt is the democratic socialist system which is based on [self] sufficiency

and justice to prevent exploitation, to lead to narrowing the differences in income, to protect legitimate earnings and insure fairness in the distribution of public burdens and costs. (approval).

Article 5: The political system in the Arab Republic of Egypt is based on a multiplicity of parties within the framework of the fundamentals and basic principles of Egyptian society stipulated in the constitution. The law regulates the political parties.

Article 77: The presidential term is 6 Gregorian calendar years, starting on the day on which the referendum results are announced. The president of the republic can be elected for further terms.

The assembly approved this article without amendment.

The assembly then moved to the Shura [Consultative] Council.

Article 194: The Shura Council will be concerned with studying and proposing whatever it deems appropriate to safeguard the principles of the 23 July 1952 and the 15 May 1971 revolutions, consolidate national unity and social peace, protect the alliance of the working people's forces, the socialist gains and the society's fundamentals and ideals and the public rights, freedoms and responsibilities and deepen the democratic socialist system and expand its fields. (approval)

Article 195: The Shura Council's views will be obtained on the following matters:

1--General proposals for the amendment of one or more of the articles of the constitution;

2--Draft laws complementary to the constitution;

3--The draft of the general plan for social and economic development;

4--Conciliation (sulh--Arabic) and alliance treaties and all the treaties which entail alteration of the state's territories or which are connected with the sovereignty rights;

5--Draft laws referred to it by the president of the republic;

6--The subjects which the president of the republic refers to the council in connection with the state's general policy or Arab affairs and foreign policy.

The council shall communicate its views on these matters to the president of the republic and the People's Assembly.

The assembly approved the article as it stands.

Article 196: The Shura Council shall be formed of a number of members to be defined by the law which provides that its membership will not number less than 132. Two-thirds of the council members will be elected by direct secret ballot of the public and at least half this number must be workers and peasants. The president of the republic will elect the remaining one-third.

The assembly approved the article as it stands.

The assembly then approved articles 197 through 205.

Article 197: The law shall define the constituencies of the Shura Council, the number of members in each constituency and the conditions which qualify the candidates and the appointees.

Article 198: The term of Shura Council membership is 6 years. New election and appointment of one half of the council's elected and appointed members shall take place every 3 years, according to law. Re-election and re-appointment of those whose membership had expired is always permissible.

Article 199: The Shura Council shall elect its chairman and two vice-chairmen for a period of 3 years at the first meeting of its normal annual session. Should one of these positions fall vacant, the council will elect a replacement for the remainder of the period.

Article 200: It is not permissible to combine membership of both the Shura Council and of the People's Assembly.

Article 201: The prime minister, the deputies of the prime minister, the ministers and other members of the government are not answerable to the Shura Council.

Article 202: The president of the republic can deliver his statement on the state's general policy or any other statements at a joint meeting of the People's Assembly and the Shura Council under the chairmanship of the People's Assembly speaker. The president of the republic can deliver whatever statements he deems appropriate before the People's Assembly.

CSO: 4802

OIL PROSPECTING AGREEMENTS SIGNED

NC021423 Cairo MENA in English 1020 GMT 2 May 80

[Text] Cairo, 2 May (MENA)--A responsible source at the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC) said today that Egypt has initialled seven oil agreements with international oil companies for prospecting for oil and exploiting it in a number of areas in Sinai and Western Desert. The source added that those companies will spend almost 121 million dollars in addition to 15 million as signature bonus for the corporation.

The source sorted out the seven agreements as follows: An agreement with U.S. CONOCO for prospecting for oil in a 600 kilometer area at Ra's Muhammad, south to Sinai. The duration of the agreement is seven years and the company will spend 13 million dollars in addition to signature bonus of 1.5 million dollars.

The second agreement is with Canadian "Gulf Stream," according to which the company will have a concession of 4,000 kilometers in the area of al-Dab'ah in the Western Desert. The company will spend 16 million dollars in five years and will pay a signature bonus of 750,000 dollars.

The third agreement was made by Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC) and the international company of Midoil, according to which the company will spend 20 million dollars for oil exploration in an area of 4,000 square kilometers in six years and will pay as well two million dollars as a signature bonus.

The fourth agreement is with British L.K., which will prospect for oil in 250 square kilometers in the area of Tanakah Mount, west to Sinai neighbouring to Sadr Valley. The company will spend for the purpose 23 million dollars in four years and a signature bonus of four million dollars.

A second agreement was made with Canadian Gulf Stream according to which the company will undergo oil exploration operations in the area of Jabal al-Wasit near Sadr Valley in 700 square kilometers. The company will spend 21 million dollars and a signature bonus of three million dollars.

The sixth agreement went to Canadian "Polar" which will prospect for oil in Ra's al-Hikmah al-Bahriyah east to Marsa Matruh, in a 3,200 kilometer [area]. The company will spend 11 million dollars in four years and two million dollars as a signature bonus.

The seventh is with Canadian "Branco," which will prospect for oil, according to the agreement, in 5,200 square kilometers in Shaybah area of the Western Desert spending 17 million dollars for the purpose and a signature bonus of 1.5 million dollars.

CSO: 4820

IRAN

DEFENSE COLLEGE PROCLAIMS PEOPLE'S ISLAMIC ARMY

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 6 Apr 80 p 1

[Article: "National Defense College Announces: A People's Islamic Army Will Be Formed"; original paragraphing not followed]

[Text] Responsible experts, groups, and political parties have been asked to present their proposals concerning the nature and quality of a people's Islamic national army, its structural organization, educational and training systems, etc.

Performing its duty by carrying out its scientific and research mission, attentive to the need to restructure the army in keeping with the changes in other fundamental organizations of the revolutionary Iranian society, and in order to actualize the creation of a national people's army and an accurate understanding of defense affairs, the National Defense College, in facing reality, is planning to hold a seminar on defense problems and national security, subject to the approval of the joint forces of the army of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Since it would be impossible to reach a favorable, effective, and logical conclusion without knowledge of the opinions and demands of all our compatriots--experts, academicians, authorities, political parties, and revolutionary societies and groups--all interested people, committed groups, and people who have a responsible and conscientious understanding of the reconstruction of Iran and the necessity of protecting the Islamic revolution are invited to present their opinions on some or all of the following issues or on other proposed issues within the framework of the constitution before 15 Apr 80 [25/1/59] in writing to the administrative office of the seminar located at the National Defense College,

Chaharrah-e Qasr, Sehrah-e Heshmatiyyeh, and in so doing perform their national, Islamic duty in bringing about one of the goals of the Islamic revolution of Iran.

Finally, please include addresses and telephone numbers to facilitate future communication concerning participation in the seminar meetings to be held for one week at the beginning of Apr-May 80 [Ordebehesht 1359] at the National Defense College.

For further information call 840158 or 851538 daily from 0800 to 1300.

1. The nature and quality of a people's Islamic national army
2. The role of the military in relation to a universal Islamic holy campaign [Jahad-e eslami]
3. The mission, duty, policy, and quality of work of the people's army during times of war and peace
4. The structural organization, educational and training systems, size, and ability of the peoples armed forces (ground, air, and sea forces) to carry out the duties and missions assigned to them
5. The system of command, consulting administration, and discipline of the army
6. The scale and quality of participation of personnel in political affairs concerning disciplinary problems, unity of command, and national unity
7. Foreign policy, international relations, and national security
8. The nature of the dangers of domestic and foreign conspiracies which threaten national security
9. The role of the military in confronting foreign and internal threats and dangers
10. The role of the military as the central nucleus and essential element in bringing about an army of 20 million regarding military training, support, mobilization, and guidance during times of war and peace

11. The role of the military in emergency, education, and production work and the Holy Campaign of Reconstruction [jahad-e sazandegi]
12. Plans for changing the general industries of the country to war and military industries in periods of crisis or war
13. The problem of military industries as regards industrial dependence and its reduction, specialization, the utilization of an industrial economy, technological transformation, and logistical management
14. Economic strategy in supporting defense policies and national security
15. The national revenue and its role in supporting the country's defense costs
16. The people's army and education
17. The philosophy of a guerrilla army in Iran
18. The sociological foundation of the people's army
19. A comparative study of the defense systems of the armies of different countries
20. Other individual proposals related to problems of defense and national security

9593

CSO: 4906

EDITORIAL TREATMENT OF IRAN CRISIS REVIEWED

Paris LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE in French Apr 80 pp 6, 7

[Article by Marie-France Toinet, research director, National Foundation for Political Science: "Some Weeks of the Iranian Revolution"]

[Excerpts] For many born into the years of World War II it was almost impossible to believe that their elders had not known what was going on in the Nazi concentration camps. It was difficult to be convinced that the ignorance claimed was not in fact hypocrisy, if not cowardice. The Algerian war strengthened that impression; those who wanted to, could know. Henry Alleg's "La Question" was not banned haphazardly: a good part of the political class, upheld by a large part of opinion, imposed or accepted a censorship which was at times open, at others more underhanded.

LE MONDE, broken in to these matters by the evaluation of participation in demonstrations, settled on speaking of "about a hundred hostages, sixty of whom were Americans." On the other hand, the obsession of the Americans remained as in the following dialog as commented on by P. Blanchet in LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: "An American journalist: 'Tell us, for heaven's sake, how many hostages are there?' Bani Sadr: 'Sixty-three, I think, but that's not the important thing.' Sixty, 63, 65? Ten days after the U.S. Embassy had been occupied, no one yet knew just how many hostages were being held. Incredulity was written across the face of the American journalist." This incredulity, so well brought out by the French journalist, is a symbol of the lack of understanding between two antithetical cultures, neither of which knew much about the other, and this is one of the explanations for the crisis.

The obsession with precision thus implies the idea that bare facts produce objectivity, neutrality. But figures don't exist "in themselves." It is their selection which is significant. Probably it is not very important to know the exact number; to the unit, of the hostages. Is it so uninteresting, before Iranian insistence that the shah was committing genocide, to know that it was so? Already at this stage, it was being discussed in the left wing press much more than in that of the right. And when it is being spoken of, the manner of speaking testifies to a fundamental ideological disagreement, much more apparent in the French press, for example, than in the American. Jean-Francois Revel, in L'EXPRESS, affirms: "I have always profoundly detested SAVAK." But in the following paragraph he writes: "when no one in the international community will spontaneously and totally stand by the country victimized (by such taking of hostages), a green light is given to the sup-

pression of diplomatic life, purely and simply." On the other hand, while L'HUMANITE is certainly "opposed to the taking of hostages and believes respect for diplomatic immunity is necessary," continues "how can the Iranians forget being the victims of bloody oppression during the dozens of years following the coup d'etat engineered by the American secret services and which resulted in the installation of the shah and his dictatorship?" And LUTTE OUVRIERE goes even further in linking the two events "the hostages concerned are not simple passers by, at least some are direct agents of American imperialism in Iran."

On the right, Francois Brigneau, in MINUTE, reasons to the very end: "The shah's regime could have had numerous faults, it did present indisputable advantages. It maintained law and order. It was anti-communist and pro-West. It was worth a second look before pushing this "fanatical guru game." Serge Jully proceeds in an inverse direction: "This dialectic of nationalism and human rights implies that their present defenders at least recognize the right of the Iranians to judge the man who deliberately violated them for years. The Iranians come out criticizeable only if it can be simultaneously affirmed that the shah should be judged." Grosso modo, with nuances which are not necessarily deceiving, the French press as a whole can be defined in terms of conflict between freedom and order, between legality and justice. It does not supply an answer--that is not its role. It situates it, implicitly and instinctively--that is its role.

Once again it must bring out those elements which will allow informed conclusions to be drawn. And it recognizes itself that it cannot do it. "The only suitable way to represent this situation would be with a gigantic question mark," affirmed Pierre Charpy. There is no organ of the press which does not at some time or another, on some point or another, assert its incomprehension, its ignorance. Nothing more natural, or more comforting even, there is a sort of wholesomeness in this recognition of powerlessness.

For Western "rationality" can also be equivocal. The reader will not be shown a well-formed American Government policy. Let us take, for a few days only, the reports of FIGARO's Washington correspondent, Charles Lambroschini. Monday, 19 November 1979: "An American military attack against Iran now seems unlikely." Wednesday, 21 November 1979 (AFP): "Yesterday for the first time the United States alluded to their right to an armed intervention." Thursday, 22 November 1979: "Ayatollah Khomeini still has a few days to think it over! This is the time it will take for the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk, carrying 85 fighter planes, to reach the Iranian coast." Friday, 23 November 1979: "The military threat remains theoretical, but it is serious! This is the message American authorities have tried to get across during the past 48 hours." And further on in the same article: "The possibility of military intervention seems to be all the more credible." Monday, 26 November: "President Carter seems to have renounced definitely any project for military intervention." And again: "The Americans seem to have chosen truce. In his turn, Jimmy Carter is running hot and cold."

Finally, Monday, 3 December: "If the ayatollah continues to refuse conciliation, the White House must resign itself to the worst. And this is recourse to force." So? Unlikely or serious? Theoretical or imminent? Inevitable or definitely abandoned? What was 'confusion' in Iran becomes "running hot then cold"—that is, a rational policy—in the United States. In the west "in spite of everything, they keep their cool," "they try to keep clearheaded"; What in Iran is an 'idée fixe' of Khomeyni, passes for firmness in the United States. Is the reality so simple, so simplistic?

The Fanaticism of the Others

Side-slipping words, meanings, is not rare, nor without significance. For example, the term 'fanatic' is frequently awarded to the Ayatollah Khomeyni or to the Iranian crowds by the press (L'HUMANITE is a notable exception), especially by those not in Iran, the correspondants in Tehran seeming to be more moderate in their judgments. According to the dictionary Petit Robert, fanatic means "intolerant, sectarian, elated."

What is interesting is that the question of what the fanaticism of Ayatollah Khomeyni and the Iranians consists of is never really raised. Does the word cover the taking of hostages in despite of international custom? But when the ECHOS writes "it is a long way from the time when the American President sent marines to Santo Domingo to eliminate a regime guilty, in his eyes, of leftist sympathies," it is with a shade of regret and not to invoke the 'fanaticism' of President Johnson. Was not this intervention just as contrary to international rules? Is it because Khomeyni would be a bloody tyrant? Some do not hesitate to incriminate one of his adjoints, Ayatollah Khalkali, who would be "the one who finished off the sick," and accused the ayatollah of having imprisoned "more than 30,000 (political prisoners), the maximum number Iranian prisons could hold." Khomeyni "will remain in history as one of the most terrible symbols of fanaticism, of what is most intolerant, most criminal, and most odious."

But to the leftist press, the shah is a "criminal of the first water... (who) has on his conscience at least a 100,000 persons assassinated." So the choice is up to individual ideology, whether to give greater credence to Claude Bourdet or to FIGARO-MAGAZINE.

Is Iranian 'fanaticism' shown in the treatment inflicted on the hostages? There again the reader will be at a loss. L'HUMANITE affirms that "according to various sources, all the persons detained on embassy precincts are in perfect health." But what are these sources? LE MATIN reports the words of the hostages themselves: "'No,' they explained, 'we have not been ill-treated. Some of the guards have become quite friendly, but they [the hostages] have not been able to communicate with each other and some are beginning to suffer from low morale.' 'How can someone not become introspective,' said Kathy, 'tied to a chair 16 hours a day?'" LA CROIX cites American sources: "A number of American newspapers are suggesting with increasing insistence that the hostages are being subjected to some sort of brain washing." LE FIGARO goes into details:

"Today the Tehran hostages begin the fourth week of their captivity. For 21 days the unhappy Americans have been held by their jailers, 504 hours of being tied hand and foot, being blindfolded during any change of location, being completely cut off from the outside world and hearing the whole day through the muted roar of the frightening, hate-filled crowd." Note that LE FIGARO worries about the fate of the Americans only; the others, Indians and Pakistanis (of whom the press speaks very little) are indubitably suffering less? And finally, L'EXPRESS imagines the hostages "shut in a cellar, insulted, doubtless beaten." Doubtless? We are far from knowing the exact conditions of their detention even though about 20 hostages were freed about 3 months ago. Their silence is not surprising. LE FIGARO affirms: "This secretiveness is officially characterized as being humanitarian, in order to allow the exhostages to regain their psychological equilibrium and, if need be, their mental health." The explanation is only partially convincing given the curiosity, even morbid curiosity, of the American journalist.

A last point: is the 'fanaticism' of Khomeyni indexed by his dictatorship over Iran, over "this people that he does with as he wants." But there is "strong opposition" within the Revolutionary Council, public enough that Eric Rouleau can describe it in detail. But Khomeyni can be "opposed by some militants," and "see his followers taken violently to task" by the partisans of Madari. But the project for the Constitution has been widely debated: "During the past 3 months, the greatest publicity has been given to the deliberations of the Constitutional Committee whose public meetings were televised live. Hundreds of public meetings have been held throughout the country to debate the text. The diverse political groups have analyzed, and often denounced, any dispositions they felt to be antidemocratic." But half the population observed the boycott on the constitutional vote as proposed by "militant Marxist fedayin, the National Democratic Front and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, 17 lay associations, including that of Iranian jurists." But the "all-powerful" imam refused to indicate his personal preference in the presidential election carried by Bani Sadr, though earlier it had been said he had lost confidence.

So, fanaticism? Yet, from 'simple' fanaticism, the characterizations are gliding to harsher, even insulting language, step by step with the advance to the right of the political chessboard.

From L'EXPRESS: "Outside the Law?" (note the question mark) to L'AUORE: "the Imam Khomeyni has put himself outside international law. And the time has come to treat him as such." "The suicidal million (of Khomeyni), his policy of Apocalypse" in L'EXPRESS becomes "frenzied barbarity" in RIVAROL. "Explosive anarchy" in LE POINT transmutes as follows in MINUTE: "Iran has delivered itself up to a dangerous and furious psychopathy, awakening savagery and igniting, before an aghast civilized world, the most ferocious and imbecile fanaticism." And finally, the "out and out xenophobia" of the NOUVEAU JOURNAL metamorphoses into diatribe in RIVAROL: "A population fanaticized and reduced to a state of savagery, a population, once the verneer imposed by the shah's 'white revolution' has been scratched, reveals itself as the 'inner Iran'."

If this is how events in Iran are described, it can very well be asked where the real fanaticism, the real xenophobia, are to be found.

If it's true that the obsession with numbers does not necessarily mean coming to grips with reality, contempt for the facts does necessarily result in biased news, deceiving the reader. More interesting are internal contradictions or attempts to manipulate the news.

To be sure, it is not easy for the journalist to know everything about everything. But when over the space of a few days, the Ayatollah Shari'atmadari is a "liberal", who, with "Muslims of the left" rises with "vehemence against a religious regime" (2-3 December 1979) then becomes "a monarchist at heart and a conservative," (7 December 1979) to end up a "moderate" (8 December 1979) with or without quotes--there's a lot that could be said about the role of quotation marks in the news--wouldn't that be grounds for a smile?

Manipulations, Omissions

More serious are faults in interpretation: when L'HUMANITE (3 December 1979) speaks of a "massive vote" and LE FIGARO of the same day stresses "massive approbation" for the Constitution, isn't this clearly inexact inasmuch as the near-unanimity of the 'yes' vote is counterbalanced by a massive abstention, a clear-cut sign of the opposition responding to the call for a boycott?

One goes from uneasiness to fear when viewing, all too frequently, what can only be termed manipulation of the news. When L'HUMANITE denounces under big headlines "The Elysee Backs Carter" because the Nine (and not France only) feel that the taking of hostages constitutes "a violation of international law" and "launches an appeal to the Iranian Government to free all the hostages," aren't they deceiving their readers? For where is the difference with the statements of Georges Marchais to France-Inter: "We are against the taking of hostages and for respecting diplomatic immunity"? In the other direction, Jean-Francois Revel is just as wrong when he writes that PRAVDA, RADIO-MOSCOW, and L'HUMANITE "stated that the ayatollah's hordes are perfectly justified in sequestering the United States representatives in Iran. Not only does the USSR media not disapprove, they encourage it." From what source do they draw such conclusions? Finally, when L'HUMANITE affirms, still in headlines, that there is 'accord between Iran of the extreme right and the socialists: only the communists are denouncing the holy alliance hostile to the Iranian people that was put together at Strasbourg,' at the European Parliament, aren't they lying by omission? For only the French communists voted against the resolution calling for the immediate release of the hostages, and that only, a resolution approved by the Italian communists.

These manipulations are not reserved to L'HUMANITE and L'EXPRESS only, but are sometimes more subtle. Insinuations (notably on the possible role of the USSR, though no evidence has been brought forward), silences (SAVAK tortures, the role of the U.S. in Iran since 1953, the espionage functions of embassies which are scarcely ever mentioned in the press of the right), or mutilation of texts are used. AFP dispatches (note that LE MONDE is the only newspaper

to cite systematically its sources and the authors of its articles) are the biggest contributors to this practice.

Bagatelles, it might be said, these examples, these citations, these questions, are trivial. Perhaps, but these bagatelles are very revealing of differences in political approaches that are not always explicit but which the reader often divides very well. The French reader can, perhaps even more easily than in the United States, be up to date on more things because the press is so much more diversified here than over there. But who has the money and the time to put and repeat these questions, to make the necessary forays into the past, and this on all problems, not just the one event in one country that we have just touched on? Above all, are we not seeing, after Iran and Afghanistan, at the end of a period of opening and doubt, a sort of intellectual freezing up, a search for certitudes which are the more reassuring the more they are exact?

8860

CSO: 4900

IRAN

CENTRAL BANK DEPUTY EXPLAINS FINANCES, INVESTMENTS

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 9 Apr 80 p 9

[Interview with Dr. Hushang Azarmah, Vice president of the Central Bank of Iran by JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI]

[Text] Our deposits in foreign banks are in fact a kind of investment

The Central Bank implements the monetary policy by changing the legal capital of the banks and sometimes by changing the rate of service charges

Following the news of bank investments in production projects, the country's monetary policy, the detachment of the rial from the dollar, the manner of share payments of nationalized banks, and a number of other important banking concerns, we arranged an interview with Dr Hushang Azarmahd, vice-president of the Central Bank of Iran, here presented for the reader without introduction:

[Question] Iran's monetary resources have increased apparently reaching an estimated \$15 billion. Essentially how are these resources spent and who decides how they are to be used?

[Answer] Our monetary resources are probably about that amount; as a matter of fact, we do have sufficient monetary resources. Concerning decisions about their use, as soon as money is available to us, we put it at the disposal of the government, to the last rial. The government itself decides how it is to be invested and used in the country. Part of our monetary resources which are deposited in foreign banks are in fact a kind of foreign investment from which we also gain income.

Decisions about granting loans to foreign countries are also made by the government, and if the government finds it necessary to give a loan to a country, it sends us word and we take the proper payment procedures.

[Question] Unemployment and inflation are among the crucial problems of the country. What monetary decisions has the Central Bank made to stabilize the economy of the country during the new year?

[Answer] Inflation and unemployment are truly two of the major problems of our country, much of which, of course, was caused by the revolution. It is natural for such problems to occur after a revolution. In the past year, the Central Bank, to control inflation and unemployment, has taken certain steps concerning credit and currency policies, which are stated in detail in the annual report of the bank. For the current year, the Central Bank is studying new ways to stabilize the economy of the country. As soon as these studies are completed, the people will be informed of any decisions.

[Question] Now that interest has been abolished, how does the Central Bank implement its monetary policies?

[Answer] Certainly in the past interest was one of the important instruments of the Central Bank's monetary policy and part of the country's monetary policy was implemented through changing interest rates. At the present time, the Central Bank can decide to increase or decrease the legal capital of the banks thereby changing the ratio of legal bank capital and regulating the amount of money banks can loan or invest. In addition, since the Central Bank generally gives loans to the banking system, it is able to implement its policy regarding other banks to a certain extent by obtaining appropriate service charges. Of course, the changes in service charges are marginal, but still, the effect is notable.

[Question] In the past, the government was studying the feasibility of replacing the monetary policy with a fiscal policy to stabilize the economy. The results of this study have not been released yet. What is your opinion in this regard?

[Answer] This issue is presently being considered, but it appears that for the time being the most effective policy is the monetary policy. As regards stabilization through a fiscal policy, studies are still under way. If these studies should indicate that a fiscal policy is more appropriate for

the stabilization of the country's economy, more consideration will be given to a fiscal policy. Of course, one should not suppose that the monetary policy will be put aside altogether. Since money plays an important role in our economy, a monetary policy will always be of interest to us.

[Question] In every country, in order for a monetary policy to be successful, a balance and a harmony between the monetary policy and fiscal policy are necessary. What steps has the Central Bank taken in this regard?

[Answer] Presently, unfortunately, there is not much of that necessary balance and harmony between these two policies. But we are trying to create more harmony in the future.

[Question] Some time ago, a bank called the Islamic Bank was established in Iran which distributed a number of shares. Does this bank work under the supervision of the Central Bank? How does this bank differ operationally from other banks?

[Answer] This bank has not joined the banking system of Iran. It is an absolutely independent bank whose constitution differs completely with those of the other banks in the national banking system. Since the nature of the economic activities of this bank differs from that of other banks in the system, naturally it differs from them operationally.

[Question] In the past year about 7.5 percent interest was paid to savings account holders. Now, since the rate of inflation in the country is reportedly 12 percent, and the account holders did not become shareholders in the bank's investments, do you not think that the paid interest rate was in effect negative?

[Answer] The inflation rate does not usually relate to the rate of service charges or even interest. Although inflation is a factor which can affect the interest rate, there is no law which sets the rate of service charges and interest to correspond with the rate of inflation. For example, a few years ago, interest rates in England were about 9 percent whereas the rate of inflation was reportedly 16 percent. Therefore, it should not be thought that there should be a definite relationship between these two. But, without a doubt, one of the factors considered in setting interest rates is the country's inflation rate. Generally, interest rates in a country depend on the circumstances of the time and do not necessarily depend at all times or to such a large extent on the rate of inflation.

IRAN

MINISTER OUTLINES WAGE POLICY

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 19 Apr 80 p 10

[Article: "Announcement of Ministry of Labor on Wages"]

[Text] The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs announced the minimum wage and housing allowances approved by the Revolutionary Council subsequent to approval by the High Council of Labor concerning workers and employees coming under the Labor Law.

Part of this announcement states:

Since attaining the goals of the Islamic revolution of Iran, most important of all putting an end to every kind of economic and industrial dependency through the constant struggle of all social forces, especially the workers, and raising the level of domestic production are of special importance and since under the condition of stagnation caused by economic and industrial dependencies, wage increases will bring about unreasonable price increases, the High Council of Labor, recognizing these problems, set the minimum wage and housing allowances of workers during its session of 14 Apr 80 [26 Farvardin 1959]. This decision was approved in a session on 15 Apr 80 [27 Farvardin] and sent to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs to be enforced.

According to the decision, the minimum wage and housing expense aid for production and industrial workers and employees of organizations covered by the Labor law are to be determined as follows:

1. The minimum daily wage of a regular worker in industry and trade is set at 635 rials throughout the country.

2. The daily minimum wage increase in every workshop is set at 68 rials. This amount must also be paid to those working on a fixed wage basis in workshops where contracts specify wages per million units.

3. All ranks in the wage and classification charts except job classification Rank 1 will be eliminated from now on. In the current year, an across the board 40 rial per rank (years) increase will be added to the wages of all employees and workers covered by the Labor Law regardless of any workshop plan for the classification of jobs. In some cases, ranks in certain classifications have received more than 40 rials according to previous plans, but now only 40 rials will be payable. The payment of sums according to rank (years) in future years will depend upon an evaluation of competence, ability, discipline, and usefulness of the workers on the basis of the forms to be provided by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and given to the workshops. All employers must evaluate their workers once every three months under the supervision of worker representatives on the basis of discipline, usefulness, and role effectiveness in production increases and on the basis of the regulations found on the evaluation forms.

4. Housing allowances are set at 2,000 rials per month for single workers, 3,000 rials for married couples, and 4,000 rials for couples with children. These sums are payable only to workers and employees whose new salaries are less than 50,000 rials per month. Workshops which previously paid more than these sums for housing allowances are under no circumstances allowed to increase this allowance.

5. If overtime wages were paid during the present year in some of the workshops, part of this overtime wage will be regarded as implementation of this decision. Clearly, if differences remain, these differences must be calculated and paid retroactively from 20 Mar 80 [1 Farvardin 1359]. In any case, wage increases and any benefits must not be more or less than the amounts set by this decision in any workshop.

6. The regulations of this decision do not include high school or university students who will work on a temporary basis during the summer holidays of 1980 [1359]. Their wages are to be set and paid according to agreements between the parties involved. It is expected that in following these regulations wholeheartedly, the workers will consciously and with awareness of their national duty and the sensitive historical circumstances work more energetically to revive the economic foundation of the society and with effort worthy of the period of revolution will help to raise the production level and reduce waste thereby lowering the price of products which will better the general welfare of the rural and urban low-income classes.

BRIEFS

TECHNICAL PROTOCOL WITH INDIA--New Delhi, 22 Apr--A tractor-manufacturing plant is one of various projects to be set up in Iraq by India under terms of a protocol signed here Monday on economic and technical cooperation between the two countries. A Foreign Office spokesman said that an electronic equipment plant and a machine tool unit were another two projects envisaged. He said 22 areas in all had been identified for collaboration in industry. India has already undertaken implementation of projects worth about 500 million US dollars in Iraq, mostly in the construction sector. This is expected to be doubled in value following the signing of the protocol. The protocol was signed at the conclusion of the sixth meeting of the Indo-Iraqi Joint Commission, covering also the fields of trade, agriculture and transport. The Iraqi delegation was led by Oil Minister Tayeh Abdul Karim and the Indian side by Petroleum Minister Veerendra Patil. NAB/AFP [Text] [Rangoon THE WORKING PEOPLE'S DAILY in English 23 Apr 80 p 5]

MURDER REPORTED OF FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER--Abdel Karim al-Shakhaly, who was Iraq's Foreign Minister following the Baathist revolution in 1968, was found murdered in his home in Baghdad last week, the Libyan news agency reported. Mr Shakhaly, who had been a member of the Baath Party's National Command, later served as his country's Ambassador to the UN. According to some reports, he expressed opinions hostile to the Baghdad regime while in New York and was recalled home. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 21 Apr 80 p 6]

AGREEMENTS WITH BELGIUM, FRG--Iraq recently signed two agreements for economic and cultural cooperation with Belgium and West Germany. This cooperation will cover all aspects of commercial, development and technological fields. The cultural field will include university and scientific research activities, as well as training programmes and improving the technical ability of the country. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 19 Apr 80 p 11]

PLASTER INDUSTRY--Iraq has placed a contract worth DM 100 million (\$52 million) with a West German consortium for the construction of four plaster factories, it was announced last week. Noell, which is part of the state-controlled Salzgitter group, Knauf Engineering and Iphofen, hope to complete the work within two years. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 21 Apr 80 p 12]

CSO: 4820

AUTONOMY TALKS CANNOT BE RUSHED

Israel Should Not Be Pressured

Tel Aviv HATZOFER in Hebrew 13 Apr 80 p 2

[Editorial: "Without Pressure or Dictations"]

[Text] On the eve of Prime Minister Menahem Begin's talks with U.S. President Jimmy Carter, a propaganda campaign along similar lines is shaping up in Washington and in Cairo. The central theme is that in the talks between Carter and Sadat, an understanding was reached on many points, and, according to Cairo newspapers, a "secret document" was drafted to serve as a basis for a final accord on the autonomy. All that is left is for Mr. Begin to show "flexibility," and the expected breakthrough in the autonomy will take place.

The optimistic forecasts on concluding the negotiations by the May 26 deadline have now been modified. But it is being suggested that, as a result of the Carter-Begin talks, a breakthrough is possible. This would facilitate substantive progress by that date. American sources made it their point to emphasize yesterday that the new flexibility displayed by Egypt has increased the chances of reaching an agreement with Israel on the autonomy. While it has not yet been explained how the new Egyptian "flexibility" may narrow the gap of substantive disagreements between the Israeli and the Egyptian positions, the signal given to Israel's prime minister and his team of ministers is clear—Israel too must show flexibility.

After the conclusion of Sadat's talks in Washington, a tendency has become evident in the U.S. to "soften" Israel, in order to hand Egypt's president a visible gain. There has not been reciprocity in this area, since Israel has always been asked to give, while Egypt has not failed to retreat from its positions, but has also made demands which are contrary to the Camp David Accords. Now, Carter and Sadat bat around the idea of "Marathon Talks" in Washington to achieve a breakthrough. Intensive talks a la Camp David are not a magic formula to eliminate the disagreements. The discussion would follow the pattern which was established, and their intensity would be increased. Marathon talks in Washington will not bring about salvation.

There may be those who maintain that such talks will increase the chance of a "steamroller" of pressures and dictations, to which Israel should not give its consent.

Rumblings from Cairo and Washington have it that the slow pace of the autonomy talks may endanger the peace. The chairman of the Israeli team of ministers, Dr. Yosef Burg, was right in pointing out that "such talk is a kind of threat, and I do not believe that threats are what we need at this time and in this region." Yet, a threatening tone could be heard in Sadat's words, when he was asked on the eve of his departure for the United States what would happen if Carter and Begin did not succeed in reaching a breakthrough in their talks. Egypt's president replied that there are other ways, including the initiative now being created by the countries of Western Europe, regarding the Palestinian problem. Such talk implies that Israel will be responsible for the failure of the negotiations on the autonomy if it does not show "flexibility."

Success of the cycle of talks between the leaders of Israel, Egypt and the American president will manifest itself in laying the groundwork for a resumption of intensified negotiations which will exhaust all the possibilities for reducing the disagreements. Yet, the autonomy talks must continue in the same moderate way, without threats, pressures, or dictations.

Timing of Pressure Favorable to Israel

Tel Aviv HATZOFEH in Hebrew 14 Apr 80 p 2

[Editorial: "Marathon Talks Are No Remedy"]

[Text] The government yesterday authorized the Prime Minister to respond to President Jimmy Carter's proposal to hold marathon talks on the autonomy in Washington. The disagreements are fundamental and it is difficult to believe that the gap can be bridged by such technical means as "marathon talks."

It is safe to assume that the prime minister will not be pressured in Washington, since pressure will not be of any use, and since it is not easy to use pressure against Israel during a presidential campaign. The reaction of the voters in New York primaries, who voted for Kennedy, shows that the government of the United States is limited in its ability to exert pressure.

Until now, the autonomy talks have run into disagreements on the question of whether the aim is the establishment of a Palestinian state through legislative and judicial bodies, or the establishment of self-rule bodies. This discussion is the determining factor, and not the disagreements on legal questions. Under such circumstances, there is no point in holding marathon talks and reaching quick disappointments.

Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Boutros Ghali has said that if progress is made in the talks, the deadline of May 26 will not be a

problem. Yet nowhere in the Camp David Accords does it state that May 26 is a final deadline. Hence, there is no need to threaten with this date.

It is to be hoped that the prime minister and his team of ministers who are going on this state mission will enter the talks in peace, and will come out in peace.

The Pressure Is Bound to Return

Jerusalem HANODI'A in Hebrew 17 Apr 80 p 2

[Editorial: "Temporary Relief of the Pressure"]

[Text] In his talks with President Carter, the Prime Minister has achieved a measure of relief from the pressure which may be exerted against the Israeli government on the issue of the autonomy talks at the present time, including the place of the talks. Begin immediately suggested holding the talks during the next forty days, half in Egypt and half in Israel. Having thereby extricated himself from the trap of transferring the talks to the United States, he is thus trying to prove that Israel is not interested in stalling.

The transfer of the talks to the United States would have immediately created an unfavorable situation for Israel. It is no secret that in the major part of the controversial topics the United States leans toward Egypt. Large American physical presence, which could have been expected if the talks had taken place on American soil, would have made things much more difficult for Israel than American presence in the talks which will continue till their conclusion in Israel and Egypt.

However, it is clear that this is a brief, perhaps momentary respite achieved by Mr. Begin. The main problem is not precedural, and is not one of time and place of the talks. Rather, it is a matter of essence, related as it is to the issues and the substance of the negotiations. It stems from disagreements on cardinal issues. For, if such disagreements did not exist, it would have been possible to conclude the talks in a much shorter time.

There is no agreement on substantive issues. It was not achieved in the talks between President Carter and President Sadat and, later on, between Carter and Prime Minister Begin. The pressure deliberately created by Sadat, a long time before the desired date chosen at Camp David regarding the talks, was removed by Mr. Begin through the proposal to conduct intensive talks in Israel and Egypt, but there is no substantive change regarding the unagreed upon issues.

On the question of Jerusalem, Mr. Begin reminded President Carter of the Israeli position that Jerusalem will not be divided directly or indirectly.

Another fundamental issue has not changed, namely the question of the powers of the autonomy council. Will they be merely administrative or will the Council have legislative and judicial powers, as Egypt would have it. On this issue, the United States and Israel agree, as was concluded at Camp David, but Egypt continues to cling to its position.

The problem is, what will happen when the May 26 deadline approaches? Israel's position is that it is not a "sacred deadline." While it is desirable to make progress and reach an agreement by that date, if an agreement is not reached, the talks can continue beyond that date. But it seems that the definition of the date was accepted somehow. This became evident in Sadat's statement on the procedure of the talks, in which he said that he would accept any procedure which would advance the agreement by May 26.

If the parties insist on their positions on the controversial issues which are rather fundamental, would intensive "forty day talks" be a magic formula to change their positions? Egypt, for example, insists on the participation of the Arabs of East Jerusalem in the elections for the institutions of the autonomy. Israel opposes it vigorously because of the serious implications of the proposal, which indirectly spells out the voiding of the unity of Jerusalem. This makes it impossible for Israel to make any concessions on this score. Having publicly made its position known, would Egypt give up its demands in the course of the forty day talks and risk appearing to lose face? Conversely, it may be a main point of pressure against Israel if the United States sides with the Egyptian position on this issue.

If the prime minister's trip to the United States was intended to remove the immediate pressure which President Sadat has tried to create, then it has been successful. The practical proposal which he brought with him also has propaganda value for American public opinion. Against Sadat's propaganda campaign in which he succeeded in coming across as the peacemaker, Mr. Begin is not falling behind. On the contrary, he has now brought a proposal designed to speed up the talks, which refutes the Egyptian claim that Israel is trying to stall the talks.

Yet, the fundamental question of the essence and the pitfalls of the talks which faces both parties, has remained unchanged by either Sadat's or Begin's talks with President Carter. The difficulties of the talks on the autonomy have now intensified. The pressure which has let off may come back in forty or less days.

9565

CSO: 4805

EUROPEAN ALLIES ARE NOT RELIABLE

Tel Aviv HATZOFEN in Hebrew 14 Apr 80 p 2

[Editorial: "The Treachery of the European Nations"]

[Text] The United States' request of the European allies to sever their relations with Iran as a show of solidarity with the United States which has broken off relations with Iran due to the holding of the hostages, has met with hesitation, and, in some cases, refusal. These nations prefer to guard their interests in receiving oil from Iran rather than maintain an appropriate level of relations with the United States.

It was the United States which helped the nations of Europe during two world wars, and freed them from German oppression. The United States sent its best sons to spill their blood for the nations of Europe, and, after the war, gave the nations of Europe economic aid to overcome the ravages of war. Yet, when the United States turns to them in a time of national need, there are not responsive, and their interests take precedence over the need to identify with the United States. Under such circumstances, the United States should review its relationships with some of the nations of Europe.

We in Israel are angry at the nations of Europe for putting their oil interests above their traditional relationship with Israel, siding with the Arab nations, and supporting the PLO. But this instance of lack of consideration toward the United States shows that the nations of Europe lack not only consideration toward Israel, but also toward the leader of the Western world.

It is necessary to remember that the nations of Europe are tied to the United States through the NATO pact, yet even this pact does not provide enough of a political basis for identification and political cooperation.

This crisis between the United States and the nations of Europe, added to the crisis in Afghanistan and Iran, is an important political lesson for the United States as the leader of the Western world. This is that at times it may be better for the United States to practice isolationism, and not to try to defend the entire Western world, part of which is not prepared to identify with the need for such defense.

KNESSET LINEUP CHANGES DURING NINTH TERM

TA051906 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1510 GMT 3 May 80

[Summary] During the Ninth Knesset's term the number of factions increased from 13 to 15. Those Knesset members who are the only representatives of their factions has increased from five to eight: Shmu'el Flatto-Sharon, Po'alei Agudat Yisra'el, Shulamit Alloni, Gid'on Hausner, Shaykh Abu-Rabi'a, Moshe Dayan, Yitzhaq Yitzhaqi and Mordekhay Elgarabli. Factional allegiances have also changed: the Shelomziyyon faction, which ran for the elections on its own, joined the Herut movement, and Mr Moshe Dayan, who was No 7 on the alignment list, left the alignment and became a single Knesset member when he agreed to serve as foreign minister. The DMC split a year after the elections and is now composed of the following: The Democratic Movement, which has seven Knesset members and has remained in the government; the Shay faction, which also has seven Knesset members who moved over to the opposition; and Asaf-Yaguri, who has been recognized as a single faction called Ya'ad.

The Likud faction also split after the Camp David agreements, when the La'am Likud faction split into two: one headed by Yiga'el Hurvitz, which changed its name to Rafi and left the government, but remained in the Likud, and the faction led by Minister Shostak, which remained in the government. The other change that followed the Camp David agreements was the establishment of the Tehiya Banay faction, led by former Likud members Ge'ula Kohen and Moshe Shamir. In addition, Yosef Tamir who had been secretary general of the Liberal Party, moved into the opposition Shay faction, while Yitzhaq Yitzhaqi left the coalition and joined the opposition as a single member. This move was compensated for by Asaf-Yaguri, who left the DMC and joined the Likud. Mordekhay Elgarabli left the Democratic Movement and also became a single Knesset member. Me'ir 'Amit and David Colomb, who had first left the Labor Party, joined the DMC and then moved to Shay, have returned to the alignment.

CSO: 4805

PROSPECTS FOR NEW CENTER PARTY EXAMINED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 4 May 80 p 10

[Interview with Mordechai Virshubski and Shulamit Aloni by Mark Segal, date and place not given]

[Text] **Post** political correspondent MARK SEGAL talks to Shai's Mordechai Virshubski and the CRM's Shulamit Aloni about the prospects of a new centre party.

AS THE POLLS CONTINUE to indicate Labour's upward surge and the Likud's continuing nose-dive, there is much talk about the need for a new force in the centre. Not everyone would concur with Deputy Premier Simha Ehrlich's claim that the Likud is the centre party, especially the one-third of the electorate regarded as the floating vote. To go by public opinion surveys, about 100,000 people who voted for the defunct DMC in 1977 are casting about for a new party. They have gone through the harrowing experience of the naive who have awakened to find that they have been used for gain.

Whether Ehrlich or Jewish Agency chairman Arye Dulsin will manage, with Ezer Weisman's erratic help, to launch a centre party remains to be seen. Meanwhile, intensive efforts are afoot to combine the splintered radical centre factions into a larger party. The most obvious candidates are Shai and the Citizens Rights Movement, plus the minuscule Independent Liberals and the Heh Be'lyar civil rights action group. However, what is currently keeping them apart is personalities, or more accurately Shai chairman Amnon Rubinatein's

disinclination to join forces with CRM founder Shulamit Aloni. His friends are pressing him to overcome his feelings for the sake of the common cause, which they think can attract uncommitted voters. They base themselves on polls indicating a Labour majority backlash, if elections were held now.

Two people who are committed to forming a centrist group are Shai's Mordechai Virshubski and Shulamit Aloni. They have a number of political positions in common, although he is not as militant as she is over the rabbinical establishment, nor is he as close to the left on the Palestinian issue. But both are passionately concerned with the need for reform on the domestic front, feeling that the bigger parties have neglected them due to over-concentration on foreign policy. They echo Knesset Speaker Yitzhak Berman's warning that: "We need not only secure borders, but safe streets." Both Virshubski and Aloni belong to the Heh Be'lyar circle which has set as its aim the safeguarding of the principles enshrined in the Declaration of Independence concerning freedom of opinion and religion, and equality of race and sex. In the

face of what they consider to be "creeping Khomeinism."

Virshubaki does not see early elections in the offing? "The government does not exist, so how can it fall?" he asks sardonically. Virshubaki feels that many voters who do not want the Likud will steer clear of the Labour Alignment and seek a third alternative. He notes that Labour's record on domestic issues in the Ninth Knesset would not seem to indicate any significant change. This was particularly so in Labour's courting of the NRP as exemplified by the case of the strict factional discipline imposed on Alignment MKs over the Rabbinate bill. "They are paying an advance instalment for renewal of their future partnership," he charged. However, Virshubaki admits that if he had to choose, he would opt for going along with Labour "if only because the Likud is so dreadful and because Labour has a better choice of people to offer, even if their basic orientation has remained unchanged."

Virshubaki, who has earned himself a reputation as an expert on local government, still believes that if Deputy Premier Yigael Yadin had not let Justice Minister Shmuel Tamir persuade him to join the Begin government, the DMC might have been able to play an influential role in the nation's future. Indeed, he still holds that the voting potential is out there waiting for a lead from a party that will act as a watchdog over civil liberties.

Virshubaki is far from being anti-religious as such, but he feels that the Orthodox monopoly should be resisted. Accordingly, Shai will table an amendment to Clause 6 of the Rabbinate bill, cancelling the transfer of the powers of registrar of marriage and divorce from the Religious Affairs Ministry to the Chief Rabbinate Council. As this country was one of law and not of halacha, his party would ensure that citizens could appeal to the High Court on such matters. Regrettably, Labour had helped the NRP remove this power from the civil to the rabbinical authority, and it would be Shai's intention to provide a real public test of Labour's intentions as soon as the Knesset reconvened.

He expected the NRP to push ahead with a programme of religious legislation on the assumption that if the Likud did not back

them, they could always rely on Labour by promising post-electoral support, while ensuring that elections were put off until the last moment.

Would new elections wipe Shai off the map? Virshubaki answered: "If that's the price for saving the country from the Likud, then I'm ready to pay it." He said Shai was the only party to have initiated a petition for early elections.

His party had become more homogeneous since Tamir took Yadin and the others into the coalition. The latest departure, of Meir Amit and David Golomb to Labour, meant a further consolidation, he said, noting bitterly that those two had provided "a perfect demonstration of political opportunism. They joined the DMC when it was at the height of its popularity, and now they are running back to Labour because they think it's on the rise. They had a patina of integrity to offer, now they've lost even that."

Nonetheless, his group — if it had to choose — would prefer a coalition led by Labour rather than the Likud, where it would wish to fill the function of a watchdog of civil liberties.

Aloni's circle of supporters has expanded to include members of the Heh Be'Iyar circle such as writer Yoram Kaniuk, ex-Jerusalem deputy mayor Meron Benvenisti and industrialist Uri Bernstein (Amcor). Virshubaki is also a frequent participant in their discussions, and has been representing Shai in unity discussions embracing his party, the CRM and Heh Be'Iyar, while Rubinstein has preferred to seek ties with the ILP's Moshe Kel.

In the meantime, Aloni has been to America, where she garnered support for the ideas of Heh Be'Iyar among a large number of American Jewish feminists who assembled earlier this month under AEYF auspices at Brooklyn College and proclaimed their association with the Heh Be'Iyar group's programme, especially relating to women's rights. They even set up a Zionist feminist lobby entitled "Coalition for Women in Israel."

Would Aloni take up the standing invitation to return to her old party, from which Golda Meir had forced her out after she had been one of the few MKs to stand up to that most formidable of party leaders,

something which few men had dared do? "First of all, B-G, Beri [Kataneleon] and Tabanakis are dead, and I mean that for their ideology too. I don't see why I have to flee to the embrace of the apparatchiks. Though they do need someone to nag at their socialist consciences."

Mention of the Rabbinate bill exasperates her. She says it was tailored to the needs of Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren, to obviate the need for his re-election. She described him as "the joint creation of the Mapai-Mizrachi historical partnership."

The Likud had been disinterested in the bill, especially with the retroactive legislation aspect. The original version, dealing with the Chief Rabbinate Council, was drafted by Minister-without-Portfolio Moshe Nissim, and spoke of a single chief rabbi without the kind of extra powers injected into the NRP-Labour measure, Aloni said. It was part of the package deal worked out in Labour Party secretary-general Haim Bar-Lev's office last year, when the two parties divided up patronage and budgets in the religious councils. It was then that Labour accepted the NRP ultimatum to exclude its own Conservative and Reform members from the councils, she charged.

She continued: if Labour had really been sincere about granting equal status to all three trends, as Shimon Peres had promised the Reform Movement at its conference in Toronto, then why were two prominent Labour men, who are Reform rabbis — Ezra

Spicehandler and Richard Hirsch — excluded from the meetings with the NRP?

Was she ready to combine with Shas? As far as her fellow members of the CRM were concerned they were open-minded on the issue. And Labour? They treated her as one of them, knowing they could rely on her to bring the Likud down. But she had decidedly strong reservations about returning to Labour, where she would have to depend on the goodwill of party functionaries. She preferred to be elected for her own worth.

The often-waspish MK has a league of admirers among the broader public if only because of the way she has bent the bureaucratic machinery in order to solve their individual problems. In this she behaves like a member of Parliament or Congress who has a constituency. Her party has done its best to help people through its Citizens Advice Bureau, which used to operate with volunteer teams of lawyers, social workers and psychologists. For lack of funds they closed down all their offices except for one.

Aloni was increasingly concerned over unreasonable police conduct affecting people's careers. A student at the Hebrew University, who had served in an elite army unit, was refused a job as a watchman because he had a black mark against his name. It turned out that the police had noted his participation in a "Peace Now" demonstration. This she found to be utterly reprehensible, asking "Do they ever touch Gush Emunim demonstrators?"

POLL SHOWS SWING TOWARD LIKUD

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 6 May 80 p 1

[Article by Mark Segal]

[Text]

TEL AVIV. — The opinion poll pendulum has swung back, slightly improving the Likud's and the National Religious Party's showing while denying Labour an overall majority.

The sharp rise in the number of undecided voters and the erosion in Labour support lend substance to the supposition that many people took fright at recent polls indicating an absolute majority for Labour if elections were held now.

Labour support sagged by 8 per cent and the Likud improved by 4 per cent, while the floating vote increased by 9 per cent. This emerged from The Jerusalem Post poll conducted in late April and early May by the Modi'in Ezerachi applied research centre among a representative sample of 1,808 adults.

Centre director Amiram Yarkoni pointed to an interesting trend in the floating vote: In the latest poll it totalled 39 per cent (undecided 38.7, won't vote 5.8, won't say 4.6) com-

pared to 30.4 per cent in March (undecided 30.4, won't vote 6.9, won't say 2.1) and February's 32 (undecided 22.2, won't vote 6.9, won't say 2.9).

Analysing the undecided vote, he found that there had been a 10 per cent shift (from 31.7 to 21.9) away from Labour over a period of three months.

He also regarded as significant the breakdown of the May-April undecided voting bloc according to their previous political choice: 4.6 per cent former Likud voters, 10.7 from Labour, 1.3 from the NRP, 0.8 from Aguda, 15 from the defunct DMC, 4 per cent from the smaller parties, while 23 per cent remained hard-core undecided voters.

Analysis of former DMC voters indicates that 68.1 per cent are still in limbo (39.3 per cent undecided, 9 per cent won't vote and 4.8 per cent won't say), while 40 per cent would now choose Labour, 2.1 Likud, 0.7 per cent Tehiya. Only 3.4 per cent prefer Shai and only 0.7 per cent the Democrats.

	May-April		March		February	
	%	Seats		Seats	%	Seats
Likud	22.3	27	22.4	22	23.3	28
Labour	48.4	60	46.4	58	48.3	60
NRP	9.9	12	7.8	9	9.2	11
Aguda Bloc	6.3	8	6.8	8	4.4	5
Democrats	0.4	—	0.8	—	0.1	—
Shai	0.9	1	2.0	2	1.6	2
Tehiya	1.6	2	1.0	1	1.6	2
Others	13.3	16	11.4	14	11.7	14

SHAMIR, NEW FOREIGN MINISTER, DISCUSSES FUTURE

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 5 May 80 p 8

[Article by David Landau]

[Text] **Post Diplomatic Correspondent DAVID LANDAU talks to the new Foreign Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, about Europe, south Lebanon and his own political future.**

YITZHAK SHAMIR, six weeks into the job of foreign minister, is still taking his time. "I am not the hurrying type," he says. "Never have been." He likes to weigh things up carefully, to look around and to take stock. "I want to study everything, to get to know the people. I very much don't like hurting people."

The ministry, he has already concluded, was much maligned. "The picture one had was of a neglected, demoralised ministry. That is just not true. I had a pleasant surprise. I found a well-organized, active ministry, with lots of good, impressive people."

So far, he has made no changes at all. Director-General Yosef Clechanover tendered his resignation on the first day, but Shamir asked him to stay on. Spokesman Naftali Lavi is still there. And so is the chief of bureau, Elyakim Rubinstein, another Dayan appointee, who has also retained control of the normalization-with-Egypt department.

Even the pictures on the walls are unchanged. A pastoral view of Jerusalem by Rubin hangs over Shamir, as it hung over his predecessors. "I don't look at the walls," says Shamir. "I haven't got time."

What news of the ambassador to Mexico, Shaul Rosolio, who was accused by Arik Sharon of falling, *inter alia*, to hang a picture of Begin in his office?

"We are still examining the case," says Shamir.

Spokesman Lavi ventures that according to the rules, only the president's portrait need be hung in embassies abroad. "There are the rules, and there is the custom," Shamir cuts in, suddenly stern.

Shamir says he is not prepared to listen to carping and rumour-mongering about the ministry from his Herut comrades. "I tell all of them: If you've got a specific allegation to make, I am prepared to look into it. But I refuse to pass judgment on the basis of hearsay." There have been "no complaints yet" from Herut faithful that he is not appointing party loyalists to plum diplomatic posts. "Everyone knows that in my case, the considerations will be purely *mamlachati* [broadly non-partisan]," he says.

Certainly, he would like his own ideological beliefs (he is regarded as a Herut hardliner) to have an impact, and leave an impress, on the ministry. He carefully leaves open the prospect of new appointments in certain key positions. But there is

to be no wholesale head-rolling; that much is clear already.

"Under Sharett, when the ministry was founded, they tried to follow the example of the British civil service's professionalism. Later, unfortunately, that trend declined. But a lot of it has still remained intact — and we mustn't destroy it, we must preserve it."

HE WANTS the ministry to become more active in what he calls "policy thinking." He is "very aware" of the Agranat Commission recommendation that the foreign ministry's research section be built up into a national intelligence-assessing agency, alongside the IDF Intelligence Corps and the Mossad. Under Dayan, the research section, far from being built up, seemed to wilt.

"I am in the process of studying this whole problem," says Shamir. He spurns talk of the ministry's "prestige." "The foreign ministry has simply got to fulfill the role that it was intended to fulfill. If we can achieve that, the 'prestige' will follow naturally."

One area where Shamir clearly wants to make a mark for himself and his ministry is in relations with Europe.

"I don't agree with what has been happening for the last 10 years and more. We have been telling the Europeans: 'Don't interfere, it's not your business, don't disturb the negotiating process.' This is a mistake. Even if you think that way — and I don't — here was no need to say so."

Europe's economic importance is obvious. But it is also a major force militarily and politically, says Shamir — a force not to be brushed off by Israel, but to be reasoned with.

"We have to try and stem the tide flowing towards full recognition of the PLO. We must instill doubts in their minds, persuade them that they are undermining the only viable peace prospect: Camp David. They should realize their pronouncements make things hard for Sadat, not just for us."

He acknowledges that he has notched no successes yet, and that, indeed, Israel's situation in Europe is steadily worsening. "We must sow seeds now, and hope to reap the benefits later," he says philosophically.

SHAMIR HAS nothing new to offer on the south Lebanon issue which, he readily concedes, "is damaging our position in Europe."

Some foreign observers here detect differences — of "nuance," at least — between the foreign ministry and the defence establishment over south Lebanon. But if there are such differences, Shamir effectively conceals them. "This is basically a security problem," he says, "with political repercussions. We will not stop supporting Haddad; that is our security interest."

"We cannot control him, we can only seek to influence him. That is the honest truth. I doubt, in fact, whether Haddad himself can control what goes on in every village nominally under his command..."

UNIFIL — to Israel's chagrin — has in effect acquiesced to the PLO presence in its area of operations, Shamir continues. By the same token it should at least acquiesce to the presence of Haddad's forces. The foreign minister rejects UNIFIL's claim, which is to upend that argument and say, in effect: We will not confront the PLO unless we are allowed to confront Haddad, disarm his force, and take over his enclaves.

There is no certainty, Shamir says, that the original Security Council resolution actually required UNIFIL to take over Haddad's enclaves. UNIFIL was to take over only the areas which the IDF had occupied (in Operation Litani). And the IDF had not occupied the enclaves: it had merely passed through them.

"You can call it *pitul* if you like. But the point is that UNIFIL was set up to keep out the PLO, not Haddad's militia."

SHAMIR IS considering a high-level *hasbara* mission to Europe, perhaps in concert with the Defence Ministry, to explain Israel's position on south Lebanon.

But while he considers, things are rapidly getting worse. There are meetings and resolutions and representations, and Israel's much-tarnished image is further blackened.

Shamir's method of unhurried decision-making seems perhaps too luxurious, too, in the face of the steady and ominous evolution of a new European "initiative" on Resolution 242. "There is nothing

concrete," says Shamir reassuringly. "It's all still in the realm of ideas. They have differences between themselves."

But the European effort may pick up pace dramatically, in the view of many observers, if the May 30 autonomy target date goes by without convincing progress having been made at the talks. Shamir says he hopes there will be such progress.

Israel, at any rate, is ready to go on talking beyond that date, whatever the state of the negotiations. It will depend on the other two parties. And Israel "will not be influenced" by the looming threat of the European initiative. "We know what we want, what we can concede — and what we can't."

Apparently, the foreign minister is planning a tour of key European capitals. His dialogue with European statesmen, he says, is free-flowing. There is no reluctance on their part to invite him. Only "technical problems" have to be sorted out.

Shamir dismisses the idea that the government's political difficulties at home, the sense that it may be facing imminent collapse, impair its standing in the diplomatic arena. Israelis' perception of this problem, one which affects so many parliamentary democracies, is "exaggerated," says the foreign minister. It is a product of provincialism. "In many countries, governments have a life-expectancy of one year or two — but their foreign ministers do not suffer from an inferiority complex as a result."

Israel, moreover, is essentially a stable country. The basic elements of its policy do not change with a change of government. Shamir cites the Arabs' view to prove his point: they hardly distinguish between the Likud government's policy and that of the Labour opposition. Only last week, he notes

with unconcealed satisfaction, King Hussein flatly rejected Shimon Peres's insistent advocacy of the so-called "Jordanian option."

HIS OWN FUTURE on the internal political scene does not overly preoccupy him. Shamir maintains. Neither the prime minister nor he himself were thinking about it when Begin offered, and he accepted, the foreign minister's portfolio. "There was simply a vacancy, and he thought I should fill it." All the rest is "imaginative speculation" on the part of press commentators.

He does not feel that he was deliberately installed into a position of potential heir-apparent, nor that he is being groomed by Begin for future Herut/Likud leadership.

Shamir, at this point, gave a lengthy exposition on the political careers of speakers of parliaments and foreign ministers in other countries. His purpose was ostensibly twofold: to prove that not all foreign ministers are automatically prime ministerial candidates ("Is Michel Poncet considered a candidate?"), and to prove, too, that not all speakers are necessarily political pensioners (Chaban-Delmas served as premier, then as speaker, then again as premier).

That left the interviewer to make two deductions. Firstly, that Shamir never saw himself as a has-been, even as Speaker — all the more so now that he is right at the hub of things. And secondly, so comprehensive and erudite was the exposition, so replete with little-known examples from far-off lands, that it rather weakened Shamir's claim not to spend much time thinking about such matters.

"Well, I am not devoid of political ambition," he conceded. "But with me — this might sound old-fashioned and even incredible — personalities and careers are not the main thing, but issues and ideology. It's a question of priorities."

HOLOCAUST MUST BE REMEMBERED

Tel Aviv HATZOFEH in Hebrew 13 Apr 80 p 2

[Editorial: "Holocaust and Rebirth"]

[Text] The people of Israel commemorate today the six million martyrs who were killed, burned and slaughtered during the Holocaust, with unparalleled cruel bestiality. One third of the Jewish people was destroyed because of its Jewishness during the dark years of the Holocaust. The Nazi murderers and their minions carried out the extermination out of abysmal hatred toward Jews and Judaism. European Jewry was at times led like sheep to the slaughter, at other times it tried to make a stand against the murders, through heroic acts and through martyrdom. They made every effort during the Holocaust years to preserve their Jewish identity. Israel will forever remember the Holocaust and the heroism. The command "Remember Amalek: is etched deeply upon its consciousness.

In recent years some people have tried to minimize the magnitude of the horrible Holocaust in order to alleviate the burden of responsibility borne by the German people. The Jewish people is obligated not only not to forget, but also not to allow anyone else to forget or to whitewash, not to allow obliteration of the facts and concealment of the truth. It is necessary to deepen awareness of the Holocaust among the Jews in Israel and abroad, especially among the young generation, which is not familiar with the horrors of those days. The decision of minister of Education and Culture Zvulun Hammer to introduce as of this year the subject of the Holocaust as a mandatory subject in high schools is a step in the right direction.

The day of remembrance of the Holocaust and the heroism is not only a time of communing with the memory of the six millions who were slaughtered and exterminated by the Nazis, but also a time of learning the lessons so that there will never again be another Holocaust. The independent and sovereign state of Israel, which was established by the survivors, will defend its security and the security of its residents. That same enlightened world which during the Holocaust stood by and watched the genocide, is now making proposals which are intended to pave the way for the establishment of a Palestinian state which will be ruled by those who do not hide their

intentions of bringing about the liquidation of the State of Israel. The act of murder of the terrorists who killed the baby in Migav Am is a tragic bloody reminder of the criminal intentions of the terrorist organisations. The people of Israel and the State of Israel will do everything possible to foil the genocidal plans. The generation of the rebirth will not forget the horrors of the Holocaust.

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CSO: 4805

ISRAELI TV PORTRAYS NATIONAL GUIDANCE COMMITTEE

TA260747 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1825 GMT 25 Apr 80

[Excerpts] Ramallah Mayor Karim Khalaf extended his hand to Judea and Samaria Commander Brigadier General Ben-Eli'azer yesterday, but the hand remained unshaken, hanging in the air. General Ben-Eli'azer—called Fu'ad by his friends—was angry. The mayors convened yesterday for an urgent meeting in Ramallah contrary to his orders. The meeting, which reached extremist decisions, was organized by the National Guidance Committee in the territories. The main goal of the committee is to foil the Camp David accords and the autonomy idea and to prepare the ground for the establishment of a Palestinian state. The National Guidance Committee is controlled by the radical bodies of the PLO and tries, through various means, to make its identity and goals foggy. However, there is no doubt in the military government today that this is the dominant body in the territories. There have been several discussions in the defense establishment on limiting the committee's activity, and there have even been proposals to outlaw it. In the following report, Rafiq Halabi for the first time uncovers the National Guidance Committee in Judea and Samaria and its goals. Here is his report: [begin videotape]

[Halabi] The sight of strikes in the West Bank is not new. A strike is almost always declared to mark every Israeli event or historic date. Correspondents' reports are also almost old stuff, only one sentence is added: This strike has been initiated by the National Guidance Committee in the territories.

The National Guidance Committee was established on 1 October 1978 with the aim of opposing the Camp David accords and guiding public opinion in the territories.

The National Guidance Committee meets in East Jerusalem, in the trade union building in Bayt Hanina. It does so in order to bypass the military government. This is where Hilmi Hanun from Tulkarm and the people from the south, from Gaza, come: Also Samiha Khalil, the number one woman in the West Bank, the representative of the women's organizations on the committee.

The guiding principle of the National Guidance Committee is the radical one adopted by the supporters of Habash and Hawatimah. They oppose the PLO-Jordan dialog and constitute the opposition to 'Arafat within the PLO. Each member of the committee is a representative of an organization within the PLO.

The National Guidance Committee has a 4-member secretariat, whose decisions are binding: Nabulus Mayor Bassam al-Shak'ah, a follower of the ideologist Ba'th, is close to the Arab National Liberation Front of Ahmad 'Abd (al-Rahim); Ramallah Mayor Karim Khalaf, a member of the Nayif Hawatimah Democratic Front; Dr Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi from Gaza, the head of the Gaza Strip Red Crescent and one of the supporters of George Habash's Popular Front, described as a communist in the territories; Fahd al-Qawasimi, the mayor of Hebron, who maintains close contacts with Patah and with Jordan, but is also acceptable to the radical groups in the PLO.

The expanded National Guidance Committee is comprised of 22 representatives. The representatives of the northern municipalities include: Bassam al-Shak'ah from Nabulus; Hilmi Hanun, mayor of Tulkarm and affiliated with Patah; and Wahid Hamadallah, mayor of 'Anabta and an associate of al-Shak'ah. The representatives of the central municipalities include: Karim Khalaf from Ramallah, Ibrahim al-Tawil from al-Birah, and Bishara Da'ud, former mayor of Bayt Jala. All are supporters of the Democratic Front. Jericho mayor 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Suwayti is the representative of the Jordan District settlement. The representatives of the southern municipalities include: Fahd al-Qawasimi from Hebron, a supporter of 'Arafat; and Muhammad Milhim from Halhul, a supporter of George Habash's Popular Front (PFLP). Trade union representatives include: Dr Amin al-Khatib, the head of the West Bank Charity Association and a Patah supporter; Samiha Khalil, the women's representative, who belongs to the Karim Khalaf Group; Ibrahim Daqaq, the chairman of the Engineer's Association and a member of the Communist Party; and (Jariyas) Khuri, a trade union representative and a Jordan Loyalist. Gaza representatives include: Dr Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi, the chairman of the Red Crescent Organization and one of the leaders of the Popular Front; and Attorney Zuhayr al-Ra'is, a correspondent who is an 'Arafat follower.

In addition to this committee, committees operate in every urban center and include the representatives of the commercial sector, charity associations, trade unions, representatives of the educational institutions and representatives of all political streams.

Public opinion in the territories is influenced by three newspapers. AL-SHA'AS; AL-FAJR; and AL-TALI'AH, the Communist Party organ. These three newspapers have permanent representatives on the National Guidance Committee. Those who oppose the committee hardly get coverage. They are not nationalistic, we are told in the territories. The more moderate AL-QUDS, for example, is boycotted by the committee.

The National Guidance Committee operates through the foreign media. Every event in the territories receives a demonstration of political identification from the committee members. There are types of heads of desks (last word in English) on the committee. Each mayor deals with the events in his region.

Ten days ago, when we wanted to take photos in the al-Jalazun refugee camp, we encountered hostility. At that point the al-Birah mayor entered the picture, introduced himself and directed the answers of the local inhabitant. The picture changed: al-Tawil is responsible for (?the functioning) of al-Jalazun. The mayor presents the questions, but in fact provides the answers instead of asking.

The sophistication and seriousness of the committee's activities have caused concern in the defense establishment. There are people in the defense establishment who regard the committee as a dangerous organization. A military government officer has told us that the Fatah supporters in the territories should be supported to prevent the radical bodies in the territories from taking over. Al-Qawasimi, for instance, is regarded as a moderate.

And, once again, meetings and conventions are held in the West Bank: Al-Shak'ah and Milhim. The National Guidance Committee has tried to gain control over all the public institutions in the territories; the East Jerusalem Electric Company, the higher educational council and the colleges in the territories. In the past, the military government banned several conventions, but its success was only partial.

Yesterday's events in Ramallah once again placed the military government at odds with the mayors. The latter have gained a lot of power and confidence. The rally in the Ramallah Municipality took place despite a military government ban. In 2 hours, the representatives of the National Guidance Committee arrived in Ramallah from the Hebron hills, Ramallah, Bethlehem and Jerusalem areas. The military government decided to take strong measures against those members of the committee who met in Ramallah. Again, there is another battle between the military government and the National Guidance Committee. [end videotape]

CSO: 4805

ENERGY CONSERVATION PROGRAM OUTLINED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Apr 80 pp 9, 13

[Article by Yoav Harpaz: "How To Save Energy in Israel--The Vital Alternative"]

[Text] The writer of this article was until recently the Chief of the Energy Conservation Administration in the ministry of energy.

Six years after the Yom Kippur War and the first oil crisis; a year into the Iranian oil crisis which has resulted in a series of drastic price increases by OPEC; one-half year after occurrences of the oil shortage in the United States; a few months after leaving the Alma oilfield which provided over 20 percent of Israel's oil consumption; and, at the height of the Russian threat to the Middle East oil and the paralysis of the western world--a strange quiet still prevails among us on the energy conservation and reduction of consumption front.

It is difficult to understand the inaction in this area. The facts in the area and the estimates of the experts not only run counter to the feeling of imagined security on the part of the Israeli public but also indicate a serious situation and lurking dangers which require vigorous action. What are the causes of the special difficulties and dangers to us?

1. Most of the current estimates expect a continuing crisis in the world oil market. This crisis stems on the one hand from the inability of the OPEC countries to increase their output (for technical reasons and political problems) in line with world demand, from their zeal in seeking to increase their oil incomes, and from the sensitivity and vulnerability of the western economy and western society to occurrences of oil shortages.

2. Israel's virtually complete dependence on imported oil for all the needs of its economy and society. After turning over the Alma oilfield, there remained only a little oil and gas produced in Israel and solar energy which is at the beginning of its exploitation (together about 2 percent of the entire consumption).

Most of the sources of oil for international trade are found in hostile countries. The sources of supply for Israel are, as is known, few and

politically unstable, and most of them do not guarantee a regular supply for an extended time. Much has already been said about the value and immunity of the arrangement with Egypt to purchase 2 million tons of oil a year, and for the long-term, the American guarantees for 15 years of supply are not defined satisfactorily.

4. The continuously rising prices will worsen the nation's balance of payments and adversely affect the Israeli economy's ability to compete and the inflation process.

5. The quantity of oil in storage tanks in Israel and the few other energy resources available to it cannot guarantee the energy needs of the nation for a long emergency period.

Oil Consumption Trends in Israel

Are not these dangers to the economy and to the security of the country sufficient to motivate the authorities to action? It is true that from time to time a public figure or a minister in the cabinet is aroused and declares a need for conservation, offers several proposals for decision--and quickly returns to his current affairs. Last year no less than four incidental collections of conservation proposals were brought up for discussion in the cabinet, most of which were rejected or changed beyond recognition by ministerial and directors-general committees. Even the few measures which were authorized are encountering difficulties in implementation which cast doubt on their effectiveness.

Even the few achievements in recent years (primarily in the planning and establishment of an operational infrastructure, industrial efficiency, water pumps, preparations for the generation of electricity from coal, and the distribution of solar pots for heating water) cannot conceal the fact that even in 1979, the managers of the economy were still not wise enough to control the expanding energy consumption.

It is no secret that Israel's oil consumption during 1976-1978 increased at an accelerated pace. Since 1975 when there was a 2.8 percent decrease in consumption, there has been a gradual increase which in 1978 reached an annual rate of 7.6 percent. The total amount of crude energy consumed during that year exceeded 7.8 million oil-equivalent tons. Both the absolute amount and the rate of increase are the highest since the Yom Kippur War, in contrast to what is happening in most of the countries of the world and in spite of the oil problem which has already been with us for 6 years. The first estimates show that in 1979, when there was a large price increase of 200 percent and a slowdown in economic activity, there was nonetheless an increase in the consumption of energy albeit a small percentage.

The picture is even gloomier in comparison with the world economy. In the developed countries the trend has been reversed in recent years: the increase in consumption has been moderated and in several places, there has even been

an absolute decrease in consumption, especially in oil consumption. In these countries there is a clear tendency to develop more energy-efficient technology, to move into low-energy industries and to save in every possible area.

If in Israel there will be no drastic intervention in the processes of energy use in the direction of greater efficiency and saving and if the trends of increase in consumption of recent years continue, we can expect that in about 5 years we will have to acquire tens of percent more oil than today. This means an additional negative burden on the balance of payments (certainly close to a billion dollars in 1980 prices and much more in the future) and substantial difficulties in acquiring the needed amounts with all that that implies. Even the burning of coal in the future power plants will be unable to change the dismal forecast projected for us in the coming decade.

System of Reduction

Until recently the entire world relied on an abundant supply of cheap energy, a tendency which left its imprint on the structure of the economy which became more and more energy saturated, with (wasteful) practices of energy use and in line with social-economic progress. It was accepted that a developed economy is energy saturated. A high standard of living was expressed by a constant increase of per capita energy consumption. Therefore, even in the planning of national development, the energy component was given limited weight. The result then is that the existing economy, in all its sectors, is functioning with low energy efficiency, that the production procedures and consumption habits are essentially wasteful, and that planners and leaders throughout the world are still captive to the past concept of energy abundance.

The implications of the oil crises and price increases have already begun to jolt the character of the world economy and to undermine the basis of the earlier concept. The recognition that oil is a shortage resource--a situation which will worsen--necessarily leads to the search for various solutions, whether in the direction of increasing the supply or decreasing the demand. It would seem that the solution could be found in the development and expansion of alternate energy sources such as: nuclear reactors, coal, solar radiation, shale oil, geothermal energy, and so forth. However, in actuality, their massive introduction into use is not expected within the next decade or two since the technological research and development and the change of the economic infrastructure for absorbing the new kinds of energy are processes which require a period of time measured in decades.

Several experts are advocates of other solutions involving processes of changes on the part of the energy users such as: development of an energy economy which is not based on fossil fuel or a significant increase in the efficiency of producing secondary energy, something which involves a significant technological breakthrough. On the horizon can also be seen a change in the character of society in general, from one which is saturated with and wasteful of energy to one which is a more careful and extended

use consumer. One thing, however, is not in doubt: these procedures of transition, albeit expected and desirable, are likely to continue for a considerable time, and the extent of their realization is not clear.

What about the interim period? Unfortunately, during the interim period we only have available partial solutions, the foremost and most vital one being the reduction in consumption as a means of conserving energy.

In the conditions extant in the State of Israel, the energy conservation policy is aimed at bringing about a reduction in the overall consumption through maintaining other national elements such as defense posture, economic progress, and minimum damage to the welfare of the population and the quality of life. The emphasis must be placed on a reduction in the use of energy generated from oil. For us this means all kinds of energy. Even if we are unable with the saving on our part to influence the balance and the prices of the world market and to eliminate completely our energy distress, the curtailment of importation by several tens percent will considerably weaken the marginal and the political-economic (the heaviest) pressure. A system of reduction as of today will also psychologically strengthen the readiness for forced saving if we are threatened with a crisis even more acute than any we have known to date.

Four Sectors

The central concept at the basis of energy conservation is that more rational use, that is to say greater efficiency and saving, can be made of the energy resources by the adoption of measures which are technically feasible, economically justifiable, and socially acceptable. On the basis of a more detailed definition suitable for conditions in Israel, energy conservation is intended for activation in four main sectors:

1. **Energy efficiency:** Reduction of the energy input per unit of production. A considerable saving in oil and electricity is achieved by means of changing the processes of production and output, regulation of burners, improvement of pots, adding insulation, reuse of emitted heat, improvement of pumps, coordination of waterlines, coordination of electrical propulsion, management of an integrated energy economy, and tens of other actions. The calculations and accrued experience show that the investment in such facilities and actions can, in many cases, be recovered in a short time.
2. **Preventing waste of energy:** Stopping the consumption of energy which is not needed. Who has not come up against instances such as daytime lighting in offices or street lights, heating and air conditioning in use when there is no one in the room? How many kilowatt-hours are wasted needlessly by those who enjoy free electricity.
3. **Selective decrease in the economic activity level and the energy services level, especially in energy-intensive areas:** The curtailment of certain activities which consume especially large quantities of oil and electricity. The reference here is to, among other things, several branches of industry (chemical, petrochemical, and so forth), pumping water to heights, the heating and cooling level of heating and air

conditioning systems, and so forth. It is to be understood that every new economic development must at the outset be oriented to low-energy areas.

4. Immediate conversion of liquid fuel energy to another source: The intention here primarily is to expand the exploitation of solar energy and to introduce the use of coal into industry (in addition to its burning in the large power plants). As a result of progress in research and development, other energy resources will reach the application stage. With this in mind, the policy of conservation must prepare and develop appropriate uses for those energies, and in this way, accelerate the process of saving conventional energy.

Action in these four sectors is relevant to all the sectors of the economy and society. It has great prospects for success since on the one hand, the public is already aware of the impending shortage, and on the other hand, in view of the current rate of price increases, the saved energy has become cheaper and cheaper than the produced energy. What is required, therefore, is an integrated system of action which will endeavor to effect the maximum saving from every possible area in the broad field.

(The potential for the saving of energy available in the economy will be discussed in the next article.)

5830

CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN AGREEMENTS SIGNED--Early in the evening Ambassador Ban-Elisar and several Egyptian ministers signed three of the normalization agreements dealing with aviation, culture and trade, thus concluding the process of preparing the framework agreements. The responsibility for execution will be transferred to the foreign ministries now. We, the soldiers--Defense Minister Weizman said to General 'Ali during the ceremony --will remain outside the picture from now on. The ceremony took place in the building of the army command in Heliopolis. The next stage: approval of the three agreements in the Knesset and the Egyptian People's Assembly. [TA082028 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 8 May 80]

DULZIN WITHDRAWAL--Arye Dulzin has withdrawn from the race for the Liberal Party chairmanship. He told the participants in the Liberal Party convention that he wanted to be elected to the post in secret and personal ballot and not through [internal] agreements. Whoever covets the post of party chairman, which is only ceremonial, should be congratulated, Dulzin said. He added that he supported the continued existence of the Likud on the condition that the liberals remain in it through their merits rather than through mercy. Our correspondent Asher Schwartz notes that Dulzin made a point of stressing that it was only because of the liberals that a majority was found in the Knesset to support the Camp David accords, whereas Herut members voted against them. [Text] [TA081022 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1000 GMT 8 May 80]

CSO: 4805

PREMIER INTERVIEWED ON SOVIET ARMS, OTHER ISSUES

GPO31335 Al-Sharjah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 2 May 80 p 7

[Interview with Jordanian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Hamid Sharaf on 30 April by correspondent Naser 'Abd al-Hamid during a visit to the UAE]

[Text] At the beginning of the interview, 'Abd al-Hamid Sharaf lauded the positive results of the talks between King Husayn and Shaykh Zayid. He said these talks were aimed at coordinating the two countries' stands and analyzing the Arab and international situation. They were part of Jordan's contacts with various Arab states to unite Arab action and galvanize Arab efforts. This was also the purpose of Husayn's talks with King Khalid in Saudi Arabia.

Sharaf declared that King Husayn will continue his visits to various Arab states for the same purpose.

Question: Are these visits by King Husayn related to his forthcoming visits to the Soviet Union and the United States?

Answer: The fact is that his majesty received an invitation to visit the Soviet Union last year, and he intends to respond to this invitation soon. However, no date for his visit has been fixed yet.

Question: It has been reported that Jordan will buy arms from the Soviet Union. Is it true?

Answer: Relations between Jordan and the Soviet Union are friendly. We hope that the [king's] visit will achieve a wider understanding, an exchange of views and a strengthening of bilateral economic, technical and cultural cooperation.

As for the question of arms from the Soviet Union, in principle there is no restriction on Jordan equipping its arms forces from whatever source,

be it Western or the Soviet Union. Such armaments would be in line with Jordan's armament programs and needs. Therefore, I do not exclude the possibility of concluding an agreement with the Soviet Union, now or at a later stage in the near or distant future, to purchase arms or equipment in accordance with the requirements of the Jordanian Army's armament program if the need should arise.

Question: What about King Husayn's visit to the United States? Much has been said about this visit. What will King Husayn say to the Americans this time? Will he be speaking on behalf of the Arabs and at their request?

Answer: Naturally. If Husayn goes to the United States he will be speaking on behalf of [sentence as published].

Question: What is Jordan's stand on the current conflict between Iraq and Iran? What can Jordan do to calm the situation?

Answer: Jordan has declared its stand on this matter on numerous occasions. We hope good neighborly relations will exist between the Arab homeland and all countries in the region. At the same time, we eagerly desire unity in the good neighborly relations between the Arab states and Iran, because we do not want and will not accept any threat to any Arab country by another state, whoever it may be—a threat that would endanger the Arab country's security, safety and territory.

As I have said in the past, we take pride in the fact that Iraq has played a pivotal role in building Arab solidarity and consolidating the Arab homeland's unity. We are anxious to preserve fraternal Iraq's security, safety and stability. At the same time, we do not want any clash to occur between the Arab homeland and Iran, because we want to [sentence as published].

The Arab cause in general and not on behalf of the narrow Jordanian interests. [sentence as published] At the present time, a visit to the United States is not on his majesty's agenda. No arrangements have been made for such a visit.

Question: What is Jordan's assessment of the situation in the Gulf in view of threats to the region, and what do you believe are the consequences of such threats on the Arab level?

Answer: The truth is that we in the great Arab homeland become very worried when international conflicts reach our area. We believe that it is in the Middle East's interest to be far from international and superpower conflicts. We are also opposed to interference in the internal affairs of any state. As for Iran, we want—and Husayn has said this on several occasions—Iran to be stable, on the correct path and supportive of Arab nations and their efforts. We do not want Iran to clash with any Arab state or with Arab interests and aspirations. Therefore, we hope that the two sides, Arab and Iranian, will always exert efforts to prevent such a clash so normal bilateral relations can exist. That Iran is on our side and not against us. [sentence as published]

Question: How far has the Jordanian-Palestinian dialogue gone? It has been said that the results of this dialogue have not been up to expectations?

Answer: The fact is that we have stopped using the term "Jordanian-Palestinian dialogue." We have gone much further than that. There is Jordanian-Palestinian cooperation--cooperation between the Jordanian Government and the PLO--in various fields that serve the Arab and Palestinian cause and make it progress. This cooperation exists on both the Arab and international levels. It also exists in supporting the steadfastness of our kinsmen in the occupied territories and in supporting the Palestinian people and the Palestinian cause in all its forms. We are concentrating on implementing the cooperation program. We are satisfied with this program and hope it will grow and develop with the growth and development of our relations.

Question: Western European nations are currently moving toward an initiative to establish peace in the Middle East. The French president discussed this initiative during his recent visit to Jordan and the Gulf. How does Jordan view the extent of this initiative's success?

Answer: We welcome any collective European move on the Middle East--a move that would tend to improve the West's stand on the Palestinian question and our rights. For more than 10 years, our endeavors have been geared toward bringing about a change in the international situation so the countries of the world will support our rights and our cause. Thus, King Husayn was among the first people to call on European nations to protect their interests and, in response to the requirements of justice, to support Palestinian rights, the principle of self-determination for the Palestinian people and an expeditious Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories within a just and peaceful framework. Therefore, we have welcomed President Giscard d'Estaing's statements. We have also welcomed the various statements and declarations made by leaders of several European countries on this matter. We hope they will develop and take one more step forward.

Question: Do you think the Israeli Labor Party, through the plans it is putting forward and currently discussing with the Americans, will ultimately reach a comprehensive settlement laying down borders that are acceptable to the Arabs in general, and to the Palestinians in particular?

Answer: The Israeli Labor Party ruled Israel from its establishment until 2 years ago. This party carried out the 1967 aggression and occupied Arab territory. For many years, it closed the door to the calls for peace and justice and a just and peaceful settlement until the Likud government and Menahem Begin came to power. There is nothing in the Labor Party's record that suggests there will be a basic change in the thinking and mentality of the Israeli Government, whether Shimon Peres or Menahem Begin is in power.

Question: What is important on the Arab level at this stage?

Answer: What is important at the present stage is that the Arab stand should be strong, united and steadfast. A self-sufficient Arab power should be built. This is the decisive factor in the Middle East formula. After this, international action will pressure Israel into changing its attitude toward the peace issue regardless of the existing Israeli Government.

Question: Mr Prime Minister, how do you assess the resolution of the steadfastness and confrontation summit conference recently held in Tripoli?

Answer: We are committed to the resolutions of the Baghdad and Tunis summit conferences. We consider them to be the only Arab framework that binds all the Arab sides. We hope that every Arab action or any action by any group of Arab states will be made within the framework and in the spirit of the Baghdad and Tunis summit conferences and in no other way.

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

SENEGAL RIVER PROJECT--Kuwait has agreed to increase from \$75 million to \$105 million its contribution to the Senegal River development programme launched by three West African countries. This means that Kuwait has donated 12 percent of the total cost of the \$800 million dam and irrigation project and almost 20 percent of the money raised so far. The agreement was reached during talks in Kuwait involving Presidents Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal and Moussa Traore of Mali and Mauritania's Minister of Supply, Maj Amadou Baba Ly. The announcement of the agreement suggested that the cost estimates of the project, which includes the building of two dams, have increased substantially since work began in November. Then, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi had pledged \$218 million and West Germany, France, the EEC and African Development Banks a further \$230 million. This, together with \$50 million from the World Bank and \$10 million from Canada, was enough to cover almost all of the cost. The dams, close to the Senegalese village of Diam, in the river delta, and on the Bafing tributary of the river in Mali, are designed to permit the irrigation of 100,000 and 1 million acres of land respectively. They will also generate hydroelectric power and provide land-locked Mali with a 575-mile navigable waterway to the Atlantic Ocean. The project is expected to take between five and seven years to complete; fuller details were published in An-Nahar Arab Report & Memo, September 3, 1979. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 21 Apr 80 p 12]

SEAWATER EVAPORATION CONTRACT--Kuwait's Ministry of Electricity and Water Supply has awarded a contract for a steam production plant worth \$62.5 million to the Dutch shipbuilding and engineering firm Rijn Schelde Verolme, according to a report from Amsterdam last week. The firm's De Schelde division is to design, build and instal the plant, which is to be used to evaporate sea water. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 21 Apr 80 p 12]

CSO: 4820

UN, COMMON MARKET, ARAB AID FOR RECONSTRUCTION REVIEWED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 21 Mar 80 pp 44-45

[Article by 'Adnan Karimah': "Lebanon Regains Its Economic Vitality From the Green Light Given by Waldheim"]

[Text] The least that can be said of the "testimonial" delivered by UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim is that it shows "international confidence" in the Lebanese economy, after a continual 5-year war. Lebanese businessmen were delighted with it, even though some were pessimistic about anticipated developments and what might be lying in store for them.

In an official report to the General Assembly about "the need to provide international aid to Lebanon," Dr Waldheim affirmed that "the Lebanese economy is still functioning, in spite of great losses, chaos and instability, which reflects its capacity for rapid growth as soon as existing difficulties and obstacles are overcome." The UN secretary general pointed out that the reconstruction of Lebanon is an "extensive program" and a "long-term operation."

Before Dr Waldheim made this declaration, he had been briefed by UN Permanent Ambassador to Lebanon Iqbal Ikhwand, who is general coordinator of all the UN organizations and authorities aiding Lebanon, about the implementation of the reconstruction project drawn up by the Development and Reconstruction Council. From this briefing he obtained an understanding of the real situation in the Lebanese economy, the progress of work in its various sectors, especially commercial, industrial, banking and finance, and its abundant potentials which would enable it to completely regain its vitality on the condition that security and political stability is ensured.

After completing his mission in New York, Ambassador Ikhwand, an Indian, returned recently to Beirut to resume his permanent post in Lebanon.

The week before last, a mission from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [IBRD] visited Lebanon, the first visit since 1978. Its assignment was confined to two points.

First, it was an inspection trip to study the stages of implementation of those projects which the IBRD is helping to finance through an earlier \$5 million loan. The most important projects are rehabilitating the three basins at Beirut Port, equipping professional schools, and rehabilitating some telephone projects.

The IBRD experts expressed their pleasure with the results, especially with respect to the progress of work on Beirut Port, in spite of the security disturbances and its occasional shutdown because of "shooting." However, they had some observations which the Lebanese team recorded, to make use of in completing these projects.

As for the second point covered by the mission during its assignment, it consisted of conducting negotiations with Development and Reconstruction Council officials about financing new projects which Lebanon wants to carry out according to the priorities set by the council. The mission conducted a comprehensive review of the additional needs of Beirut Port, not to mention housing and electricity projects and projects pertaining to developing telecommunications.

As is known, the Development and Reconstruction Council, headed by Dr Muhammad 'Atallah, is performing the role of consultant for the IBRD in the implementation of the projects which the IBRD is helping finance, and which the pertinent departments are in charge of.

In addition to the IBRD, there are other UN organizations and authorities which the Development and Reconstruction Council is contacting in order to study projects in which it had formerly participated, and the projects in which it could participate in the future, to be incorporated into the reconstruction project according to its priorities.

The European Common Market also has a part in financing a number of projects in Lebanon, especially in electrification, since to date it has contributed \$50 million in loans. Claude Chasson [transliterated], the Common Market's executive commissioner, has expressed his willingness to finance more Lebanese projects.

But all the foreign financing, whether from the UN, the Common Market, or other foreign sources, is financially limited with respect to funds required for the reconstruction project. However, all that Lebanon desires from these organizations is technical expertise and international confidence, so that the IBRD financing, for example, could be a model which other Arab and foreign sources of financing could follow.

Naturally, Lebanon still wants Arab money, whether as assistance in gift form or as easy-term loans from Arab funds.

Dr Waldheim's testimonial to international confidence in the Lebanese economy and the IBRD mission's visit to Beirut coincided with information

reaching the government indicating that the first installment of Arab financial aid decreed by the Tunis summit late last year will arrive soon, heralding a start in the payment of \$2 billion, at the rate of \$400 million each year for 5 years.

In view of the Lebanese officials' confidence in this information, they are expecting the first installment's arrival any day. Perhaps the Lebanese government will have received it before publication of this issue of AL-HAMADITH.

In spite of official reticence, Iraq's contribution might be the start of the arrival of Arab money in Lebanon, in implementation of a previous promise made by Iraqi President Saddam Husayn to Prime Minister Dr Salim al-Huss at the end of the Tunis summit.

But how will the \$2 billion decided on by the Tunis summit to aid Lebanon be distributed?

At first, it was decided to rely on the usual method followed before in providing Arab aid to other countries, which calls for the following percentages: Saudi Arabia, 28.58 percent; Kuwait, 15.71 percent; Libya, 15.71 percent; Iraq, 14.66 percent; United Arab Emirates, 11.63 percent; Algeria, 7.14 percent; and Qatar, 6.57 percent.

According to these percentages, the Saudi contribution would be \$571.6 million at the rate of 114.32 million per year; Kuwait, \$314.2 million at the rate of \$62.84 million per year; the same for Libya; Iraq, \$293.2 million at the rate of \$58.64 million per year; the United Arab Emirates, \$232.6 million at the rate of \$46.52 million per year; Algeria, \$142.8 million at the rate of \$28.56 million per year; then Qatar, \$131.4 million at the rate of \$26.38 million per year.

But a reduction in the number of contributing states would naturally lead to a reexamination of this method.

Algeria has excused itself from contributing reconstruction aid to Lebanon on the pretext that its financial situation does not permit it, especially since it is submerged in foreign debts. The other contributing countries have promised to divide Algeria's share and pay it to Lebanon, so that the assistance will not be less than the \$2 billion decided upon.

As for Libya, it did not attend the Tunis summit, but Arab League Secretary General al-Shadhili al-Qalibi contacted Libyan officials about the need for Libya to contribute to Arab aid to Lebanon. The results were encouraging, since they led to Arab League emissary Hamadi al-Sayyid's trip to Tripoli, from whence he returned optimistic.

However, the Lebanese government has not received any official word from the Libyan government expressing their willingness to contribute to Lebanon's reconstruction

While in this respect the Lebanese are repeating the proverb "Don't talk about beans until they are in the scale," and while Libyan aid is still far from the "Lebanese scale," it can be said, as of the writing of these lines last week, that five states have promised to help Lebanon financially. The \$2 billion will be distributed as follows: Saudi Arabia, 36 percent, its share being \$720 million at the rate of \$144 million each year; Kuwait, 21 percent, or \$420 million at the rate of \$84 million each year; Iraq, 20 percent, or \$400 million at the rate of \$80 million per year; the United Arab Emirates, 15 percent, or \$300 million at the rate of \$60 million each year; and Qatra, 8 percent, or \$160 million at the rate of \$32 million each year.

Here a question arises--will Lebanon be able to spend this money?

President of the Development and Reconstruction Council Dr Muhammad 'Atallah says that the Lebanese reconstruction workshop is awaiting security and political stability, and that should this be achieved there will be no spending problem, because the plan drawn up for the reconstruction project is a well-thought-out one, with expenditures balanced between the public and private sectors, as well as between dollar funds, which will be spent on internal necessities, especially manpower wages and other expenses. This will reduce the effects of inflation as much as possible.

In case security disturbances continue, adds Dr 'Atallah, there will be priorities for the projects which must be implemented. The Development and Reconstruction Council has drawn up a schedule for these projects, with the approval of the ministries concerned, providing for adopting the necessary measures for implementing the most important projects--water, electricity, roads, Beirut Port, the airport, telecommunications, and waste disposal, not to mention the housing project, which must be financed with Arab aid.

Obviously, continuing price inflation is in turn a factor putting pressure on expediting the implementation of the projects.

The costs of the reconstruction project, which were estimated in 1977 prices at 22 billion pounds (about \$7 billion) are now more than 30 billion. The reasons for the increase are not just rising prices, but also new requirements which have overtaken these projects. For example, the reconstruction project's rehabilitation and repair of the road network was to cost 465 million pounds. This figure has doubled in today's prices, as a result of the roads' deterioration and increased potholes, especially after the winter's effect on the roads.

In his capacity as president of the Development and Reconstruction Council, Dr Muhammad 'Atallah, whose nickname is "Building Teacher," is at present concerned with bringing together these efforts and coordinating them, so that Lebanon can profit from them to the utmost. They must not be allowed to be dispersed, with a large portion of them going to waste.

Dr 'Atallah says, "Lebanon has drawn up a reconstruction project and has studied it with Arab and international sources of finance and aid, and it has thus determined what it wants. The next step must be making the implementation of this project an obligation for these sources, each according to the type of aid which it will give to Lebanon--financial or technical."

As for expenses this year, 1980, especially since it is the first year of the 5-year Arab assistance plan decided on by the Tunis summit as part of a long-term reconstruction, they will be determined according to the rise or fall of the security barometer. But the insistence of officials, led by Ilyas Sarkis and Salim al-Huss, on implementing the urgent projects even under conditions of security disturbances, means that expenditures might reach 1 billion pounds. If security and political circumstances were suitable, the experts would expect expenditures to reach \$1 billion.

8559

CSO: 4802

SECURITY DISTURBANCES SEEN REASON FOR AIRPORT FUEL PROBLEMS

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 28 Mar 80 pp 45-46

[Article by 'Adnan Karimah: "Foreign Airplanes (Using Beirut Airport) Carry More Fuel and Less Passengers and Luggage"]

[Text] For some time, travellers to and from Lebanon, especially citizens working in petroleum countries, have noticed an airline reservation crisis, especially during the regular travel season.

The crisis is plain to see, and is reflected in the daily crowds at airline company offices. Naturally, tourist and travel agencies--the recognized, regular intermediary organizations--have benefitted from it, since their activity has increased. This crisis has even created a black market and exceptional middlemen, who are paid a definite commission for each service they perform for travelling clients, in addition to the price of the ticket. The person in need is usually hard-pressed, and is willing to pay the price demanded in return for facilitation of his trip, because each delay might cost him many times what he pays.

No doubt there are many reasons for this crisis, the most important being the fuel problem. An airplane's capacity is limited, and when the amount of fuel it carries is increased, this must be accompanied by a decrease in the number of passengers and the weight of baggage it will take. Most Arab airline companies, especially those of the petroleum countries, provide their planes going to Beirut with additional quantities of fuel, enough for a round trip.

The reason for this is the fuel shortage at Beirut International Airport, resulting from the unstable security situation and the cutting of the coastal road between Tripoli, the location of the petroleum refineries, and the capital city of Beirut, where the airport is situated. In addition, the petroleum distribution companies do not dare to store large quantities of imported aviation fuel in the al-Dawrah storage tanks in the eastern part of Beirut, fearing that they would be exposed to fire and explosion, as happened in 1978 because of security disturbances.

Figures are the best way to give a true picture of the aviation fuel problem. Before going into them, we should refer to the activity at Beirut International Airport, which received its first plane in 1950, and which is a stop for the major world airline companies and an important link between East and West.

In 1974, a year of economic boom before the Lebanese war, there were 40 scheduled airline companies using Beirut Airport. But the 2-year war (1975-76) affected conditions at the airport, limited its activity, inflicted great losses on it, and imposed a total shutdown for 6 months.

In 1977, 30 scheduled airline companies resumed their activities at Beirut Airport, which continue to this day. There are 10 companies which have not yet resumed their activity, the most important being Pan Am, Japanese Airlines, Air India, Pakistani International Airlines, Gulf Air, Sudan Airlines, and Luftansa.

According to official statistics, there were 44,400 aircraft landings and take-offs in 1974, and 2.278 million arriving and departing passengers. In 1979, which is considered the best of the Lebanese war years, activity was 65 percent of that of 1974.

But the aircraft fueling activity at Beirut Airport is much less than that, for it dropped from 3,006,000 barrels in 1974 to 935,000 barrels in 1979, i.e. to about one-third.

An increase has been observed in the national airlines' (Middle East Airlines and Trans-Mediterranean Airlines) reliance on Beirut Airport for fuel supplies, from 44 percent in 1974 to 80 percent in 1979, as opposed to a drop on the part of foreign companies from 56 percent to 20 percent. This indicates that foreign planes are trying to obtain most of their fuel needs from other Middle East airports, according to their flight plan.

To give a clearer idea, let us examine some fuel supply figures for the most important foreign companies using Beirut Airport, for the years 1974-79. Air France's purchases dropped from 133,000 to 55,000 barrels; British Air's purchases dropped from 219,000 to 14,000 barrels; Swissair's purchases dropped from 69,000 to 6,000 barrels; Alitalia's purchases dropped from 61,000 to 3,000 barrels, Czechoslovak Airlines's purchases dropped from 24,000 to 11,000 barrels, and Aeroflot's purchases dropped from 40,000 to 5,000 barrels.

Even Arab aviation registered a noticeable drop in their fuelling rate at Beirut Airport, which confirms that additional fuel from the country of origin or another country is displacing passenger and baggage weight. For example, Iraqi Airline's purchases of aviation fuel from the Lebanese airport dropped from 32,000 to 3,000 barrels; Saudia's purchases dropped from 45,000 to 18,000 barrels; and the Egyptian Airlines' purchases in 1979 were only 1,000 barrels above the 56,000 barrels purchased in 1974.

The marketing of aviation fuel is one of the commercial factors with which foreign oil companies are concerned. When these companies left Lebanon in 1976 because of the security disturbances, they assigned their property and shares to the Lebanese; these companies include America's Mobil Oil and British Shell. They felt it necessary to keep fuel services at Beirut Airport under their supervision, directly or indirectly, in order to make sure that internationally accepted technical specifications are followed, provided that in turn they got a share of the profits.

These companies' concern for this matter does not stop merely with the profits they were getting, which are almost insignificant compared to their huge profits from foreign operations. Instead, their concern is due to Beirut Airport's being a stop for foreign airline companies who had contracted with the oil companies to be supplied with fuel at all airports. Therefore, ensuring the service they require at the Lebanese airport is an integral part of fulfilling their world services.

Before the 5-year war, Lebanon produced about 60 percent of the aviation fuel consumed at Beirut Airport, and the remaining 40 percent was imported. But after the drop in consumption during the war, the percentage of fuel provided by local production rose to 80 percent, as opposed to 20 percent imports. Contributing to the drop in imports was the terrible fire which consumed the company-owned aviation fuel tanks in eastern Beirut, because of violent security disturbances in 1978. This made the companies avoid storing large quantities out of fear of a similar fire, God forbid.

In view of the severing of the coastal road between the Tripoli refineries to the north and Beirut, as a result of the break in relations between the Zagharta front led by Former President Sulayman Franjiyah and the Lebanese Front because of a Phalangist-Zaghartist dispute, fuel tank trucks were forced to go through Syria and then come to Beirut Airport through the mountains. Inasmuch as the tank trucks the companies already had were originally equipped to travel on level roads, they were unable to go up the mountains. For this reason, these companies approved the purchase of about 22 new tank trucks worth about 8 million Lebanese pounds, which are now transporting about 400,000 liters of aviation fuel a day from the Tripoli refineries to Beirut Airport via Syria.

Company sources say that they want to adopt all the necessary, prompt measures to make up for the fuel shortage afflicting the Lebanese airport, and that in addition they are willing to transport locally-produced aviation fuel even under conditions of security disturbances as well as import the required amounts and assume the dangers of storing it, in spite of the rise in its price.

But why are these companies undertaking this daring venture?

Leaving aside national jealousy, the profit element is no doubt these companies' incentive to assume the dangers of domestic transport, storage and importing, for the more they sell the more profits they get.

In turn, aviation fuel prices in Lebanon are a factor encouraging the foreign airline companies to return to Beirut Airport to fuel their planes. The average price per gallon (3.78 liters) is about 3.5 pounds, as opposed to 5.12 pounds at Athens Airport.

Furthermore, the price of locally-produced aviation fuel is about 3 pounds per gallon for national aviation companies (Middle East Airlines and Trans-Mediterranean Airlines), and they buy three-quarters of the local production. The other quarter is sold to foreign airlines at 3.25 pounds per gallon.

Therefore, the problem is one of security. In case the security situation improves and regular tank truck traffic is ensured between the refineries and Beirut Airport, that will help solve the aviation fuel shortage problem. Security improvement in itself will lead to revitalizing aviation activity and encouraging the various companies to resume their flights to Lebanon, as well as encouraging presently operating companies to increase their flights as soon as the airport can once again operate and receive planes by night as well as by day, thereby restoring activity to its pre-war, 24-hour-a-day level.

Finally, it must be pointed out that economists are looking to the politicians' efforts in the channels of national accord, by which they hope security will be restored to the Lebanese and the airport road will become open and safe even for tankers coming from the northern coast, especially since air transport constitutes a major element in Lebanese economic and social development.

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CSO: 4802

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

KUWAITI PAPER REPORTS ON THE AFTERMATH OF ISMA'IL OUSTER IN ADEN

LD280857 Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 24 Apr 80 p 13

[AL-SIYASAH correspondent report: 'Mut'i' Is Number Two and 'Abd al-Wali Is Number Three']

[Excerpts] Aden—"You will not see any tanks in the streets or be able to photograph arms at the entrance to the party Central Committee headquarters in Al-Tawahi." These were the remarks of my escort from the Foreign Ministry upon my arrival in Aden yesterday. My escort was commenting on reports and speculations by foreign news agencies that spoke of a power struggle which brought recalled stories of what usually happens in most other countries, stories of bloodshed and armed tension that accompany struggle for power.

My escort added: If Comrade 'Abd al-Pattah Isma'il's health conditions permits you and other journalists might be able to meet with the party chairman. (Incidentally, AL-SIYASAH was the first Arab or international paper to enter Aden following the party reorganization that took place last week which U.S. news agencies described as a bloodless coup).

After a pause, my escort from the Foreign Ministry added jokingly: "Don't forget to ask him ['Abd al-Pattah Isma'il] about the way he will come back to the post of head of state with Soviet military support as has happened in Afghanistan." The escort was referring to speculations abroad that Isma'il was ousted from his post as part of a political step aimed at containing Soviet presence and, therefore, Moscow would act the same way as it acted in Afghanistan, and would bring Isma'il back to power by military force.

Up to the afternoon of last Wednesday it was known here in Aden that the party Central Committee session which began last Sunday would end tonight so as to give the Supreme People's Council the opportunity to meet on Saturday in order to complete the constitutional procedures and approve 'Ali Nasir Muhammad's assumption of office as chairman of the Presidium.

Just as the resignation of former chairman 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il and 'Ali Nasir Muhammad's assumption of the chairmanship came in accordance with the system of majority voting (although Isma'il was absent from the voting session on Sunday), the Supreme People's Council meeting on Saturday is regarded as the complementary constitutional step, the final results of the discussion of the three issues by the party Central Committee during the past 4 days will be put before the Supreme People's Council.

The first issue, which took the Central Committee's time during the first 2 days, was the question of 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il's resignation and 'Ali Nasir Muhammad's assumption of the chairmanship of the Presidium in addition to the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers. The creation of the post of party chairman and its assignment to Isma'il was a gesture of appreciation for his party role and his international political stature as well as for his struggle within the Yemeni revolution since 20 years.

The second issue which took much of the Central Committee's time was the "economic working paper" which was prepared by two committees that were set up early this year with the aim of reviewing and evaluating the entire economic experiment in the industrial, agricultural and fisheries fields.

This paper was put to the Central Committee with the aim of restructuring the second 5-year plan which began early this year.

The third issue which the party Central Committee discussed was the "Yemeni question" in general, that is the question of unity between the two parts of Yemen and studying the possibilities of stepping up unity meetings between the two parts and speeding up unity measures on the basis of the resolutions of the Kuwait conference which brought together Chairman 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il and President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih.

During the past 10 years the party Politburo has been shaped in the following order: 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, Muhammad Salih Muti', 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abd al-Wali followed by the rest of the well-known leading figures. Therefore, for those who know the importance of the Politburo structure they would realize that the order of political responsibility in Aden would be as follows:

Chairman 'Ali Muhammad Nasir followed by Muhammad Salih Muti' and then 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abd al-Wali. As for Defense Minister 'Ali Antar al-Bishi, who according to analysts was recently thought to be number two in the state, he is officially regarded, according to the Politburo structure, as a "Politburo candidate member."

Therefore, the talk about 'Antar being the next man to assume power in the future is organizationally impossible unless this is done by bidding on a tank --something which the party in Democratic Yemen seems to have practically done away with and for which it has removed any justification.

CSO: 4802

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

BRIEFS

SOVIET MILITARY MOVES--According to a South Yemen opposition party, the USSR has deployed surface-to-surface missiles (probably SCUD missiles) near the South Yemen frontier with North Yemen; these missiles are said to be operated by Soviet troops. Moreover, two squadrons of MiG-25s, with Soviet pilots, are said to have arrived in South Yemen. An airlift recently established between South Yemen and Ethiopia is said to enable the transport of T-72 tanks and other military materiel to South Yemen. [Text] [Paris DEFENSE INTERARMEES in French Apr 80 p 8]

CSO: 4800

PAPER URGES IRAN TO STABILIZE TIES WITH NEIGHBORS

LD050919 Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 29 Apr 80 p 1

[Editorial: "What Is Required of Iran"]

[Text] Had the U.S. military operation in Iran succeeded, it would have undoubtedly changed completely the situation not only in Iran, in the Iranian-U.S. situation and even in the area as a whole but also on the world level. Indeed it could have been the spark that ignited a world war. But the failure of the operation has cast a different shadow on events.

We can say that the hostage question is a humanitarian one, but we can only describe the U.S. operation as an act of aggression in violation of international law regardless of its justifications.

We must realize and the Iranians too must realize that the area belongs to us all; it will not clam down or ward off the covetous ones as long as we create a climate encouraging those who feel covetous toward us and our enemies, regardless of their origins.

Because of the ties of Islam and neighborhood that link us to Iran and of the common interests emanating from these ties, the security and stability of this Islamic country is of great concern to us.

When the Iranian Revolution was at its peak, it enjoyed support—directly or indirectly—from most of the Arab and Islamic countries for the main reason that this revolution was advocating Islam, solidarity with just causes and cooperation with the Arab nation as an Islamic nation and, in the eyes of the Iranian leader, its just cause must be supported.

When the world, and particularly the Islamic and Arab countries, were showing sympathy with Iran because of the failed U.S. military operation early this week, Tehran, for no justifiable or logical reason, came out with an "official" report about a military coup in Iraq which eventually turned out to be no more than an April fool's joke.

Such a report certainly dissipates Arab and Islamic sympathy with Iran and, in the present circumstance, will have adverse effect, especially at a time when hostile forces are gathering against this nation, against the Gulf area in particular and against Iran itself.

It is therefore in Iran's interest as well as in the interest of the countries of the region that ties of amity and cooperation should prevail and be placed above peripheral differences so that these countries will stand as one power in the face of aggression.

Therefore, the Iranian leaders must review their country's foreign relations with the neighboring countries in particular and with the Arab and Islamic countries in general. We believe that this can be achieved only by settling the internal situation, which is disturbed by internal conflicts and opposed trends which, if allowed to worsen, will only weaken Iran and open the door to any hostile force, something which we do not wish for sisterly Islamic Iran.

CSO: 4802

FINANCE MINISTER ON SAUDI FINANCIAL POLICY, WORLD ECONOMY

LD081531 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 3-9 May 80 pp 34-36

[Interview with Saudi Finance and National Economy Minister Shaykh Muhammad Aba al-Khayl by Wafiq Ramadan presumably in Riyadh--date not given]

[Excerpts] In an exclusive interview tih AL-MAJALLAH Saudi Finance and National Economy Minister Shaykh Muhammad Aba al-Khayl spoke about the new budget. He said: "Since this is the first year of the third 5-year plan it will have the principal features of the previous plan or rather it will be a reflection of it. Naturally, there is no line or barrier separating one plan from another since everything comes as a result on gradual progress of work, the continuation of projects and the addition of new parts to previous projects. Therefore, it cannot be imagined that the next 5 years will be a separate unit."

The minister continued: "The kingdom's development programs are unlike development programs in the advanced countries or the less advanced countries with smaller resources because they are comprehensive and expansive. Therefore, as I said, the new budget will be the beginning of the next plan and will complement the previous 5-year plan."

I asked the Saudi minister: According to the IMF figures Saudi deposits since early 1979 reached \$57 billion most of which (75 percent) are in U.S. dollars. Do you not consider this risky in view of the constant fluctuation of the dollar rate?

Shaykh Aba al-Khayl: "The term deposit has a specific meaning. When you hear about the kingdom's reserves or free currency assets you must not think of the government only because the statistics published or cited by international resources, including the IMF, do not speak about the government but about the Saudi Arabian Kingdom and, therefore, include the assets of banks, the private sector, and government and nongovernment bodies. These assets rise and fall according to the rise and fall of resources and to the variation in government and nongovernment expenditure. Foreign currencies differ according to the import needs, particularly the private sector imports."

He added: "The kingdom's investments abroad are the same as they were before and there has been no change in them. They reflect the financial situation currently prevailing in the world. We are trying to exploit this surplus as may be necessary, continuously and in a suitable manner.

"Of course, there are certain risks, including the rise and fall of currency rates. There are risks faced by the small or big investor as well as by governments or individuals. The greater the improvement in investment policy the less are the financial risks. Indeed there will be higher returns. There are also two other factors, first the return and, second, the security which are on the mind of any investor be he an individual or a government.

[Question] What is the kingdom's foreign investment policy?

Shaykh Muhammad Aba al-Khayl replied: "The kingdom's foreign investment policy is, as it has always been, only short-term and middle-term. It is seeking to diversify its investments so as to face the factors and risks I have just mentioned.

[Question] What about the kingdom's petroleum policy? Will you maintain the present production of 9.5 million barrels per day?

Shaykh Aba al-Khayl: "This question must be put to the petroleum minister. However, the kingdom is trying to reconcile its interests with the interests of world economy and of OPEC countries. The kingdom adopts its stance in the light of all these considerations and its decisions are taken with a view to achieving greatest harmony possible between these three considerations."

[Question] Will there be anything new in the matter of oil prices within OPEC?

Minister Aba al-Khayl replied: "I do not think that there is anything new. Indeed a drop in demand for oil is expected because of the energy conservation policy and of the period of economic recession in the industrial states. It is expected that agreement will once again be reached on unifying oil prices."

[Question] In the light of the U.S. stand on the question of Iranian deposits in the U.S. banks, is not the kingdom afraid of facing similar conditions with the United States in the event of a new Arab-Israeli war breaking out, for example, in which case the kingdom might be forced to cut off oil supplies.

The Saudi minister of finance and national economy replied: "That financial or nonfinancial assets should be faced with unexpected eventualities in any part of the world is a possibility. We live in this world and are affected by all that happens in it. To have to operate under these circumstances is something natural and logical. There is no doubt that political conflicts

affect the economic situation. Every time there is a world or regional crisis that naturally affects even short-term interests and because of the world is becoming more compact as a result of speedy communications and transport the effects of a crisis are felt faster."

"We do not think that international relations will reach such a grave situation or will collapse so that confidence might be lost completely or that alarm and anxiety must develop into real economic collapse. We do not think that such a thing will happen except in the event of a world war. Even such a war as that seems remote in view of the tremendous mutual losses and the balance of terror. For our part, we are developing and improving our relations with others so as to maintain stability and therefore lessen the possibilities of danger."

He added: "The kingdom is currently concentrating on internal development. We consider this a historic opportunity in which we might achieve the maximum we can internally.

Consequently, we are anxious for the maintenance of world stability so that we can carry on with internal development effectively and rapidly. On the other hand, financial investments overseas are not an end in themselves. Our objective is here, inside the country. The aim is to enhance our ability to assimilate and increase development programs and economic activities so as to absorb every rial or dollar that we receive from abroad. Therefore, as I said, all our investments abroad are short-term or middle-term because our long-term objective is inside the country."

[Question] Are you contemplating taking the kingdom's deposits outside the dollar?

Shaykh Aba al-Khayl replied: "Why should we leave the dollar framework? The dollar so far represents 70 percent of the world credit system and more than 50 percent of the world trade is carried on in dollar. Banks' and individuals' assets, including those in the United States, Europe and the Far East, are mostly held in dollars. The German mark does not represent more than 10 percent of the world assets. The same thing applies to Japanese yen, the Swiss franc and the pound sterling. This is a reality that imposes itself and this is the world in which we live."

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

RECONSTRUCTION OF HIJAZ RAILWAY--Jeddah, 23 Apr--Work on a 25-kilometer section of the old and famed Hejaz Railway, linking Manzil and al-Hasa in central Jordan has started. Part of a one billion dollar plan, it envisages reconstruction of the entire line that once linked Damascus, Amman and Medina. The work is expected to be completed early next year. The old Hejaz Railway was built in 1908 by Turkey to provide Muslim Pilgrims with convenient transport from Damascus to the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina. The line was partly destroyed during World War I and attempts to restore it did not make any headway until 1964, when a stretch of track was successfully laid from Ma'an in Jordan to the Saudi border. Reconstruction of the entire railway what would link ultimately with the European railway system, under a scheme currently projected by Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia, will not only benefit contemporary pilgrims, but is also expected to enhance Jordan's position as an important middle eastern transit point for goods shipped to and from the Arabian peninsula. --PFI [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 24 Apr 80 p 8]

CSO: 4820

SYRIAN VIEWS ON SOLUTION IN LEBANON EXPLORED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 9 Mar 80 pp 14-15

[Text] Lebanese-Syrian detente is the key to a Lebanese internal settlement and a Lebanese-Palestinian understanding. This has been underlined by Lebanese events and the repeated efforts by [President] Sarkis to achieve a reconciliation. However, acceptance of this principle by Lebanese authorities in the persons of President Elias Sarkis and Prime Minister Salim al-Huss is not sufficient by itself to creating detente. There is virtually no dialogue among the Lebanese parties. [And, if there is], its language is not understandable. Furthermore, the deteriorating security situation pushes detente into a mine field. If, reaching an understanding with Damascus is basic, Israel has an effective role to play in the situation, but from a hostile point of view.

From a practical point of view, Syria seems to be the party concerned [most] with the realization of detente. It has its conditions and demands, and it constitutes the only [effective] military power within the Arab Deterrent Forces. How, then, does Syria view Lebanon and how does it see the present stage of the Lebanese crisis in the light of new developments in the area and the Middle East crisis? The answer to this question can be deduced from looking at the problems facing detente and at positive and sound solution for Lebanese-Syrian relations.

In this connection, one must take note of the initiative by the National Movement which took into primary account the Syrian role in the confrontation with Israel and what it entails in terms of a special relationship between Syria and Lebanon. This initiative is two-fold. First, emphasis was placed on a democratic Lebanese solution based upon a dialogue and the avoidance of a security blow-up. Secondly, the Lebanese problem was viewed in its entirety from the perspective of the Arab situation, especially the Arab-Zionist conflict, following the withdrawal of Egypt from the confrontation.

Sources of the National Movement sum up Syrian views on the Lebanese crisis as follows: 1. Syria considers itself alone and militarily targeted. It, therefore, sees Lebanon as either with Syria or as an extension of the enemy's borders. Syria can not deal with Lebanon as a neutral country.

She entered Lebanon on the advice and with the blessings of the Lebanese Front. President Sarkis provided the legal cover for this entry. Later, the Lebanese Front declared that the Syrians were an army of occupation. The Lebanese regime adopted this view. At least, President Sarkis did not say something to the opposite. Then, the time came when Syria decided to redeploy its troops for purposes related to its confrontation with Israel and to exert pressure on the Lebanese domestic front to revive the political situation. The Lebanese answer was to fill the security vacuum by army units as if things were that simple. They were not that simple, otherwise, there would have been a withdrawal ceremony at the Ba'abda Presidential Palace or at al-Yarzih.

Syria would not allow it to appear on its record that when it entered Lebanon, it prevented resolution of the problem in favor of the National Movement, and that, after four years of Syrian presence, the balance of power is in favor of the Lebanese Front. The Lebanese government dealt with the Syrian [redployment] from one angle. It played dumb and it is still dealing with Syria by playing dumb. According to sources of the National Movement, if the Syrians were after a security treaty with Lebanon, they would have signed on blank paper with former president Sulayman Franjiyyah or President Elias Sarkis at the start of his administration. Sarkis cannot forget Syrian favors extended during the presidential election. Since when have written agreements determined good relations among nations? There is a friendship treaty between the Soviet Union and Iraq, but mutual relations are still not good enough. Syria and the Soviet Union never signed a friendship treaty, but their relations are better than good.

2. Syria has a historical role in Lebanon. Such a role was not always asked for by Muslims. Quite often it was requested by the Maronites. Bishara al-Khuri demanded this role against Emile Edde. Camille Sham'un demanded it against Bishara al-Khuri. Hamid Franjiyyah demanded it against Camille Sham'un. Even President Fuad Shihab found it necessary to have an agreement pledging upon his military honor to the late President Nasser that "he would never allow the enemies of Arab Unity to operate in Lebanon." During the October war of 1973, a Sunni Muslim stood up in the Council of Ministers, and said that he could not, as a Lebanese patriot, offer military facilities to the Syrians, and, thus, expose Lebanese installations to attack. President Franjiyyah then pounded on the table and said: "Sister Syria is in a state of war, and I will offer her facilities regardless of consequences."

3. Syria demands that Lebanon be an Arab country. How can Lebanon be an Arab country? During his meetings with Syrian officials when he was in power, President Franjiyyah once objected to the phrase "Arab Lebanon," saying that "a thing can only be described by what it is." Syria wants Lebanon to be Arab in its political posture, i.e., to be against Camp David and to be part of the Arab community in defense of Palestinian rights. On this basis, Syria is not asking for a military presence as some think. All it is asking for is a Lebanese national government that maintains a clear

political posture on commitments to Lebanese-Palestinian relations and Lebanese Arab relations. Syria does not want a government that constitutes an extension of the Zionist State and that would surround Syria and widen border areas with the enemy.

4. Syria believes that the Lebanese authorities are diluting the process of national detente through a balanced solution that would divide the Lebanese people into supporters and opponents, and restore the political democratic discord to the country.

5. As far as Syria and as far as we in the National Movement are concerned, it has been demonstrated that an army organized along previous lines cannot serve in the proper manner. Syrian questions about reorganization of the army are many. One is why was not a supreme council called into session to build the army on a balanced foundation that would relegate decision-making to the political authority. Only then would the Lebanese army win the loyalty, admiration and respect of the Lebanese people. Why are they turning the army into a militia? Whether it is a small or a large militia, it is going to miss its role. First responsibility for this lies with the civilian authorities.

Finally, the gap between the reconciliation projects is widening, but the initiative by the Lebanese regime remains the only reliable common denominator. In view of adherence by the opposite parties to their conditions and concepts, "the common fear over a death-stricken country remains the only incentive to universal honesty that would save Lebanon the common hypocrisy which can lead to a renewal of hostilities whenever world powers wish the Lebanese wound to bleed." Thus said a Lebanese political leader who is actively engaged in finding a solution to the crisis--a solution may take long or forever.

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